Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

144. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 1, 1990, 3–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• START

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Baker
• Bartholomew
• Burt
• Wolfowitz
• Graves
• Lehman
• Ross
• Kanter
• MacEachin
• Timbie (notetaker)
• Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
• Karpov
• Akhromeyev
• Bessmyrtnykh

Baker: I can confirm that we can accept 1100 as the mobile ICBM warhead limit. This should conclude the text of the joint statement on START. Burt: Anything that we agree upon this afternoon we will put in as well.

Shevardnadze: That thing has been accepted without any authorization from me. But I raise no objection here.

Baker: We will conclude that the START statement is agreed. In addition to the joint statement on future negotiations, there are three other issues that should be addressed in keeping with the guidance from Presidents.

Shevardnadze: The basic elements are regarded as agreed.

Baker: Most all of the major issues are resolved, but there is a difference of opinion on three major issues. Hopefully we can come to some resolution on flight testing of heavy ICBMs, Backfire, and non-circumvention. I have discussed these with the US delegation and with the President.² His instructions are to see if we can conclude these three issues this afternoon.

Shevardnadze: That is a good directive.

Baker: I propose we begin with heavy ICBMs. Our original position was a ban on production, testing, and modernization. In an effort to solve this problem we have demonstrated quite a bit of flexibility. We have come off the prohibition on modernization, even though there is some hesitancy on our side on accepting the modernization now underway. In Moscow I suggested a limit of 2 flight tests per year. Amb. Bartholomew has indicated to Mr. Karpov that we would be willing to compromise on 7 flight tests over a 3-year period.

This issue for us is more of a political issue. We have received, and will receive, certain criticisms on this issue, and we will see resistance to ratification as a consequence. We are asking you for something we can point to in the ratification debate to show we are serious about limiting the further development of heavy ICBMs. We recognize there will be a reference in the joint statement on future negotiations having to do with heavy ICBMs. Of course we will be pointing to that. And we recognize the prohibition against development of new types of heavy ICBMs. At the same time the line between modernization and development of an entirely new missile is somewhat hazy. So having come off of our proposal for a ban on production and modernization and flight testing, we don’t think we are putting an unreasonable request in saying give us something to point to on testing. If 2 per year is too restrictive, if 7 over 3 years is too restrictive, what isn’t too restrictive?

Shevardnadze: Ever since the meeting in Reykjavik as we proceed to settling a number of issues, including heavy ICBMs, others arise. Until now the issue of heavy ICBMs was settled. We agreed to cut the number by 50%. Therefore I view as not legitimate a demand to impose constraints on testing of heavy ICBMs, to cut tests to a certain level, because in the context of the current START agreement we have settled the main issues with regard to heavy missiles. As to further constraints, this can be a subject for discussion in follow-on talks. Such constraints should equally apply to other types of strategic offensive arms. If you recall, during the instructions to ministers³ my president was quite frank on follow-on talks as the place to raise in some way heavy missiles. Therefore my impression is that what is reflected in our document on the START joint statement is the final resolution of this issue. Or are we talking different languages?

Karpov: This text is the product of a joint effort. There were US proposals, and Soviet proposals. All are reflected in the joint statement.

Baker: We are talking about two different things. One thing is the joint statement on future negotiations. There we ask that you agree to talk about dealing further with heavy ICBMs in the future. That will give us something to point to in ratification. In addition, in my view we really need to be able to show some testing limits in the current START agreement. What I am asking you to do is to understand our political problem. Tell me a figure within which you will be comfortable. Certainly a million tests a year would be comfortable.

Shevardnadze: No.

Baker: I can see we are not going to make much progress on this issue.

Shevardnadze: What matters in not the number, basically it is our view that all questions related to heavy missiles have been settled. They are subjects for follow-on negotiations. Why is it that we should limit flight tests of heavy missiles while leaving outside of our purview other strategic offensive arms? I am quite sure we may point to other types that need constraint as well. There would be no end.

Baker: This is the only place in the treaty where there is a ban on a new type of weapon. Therefore a limit on testing would be at the very least a confidence building measure.

Shevardnadze: We have agreed not to develop new types.

Akhromeyev: Now this issue has been in the center of discussion for quite some time. We did a lot to accommodate the US position. We have agreed to no new types, but we need to maintain the combat readiness of existing types. This issue has been continuously under discussion, and we have done a lot to accommodate the US position. Some time in the past the Foreign Minister and I were involved in the acceptance of the heavy cut, and we have been subjected to criticism ever since.

Shevardnadze: That is why Marshal Akhromeyev now wears civilian clothes.

Frankly speaking, Mr. Secretary, when this issue was raised in Moscow we were surprised. We thought everything was settled.

Baker: I have never taken that position. We see this as primarily a political problem for us. Other issues present political problems for you. If there is no give here, we ought to go on. We have got three issues left. Let’s talk about Backfire.

Bartholomew: Let me begin where we are agreed:

1. The Soviet Union will give us a politically binding declaration.

2. This declaration will include a commitment not to give Backfire the capability to operate at intercontinental ranges in any manner, including in-flight refueling.

