142. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- START, CFE
PARTICIPANTS
- Bartholomew
- Karpov
Bartholomew: (Gives Karpov a copy of the interview Akhromeyev gave in Canada)2 What is going on? We have had enough walking back. My authorities have told me to tell you what we feel about this.
Karpov: I don’t understand. This was settled totally in Wyoming. What Akhromeyev says is not right and not our position. I will take this right to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev.
Bartholomew: You have to understand the tremendous negative effect the Washington ministerial had here, where what was done earlier was walked back. Secretary Baker was most upset, but despite that took the lead and pushed the process ahead. This was difficult for him personally and politically. Now we have not only this interview but your people are leaving open the possibility of changes to the START statement when your military come in and review it. Any backtracking now on what was done in Moscow would reopen the whole question of whether these agreements are worth the trouble.
Karpov: I understand. I said before the Washington ministerial that we whould stick to what had been agreed, that this was very important. What was done was done.
Bartholomew: Nazarkin says it would be better to wait on the work he and Burt are doing until the military can be there.
Karpov: No, we should go right ahead.
Bartholomew: I can now confirm in spades what I told you on non-circumvention—there will be no treaty if you stick to what your instructions say. This is not just a matter of ending a 50-year-old pattern [Page 780] of cooperation with the UK. This is more serious, it would confront us with a choice that is not a choice for us—breaking a major relationship with a major ally. Others would ask themselves, if we would do that to our English cousins, who wouldn’t we do it to.
Karpov: The problem here is that Nazarkin did not fully appreciate the domestic political dimensions to the problem. When people in Moscow got into it and heard it, the reaction was that this was indefensible in front of the Supreme Soviet.
Bartholomew: You know this is not a real problem. You know Great Britain will not be turned into a nuclear superpower now or in the future. We have gone further than ever before. You must decide whether to turn something not a problem into a Soviet position that will leave us no choice and no START.
Karpov: The view in Moscow is you can’t have your cake and eat it too.
Bartholomew: We are not talking about doing that. There is a thin slice that concerns our existing pattern of cooperation with the UK. This is not negotiable. I must make sure there is no confusion about our seriousness on this one.
Karpov: I understand.
Bartholomew: On Backfire, don’t play games and link this to other issues. (Karpov smiled)
Bartholomew: If you think you are offering something—no upgrade and a number that does not include naval Backfire—that would only make the problem worse. People will say naval SLCMs should be out.
Karpov: This deals with naval aircraft, and we are willing to address them in naval negotiations.
Bartholomew: Believe me, this is not the way to do it.
Karpov: We can agree that we should not exceed the ceiling on the assumption that negotiations will begin on naval forces.
Bartholomew: That won’t work either. No one will understand. You are dead wrong on this problem. If we are to argue about this, argue in CFE and not in START. If we could get the commitments on no intercontinental capability and 400 clean, including all Backfire, I am willing to recommend that we can settle for that, leaving the CFE issue to be fought in CFE. I want to be clear with you. I will recommend, I am not saying I will carry the day. You know how electric this issue is. There is no chance of a solution with naval aircraft out of the 400.
Karpov: (nods) Backfire is not an intercontinental bomber.
Bartholomew: I know that. That is not the issue. I was one of those who from the outset thought it was a medium bomber. The problem is that it has intercontinental potential. We need two assurances that [Page 781] that intercontinental potential will not be realized—no upgrade and a number.
Karpov: We can agree to no upgrade of any Backfire, and a cap on the non-naval Backfire.
Bartholomew: That doesn’t do it. We need both. It won’t work if naval Backfire are free.
On heavy ICBMs, you need to take a message to Shevardnadze. Secretary Baker has been the engine all along on START. It cost him a lot after the Washington ministerial to push and reach settlements on issues of concern to you. You now need to be responsive on the two flight tests. This would have a good political effect here politically in more ways than one. You have seen the sharp attacks on Secretary Baker, the headlines about “Baker concessions,” that focus on this point. We were on a position of no modernization, no production, no flight tests. Now we are saying you can modernize with the Mod 5 and 6, now we are not limiting production, and we propose two flight tests per year. You must do something on this. If we could do two flight tests plus a specific formula in the future negotiations statement plus a clean Backfire declaration of no upgrade and 400, that would be good for START, and good for the whole relationship as far as what comes out of the summit.
Karpov: All I can tell you is how sensitive this is. Shevardnadze and Gorbachev have told you. There isn’t any room. A lot of people are nervous that if free emigration goes forward and we stop the heavy missile program with two flight tests, people worry that the best technical people in the program will leave.
Bartholomew: Go tell these people that this can be dealt with. We have experience with stopping programs.
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, Soviet Summit Memcons, May 1990. Secret. Drafted on July 2. The meeting took place in Bartholomew’s office. It commenced as Gorbachev and Soviet delegation officials were meeting with Bush and his national security team in the Cabinet Room, prior to a State Dinner in honor of the Soviet leader, who arrived that day and departed the afternoon of June 3. The memorandum of conversation of the afternoon meeting between Bush and Gorbachev is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.↩
- Not found.↩