Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

141. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 31, 1990, 11 a.m.–12:45 p.m., 3:30–5:15 p.m., 8:30–10:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• START, CFE

PARTICIPANTS

• Bartholomew
• Burt
• Hadley
• Graves
• Lehman
• Kanter
• Woolsey
• Smith
• MacEachin
• Brooks
• Timbie (notetaker)
• Karpov
• Omelitchev
• Nazarkin
• Grinevsky
• Khromov
• Koltunov
• Roslyakov
• Masterkov
• Sokov

Karpov: Perhaps the CFE negotiators will tell us what remaining questions they have, then we can let them go. We need to address the joint statement on follow-on negotiations.

Bartholomew: I understood there were certain points in the START statement as well that you need to review. Karpov: I thought Nazarkin and Burt agreed on everything yesterday. Burt: Brooks and Masterkov discussed the START statement yesterday. Masterkov wished to discuss certain passages with the military.

Bartholomew: Continue on your list of subjects to cover. Karpov: As to the joint statement on future negotiations, we can discuss that now.

Bartholomew: Does that complete what you have to say to begin with? We can confirm that the joint statement on START as it stands is agreed, but the joint statement is not completed until we have completed our review of outstanding issues we want to include. Specifically, that means heavy ICBMs, Backfire, non-circumvention, and the mobile ICBM warhead number.

Karpov: I thought we would agree on what we have. If we agree on other issues, they can be added.

Bartholomew: I ask Grinevsky and Woolsey to meet separately. They can make sure we have a common text for the CFE joint statement. This is just a technical matter. I have no reason to doubt that the CFE statement is finished, just to check.

Karpov: I reported to my minister that we have agreed on a text.

Bartholomew: I have learned to be careful. Second, I would like to ask Grinevsky and Woolsey to make yet another effort on the outstanding issues. Now we have a tremendous concentration of political energy and political will in this city at this time, let us use it. I ask Grinevsky and Woolsey to go back at it again. I know this will not make Grinevsky and Woolsey happy. I also ask Brooks and Masterkov to leave to complete the SLCM declaration.

Karpov: I would like to turn to our offer of draft language on the TU–22M, what you call Backfire.

Bartholomew: I am in fact in a position to give a considered and authoritative response. I discussed this subject with my minister² and at a meeting at the lighest level with the President yesterday.³ Our considered view is that we cannot accept the Soviet proposal for the following reasons:

— First, the form. We believe this should be a politically binding declaration by the Soviet Union, much as we agreed to do for the Soviet Union on SLCMs.

— Second, we believe there must be a reference, as in the draft declaration we gave you, a specific reference to in-flight refueling, as well as “in any other manner,” in the section on upgrade of intercontinental capability.

— Third, we believe the 400 number of Backfire must include naval Backfire, or that number will have no meaning. That number should be stated in terms of “will not exceed 400 at any one time,” not a reference to plans.

For all these reasons, we are firmly of the belief that the US draft declaration of policy is adequate to solve our common problem. We propose that you accept the draft declaration as the solution to the Backfire problem. I am prepared to expand on the reasoning on each of these points.

Karpov: What we specifically would like to reflect is, first, TU–22M is dealt with in the context of working out a START agreement. The fact is that we have agreed that the TU–22M should be discussed in Vienna within the framework of overall limitations on aircraft. There is no question there about a special sublimit on the TU–22M. Therefore, we consider our agreement here on a ceiling on TU–22M aircraft in the context of a START agreement as a good will gesture. From that standpoint, we have drafted our proposal, along the lines of the letter Secretary Baker sent on Tacit Rainbow.

I would like to single out two issues: The USSR as a good will gesture will commit not to give the TU–22M (what you call Backfire) intercontinental capability. If you would like to give specific reference to refueling, we can discuss that. Our language—“in any manner”—covers everything. Second, since there is no question in Vienna regarding establishment of limits on those aircraft, we are prepared to identify such a number in this context. Therefore I wish you to realize that we are making a concession accommodating your position. The fact is that we are not dealing with naval armaments in Vienna. If we initiate negotiations on naval armaments, all naval aircraft will be subject to discussion. Therefore there is a shade of difference between this discussion and Vienna. If we refer to Vienna, we should stick to the Vienna mandate.