3. There will be a number that the Soviet Union will not exceed.

We differ on two points:

1. We propose a limit on all Backfire at 400. The Soviet Union is proposing to give a limit of 400, but only on air force Backfire and not Naval Aviation Backfire. We believe this means we will have no overall limit on the number of Backfire at all, and that the Soviet Union can change the assignment of Backfire aircraft from the air force to Naval Aviation at will, further undermining the number. We would face criticism that we have no assurance at all regarding the number of Backfire with intercontinental potential against the US.

2. We propose that all Backfire in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone be included in CFE, including land-based naval Backfire. The Soviet Union has rejected this point.

How to resolve these two differences? By more than one and one-half American concessions. On the number, as we proposed last night to Mr. Karpov, the Soviet Union would undertake not to exceed a certain number of air force Backfire, and also undertake not to go beyond the current number of navy Backfire as of the end of this year. This would recognize the distinction you want to draw, but would assure us that all Backfire—air force and naval—were limited. We had proposed the air force number be 250, because we believe there are about 150 naval Backfire. 250 is more than we believe you have in the air force. This is why we proposed 400 originally, it is above the number you have.

Shevardnadze: The Foreign Ministry has another 150.

Bartholomew: We have some flexibility on 250, although not that much. On CFE, if we can reach agreement on what I have outlined on the first point of difference, we can drop the second point of difference on CFE without prejudice to your position or our position. We would continue to discuss this in CFE but not in START.

Shevardnadze: My feeling is that the issue the Secretary of State raised during his visit to Moscow is a justified concern that we share. We are prepared to issue a statement. Mr. Karpov has informed you on the content of that statement. Specifically, that the TU–22M is a medium range bomber, not part of strategic offensive arms. We will also announce it is not our intention to give any intercontinental capability to that aircraft, including through in-air refueling. That would encompass the entire number of that type of aircraft. And if we treat this aircraft in the way just described, it also becomes part of the subject under discussion at Vienna. As to the subject under discussion at Vienna, it’s mandate is set. I have been saying all this to indicate the main issue you voiced requiring a response concerning range capability and including in-air refueling capability. By treating this aircraft in the way I have described, we have removed the concerns.

Baker: The only difference between us is what number we are going to use. We have already crossed the bridge of dealing separately with the navy Backfire. All we ask is a freeze.

Shevardnadze: Why do you want to have a freeze on the number of Backfire if they are medium range bombers? If they are on the agenda in Vienna, why have a ceiling in START?

Bartholomew: The point is this has been a major issue in strategic arms negotiations for more than a decade in the US. This aircraft has intercontinental potential without saying what kind of aircraft it is.

Shevardnadze: But we can guarantee that to you. This aircraft has no intercontinental capability.

Bartholomew: To lay this issue to rest, we need to be able to say we have two forms of assurance with respect to intercontinental potential. We need to be able to say you will not give this aircraft intercontinental capability, and this you have done. We also need to say, because many critics will say intercontinental capability can be changed quickly, that the Soviet Union has also offered an assurance on the number. Here you have been willing to give us half of what we want—the number 400 but only for the air force. But if Secretary Baker goes before the Senate with only this they will say that is some insurance, there could be 1000 Backfire painted with the colors of the Soviet Navy. They will say you have left a major loophole. We want to be able to say the Soviet Union told us the number of air force Backfire will not exceed X, and as for the navy Backfire they have assured us they will freeze that level.

Shevardnadze: You mention that you may be entrapped. The question that we keep getting from our people concerns the number of naval aircraft. The answer we get from you is not going to calm our people. Since we are now on this very sensitive ground, this is not something we should discuss now. We should confine our effort to this statement on range and in-air refueling. We can debate the rest of the ideas in Vienna.

Akhromeyev: Amb. Bartholomew was emphatic that what the United States wants is two types of checks on the number of naval TU–22M airplanes. But at the same time you are rejecting altogether negotiations on naval forces. You mentioned difficulties you face in Congress. But what is it we could tell the Soviet people by way of explanation that while strategic forces and land forces are limited, talks on naval arms are rejected?

Baker: With no disrespect Marshal, that is a phony argument. We have been willing all along to discuss naval arms. The naval arms we won’t talk about are on carriers. What you can tell the Soviet people is the US went along with your repeated requests to deal with SLCMs in a politically binding deal. Just so we understand each other here, SLCMs are sea-launched cruise missiles, launched from the sea. We are asking you to do on Backfire what you asked us to do on SLCMs—put an overall limit on them to meet a political need, because there were concerns. We are asking nothing more of you than we have given on SLCMs, we gave you what you needed on SLCMs. We ask that you meet us half-way on Backfire. Naval aircraft is not the issue here, any more than it was when you asked us for the same thing on SLCMs. Some of you are familiar with the debate on SALT II, Backfire was a major factor in the failure of the Senate to ratify that treaty. We are asking for a number on air force Backfire and a freeze on naval Backfire.

(Meeting breaks for 30 minutes while Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze leave to address other subjects)

Shevardnadze: On the issue of a guaranteed level on Backfire, the Soviet Union has no plans to deploy more than 400 such airplanes. This number does not include the naval TU–22M airplanes. The number of naval medium bombers will be frozen as of December 31, 1990. Consequently the talks in Vienna would continue.

Baker: I have two comments. You use “deploy,” we use “possess.” Second, we need an overall limit on Backfire, just as we have for SLCMs.

Shevardnadze: We can say will not “have.”

Burt: The freeze is on the number of naval TU–22M aircraft.

Shevardnadze: Naval medium bombers.

Burt: I have a question. Under the Soviet formulation, would the number of naval TU–22M be frozen?

Akhromeyev: What we will be freezing will be the number of medium range bombers of Naval Aviation as of December 31, 1990.

Burt: So you could increase the number of TU–22M.

Akhromeyev: On account of reducing other types of medium range bombers currently operational.

Baker: We have problems with this. What we need is a political deal. We need limits on Backfire, just like you needed with SLCMs. What you have put forward here would permit a build-up of Backfire with the elimination of older models.

We are running out of time. The joint statement on future negotiations is important to you. We should make every effort to conclude it. Let us disengage, and leave these as issues remaining to be decided, and see if we can reach closure on the joint statement.

Shevardnadze: We should give it another try. Why not have a statement on range and refueling, and defer the other Backfire questions?

Baker: Let’s say we have testing of heavy ICBMs, Backfire, and non-circumvention remaining. These will need to be resolved later. Now let’s try to close the statement on future negotiations.

Shevardnadze: Take paragraph 1, and delete what you have in brackets. We can drop what you have in brackets.

Bartholomew: We should go [to] the the main issue. When that is resolved, this won’t be a problem.

Shevardnadze: On page 2 then, what is the main issue? In your language in the second section, instead of removing “incentives,” we should remove “capability.”

Bartholomew: Perhaps if I could make a suggestion. The first paragraph of the second section would be as we gave it to you. The end of this paragraph would speak of “reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, and on giving priority to highly survivable systems.”

Shevardnadze: We need a text.

Baker: There is agreement now to a new time of 6:00 for signing the final joint statements. Let us work to see if we can conclude this by 6:00. p.m.

(Bartholomew gives Shevardnaze a text,⁴ the interpreter reads aloud in Russian)

Shevardnadze: What do you mean by “measures to resolve the problem of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs as a whole?”

Burt: This is designed to get around problems the Soviet side had with earlier language that was discussed with Karpov yesterday.

Akhromeyev: There is an additional phrase—“that resolve the problem of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs as a whole.” We should instead say “that resolve the problem of strategic offensive arms and heavy missiles, including MIRVed ICBMs as a whole.” The problem to be solved is strategic offensive arms, not just heavy missiles.

We should be talking about strategic offensive arms as a whole, including heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs. We should not talk about the problem of heavy missiles but the problem of strategic offensive arms. We could talk about resolving the problem of strategic offensive arms as a whole, including heavy missiles and MIRVed missiles.

As the minister said, we should remove “capability” rather than “incentives.”

Burt: I don’t understand why we can’t just have a reference to heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs.

Akhromeyev: There are other things that concern us that are not referred to.

Bartholomew: I have a sentence: “the two sides will seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic offensive arms”—this is the whole you spoke of—“including measures that resolve the problem of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs as a whole.”

Akhromeyev: I accept your concerns, you should accept our concerns. What bothers us is other things that are left out here.

Baker: I have just talked to the White House, the signing is still on for 6:00. We need to wrap this up and get over there.

Bartholomew: If you will give us another minute Mr. Secretary, we might be able to agree on this. Let me try again: “reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic offensive arms,” or should we say “strategic delivery vehicles.”

Akhromeyev: That is what I have written.

Bartholomew: Continuing on, you have agreed to “including measures that resolve the problem of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs as a whole.”

Karpov: “including measures related to heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs as a whole.”

Baker: We don’t have any more time for this. Let’s just not have a statement of future negotiations.

Bartholomew: Mr. Secretary, if you will allow me one more try here we might be able to finish this, “including measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs as a whole.”

Akhromeyev: Type it up.

Bartholomew: (reads text) “In particular, the two sides will seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, including measures related to the problem of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs as a whole.”

Karpov: We don’t need “problem,” your proposal was “question.” And the words “as a whole” should come after “strategic delivery vehicles.”

Bartholomew: (reads text) “In particular, the two sides will seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vihicles as a whole, including measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs.

Karpov: Done.

Bartholomew: I agree. I propose one last trade: I can accept the language in the first section on “stabilizing reductions” if you can accept the word “incentives.”

Baker: Let’s get over to the White House.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, Soviet Summit Memcons, May 1990. Secret. Drafted on July 3. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary’s Conference Room.
2. No minutes were found.
3. See Document 143.
4. Not found.