Bartholomew: I will not repeat in detail everything that I said yesterday. But I must at least touch on the main points, and put some underlinings in some of the sentences in the record of yesterday. First, set aside any comparason with Tacit Rainbow. Backfire is a 15-year-old problem of substantive and political importance. What we are talking about is reaching a practical solution so that it will not be an obstacle to the negotiation and completion and ratification of START. What we are proposing now to settle this problem is the same sort of draft declaration, outside the treaty, as we have agreed upon for SLCMs. We are asking you to do four things that we designed to meet your concern as well as ours to put this to bed quickly.

First, give us this as a politically binding Soviet declaration outside the treaty, so that we can say and believe that there has been Soviet reciprocity and evenhandedness in solving this problem, as we have shown on other problems. This is not a question of discounting the value of Soviet statements, but a question of political visibility. The form can do some work in helping us solve this problem.

Second, to take care of concerns regarding the intercontinental potential of this aircraft, we ask you to give us two forms of assurance.

— To deal with concerns about intercontinental capability, we ask you to give us a commitment you will not give it intercontinental capability through in-flight refueling or in any other manner. This needs to be specific in part because it is relevant and in part because of of its particular visibility. Since you say “in any manner” you should be able to specify refueling as well. This does not cost the USSR anything. You are not foregoing something you were doing or planning to do. This would be very useful for us here in this context. I hope I sense a receptivity on your part to a reference to in-flight refueling.

— The second form of assurance would be to declare that you will not exceed 400 Backfire at any one time. This phrase should be familiar to you. We offered it and use in in the SLCM declaration. The number 400 we designed not to require any reduction in Backfire. The number fits the reality of the number of these aircraft.

You tell me you are ready to say 400 Backfire, but must exclude naval Backfire. You say these are excluded because we are not negotiating on naval arms. By that logic, we could have agreed not to negotiate on SLCMs, they are naval arms. Indeed, we could have not negotiated on SLBMs, they are naval arms. If I tried to use your argument with my political authorities, or with Congress, that would be the answer, if they gave me time for an answer before throwing me out of the room. I really would be thrown out when I said some count because they are air force, some don’t because they are naval. I’d be told that if I can decide some are air force and count and some are naval and don’t count, there is no limt.

This is further complicated because we know that the Soviet Union is resubordinating combat aircraft from Frontal Aviation to the Soviet Navy. We know these resubordinated aircraft include light bombers and fighter bombers of the Sukhoi type, as well as fighter bombers and ground attack aircraft of the Mikoyan type. Soviet resubordination of these air units has taken place several times over the past year or two, and the total number of aircraft resubordinated is in the hundreds.

This is a vivid illustration of why we are concerned about your insistence on telling us you want to exclude land-based naval aircraft from the reductions and limitations of CFE and START. Land-based combat aircraft of exactly the same type as those in the Warsaw Pact Frontal Aviation could be excluded by the simple device of changing their subordination. At the very same time you are insisting on this position in CFE and START, you are in the process of moving large numbers, hundreds of combat aircraft into this category that you insist be excluded from the limits.

I raise this point only so you can understand why I say telling us the 400 would not cover naval Backfire gives us no credible assurance, and indeed why the general question of excluding land-based naval combat aircraft is not something that can be credibly presented as limiting land-based combat aircraft. This is not a matter of naval arms, it is a matter of whether we are going to have the assurance we need. This is part of the problem of the 400, and is also a problem in the CFE context. We can make a start by solving it in the 400 context, simply by saying that the 400 includes all TU–22M aircraft, called Backfire in the US.

Let me conclude by asking you once again to look at the draft declaration of policy which I proposed to you, and ask you to accept it. If you accept it, we both agree it would have a good impact in the context of the ongoing meeting of our two Presidents.

Karpov: If they knew.

Bartholomew: I have talked to my President and my Secretary of State. Those two know.

Karpov: You would like this not to be in the form of a letter, you would prefer a declaration along the lines we have done for SLCMs. That is not the way we propose. Your own approach is closer to your heart.

Second, your proposal says those systems are being dealt with in Vienna, in the context of CFE. If we say they are being dealt with in Vienna, there is no sublimit there. When we are talking about establishing a numerical ceiling on TU–22M, that is for START, not with regard to Vienna. There is a question for us. Any level with regard to the TU–22M should not prejudice our position in the Vienna talks with regard to aviation systems.

Nazarkin: Let me try to clarify one point. If the Soviet Union provides an assurance it will not give Backfire intercontinental capability, what is the meaning of a ceiling on Backfire in terms of the START treaty?

Bartholomew: The assurance on intercontinental capability and the number are two forms of the same thing. We ourselves make that clear in our draft declaration that Backfire will not be subject to limits under the treaty. This is how I answer your question.

Nazarkin: Perhaps I did not make my question clear. If we provide an assurance that Backfire will not have intercontinental capability, I don’t see the logic of a numerical limit in START.

Bartholomew: I said that at the outset. The two together—the understanding on range and the understanding on number—combined together are an assurance on intercontinental potential.

I’d like to go back to something you said, I’d like to be clear. A policy statement by the Soviet Union that you will not exceed 400 Backfire, all Backfire, does not prejudice your position on CFE. This remains to be discussed. I think that was your question. I hope I have answered it.

Karpov: But still the question remains about naval Backfire. Since the question of naval arms has long been a subject of our discussion with you, I see no prospect for success. But the problem of naval arms is not submarines with ballistic missiles or SLCMs, but also the question of tactical nuclear weapons on the seas. I wouldn’t like to go into that problem. This still leaves the question of how to settle the TU–22M. I can give an assurance that we will not give Backfire intercontinental capability. You say that assurance should be accompanied by a ceiling on the number. We are prepared to do that with regard to aircraft assigned to the air force. When you refer to resubordination, you made no reference to the TU–22M, you spoke of Sukhoi, Mikoyan, etc. Then what is the problem in this case? Why are you not satisfied with our proposal?

Bartholomew: Very simply, in part because what has been done with one aircraft type today demonstrates what can be done with another tomorrow.

To do the job and lay this issue to rest, we need a number as well as a commitment on range, because then we can say we have resolved this problem, the Soviets have given us two assurances—political barriers against intercontinental potential—range combined with an assurance that they will not build up beyond a certain number. These two are important together. The problem I would face, and in fact already faced in meetings yesterday, is that a number that excludes certain aircraft simply by resubordination is a number that cannot be credibly defended. It doesn’t help to solve the problem, it complicates the problem and raises the questions I talked about. The sooner we can turn the page here the better. There is no better time than now during this meeting between our two leaders. This solution would not prejudice your position on CFE.

Karpov: As to in-flight refueling, this can be positively addressed. As to naval aircraft, there is a problem here.

Bartholomew: The problem is not naval, the problem is the intercontinental potential of Backfire. The problem is this aircraft which is the political as well as the substantive issue that it is. We know of the strong Soviet interest in naval arms negotiations. We don’t expect you to stop pressing us because you agreed to include naval Backfire in the 400. But this is not the way to get to naval talks. We are trying to solve a problem of Backfire, not naval arms. There is no better moment, the impact of resolving this would be larger than this issue, important as this issue is. When after long resistance we agreed on 880 SLCMs, we just said OK. We didn’t say this mission, that mission; we cut it clean.

Karpov: The main thing for the US is not to give intercontinental capability to the TU–22M. This should be made the substance of the Soviet statement. I suggest leaving aside the question of numbers. In light of the Soviet agreement not to give it intercontinental capability, including refueling, that whould settle the question.

Bartholomew: That proposal takes us backwards. Because the issue is not whether the Soviet Union is ready to give us the number, the question is relating the number to issues outside the problem we are trying to solve by excluding naval Backfire. May I say the problem again is that if we exclude Backfire aircraft simply because of their subordination to one service as opposed to another, given the possibility of resubordination from one service to another this is not a real limit. You have not addressed this problem yesterday or today.

Karpov: I am still trying to find a solution, to take us out of this dead end. It seems to me if we do not continue to argue on the number and take into account our readiness to state that this aircraft will not be given intercontinental capability, that would put behind us the problems you raise. We can give a Soviet assurance that this aircraft will not be upgraded or converted so that it becomes a strategic bomber.

Bartholomew: I appreciate your move on in-flight refueling. If we believed that alone would be sufficient assurance, we would have stopped at that. Since you have proposed a number, take a half step more, tell us it covers all Backfire. The reason we need a number is that then if there are concerns, if there is a crisis or sometime in the future a situation develops, we know aircraft can be rapidly upgraded but in any event the number will not exceed 400. This is not a matter of challenging the good faith of the Soviet Union, we are talking about a future situation.

Karpov: A funny thing is, there is no proposal on limiting to a certain number the TU–22M either in START or CFE. There is no limit on the number of aircraft of other types either, both within START or Frontal Aviation at CFE. Therefore limits on aircraft that are not strategic bombers are artificial, and look that way.

Bartholomew: I know your side does not like it, I don’t like it, but Backfire has come to occupy a special sui generis place and needs a special sui generis solution. It is a problem for both of us, and we need a practical solution. My last point concerns the naval arms question. You have your position, we have our position. Let us not import that question into this problem of Backfire.

I propose that we return to the original agenda, and take up the joint statement on future negotiations. I note that we have important differences on heavy ICBMs and non-circumvention that need to be discussed as well.

Karpov: I wonder whether we could arrive on a common solution on TU–22M, without prejudice to CFE, and do away with numbers, by assuming a commitment not to give this aircraft intercontinental capability.

Bartholomew: We need both. One is not enough.

Karpov: I would like to hear your response on the future joint statement. There are several clearly defined points of difference.

Bartholomew: I have a proposal on defense and space that could put us back on track. We propose that you drop the phrase on “related issues,” and accept “without delay.” I could accept “the relationship” and drop “cooperative transition.”

Karpov: That leaves us with heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs.

Bartholomew: I propose that we drop “stabilizing reductions.”

Karpov: What are your arguments? Bartholomew: The point is made later quite clearly. Dropping this phrase here makes the basic objectives stand out more. Our objective is not just reductions but other measures.

Karpov: The question of objectives for future negotiations is expressed here in very generalized form. We prefer to say how those objectives could be achieved. This could be achieved through further stabilizing reductions.

Bartholomew: We are making a problem here. That is why I began with our proposal on the first section.

Karpov: There the question is the phasing on defense and space and START. In para 1 I agree to delete “related issues.”

Bartholomew: We want “without delay.” When I tell my wife I “will continue” the discussion, the precise meaning is unclear. We simply want to make clear what will happen.

Karpov: I have made a second major concession.

Bartholomew: Then we can trade the other two. This paragraph begins with “within.” Karpov: OK

Karpov: Our proposal for the heavy missile section identifies heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs, without prejudging what will be agreed. The indented para also relates to strategic stability.

Bartholomew: We do not speak of the results of future negotiations, we speak of the direction of future negotiations. We carefully wrote “on working to.” Moreover, in the alternative you propose, of course strategic delivery vehicles include heavy and mobile ICBMs. This does not give us anything on singling out heavy ICBMs, which we thought your president said we could do.

Karpov: Our president did not agree to eliminate heavy ICBMs.

Bartholomew: Your phrase seems to predict the outcome—simple downloading of the number of warheads on SS–18s.

Karpov: Let’s not prejudge anything, and delete any reference to heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs.

Bartholomew: To solve this, let us add the “in particular” paragraph.

Karpov: Your theory is at variance with everything we have done. I cannot agree to ban mobility as such.

Bartholomew: We are not banning mobile ICBMs as such, just MIRVed mobile ICBMs.

Karpov: We are prepared to discuss those issues, and listen to your proposals, and you would listen to ours, for enhancing stability. I suggest we use the Soviet language, and make the phrase at the end “single warhead mobile ICBMs.”

Bartholomew: Recall when President Bush wrote to President Gorbachev making this proposal, including the element of a ban on MIRVed mobile ICBMs in this START agreement. President Gorbachev responded no, not in this agreement. But he said we should address the question of a mobile MIRV ban in START II. That is what we are trying to work here.

Karpov: We propose a more general formula. Let us say “reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including questions related to MIRVs.”

(Break until 3:30)

Bartholomew: We should continue with the option of completing our work in time to brief ministers before dinner.

Karpov: Let us conclude work on the joint statement on future negotiations first.

Bartholomew: On non-circumvention we have an agreed treaty article, an agreed statement, and a US unilateral statement. If you say this issue is closed on this basis, we can record that in the joint statement on START. The statement you have made to us would in effect stop US/UK cooperation with Trident. Not continuing the long-established pattern of cooperation is not acceptable to us. We cannot and will not accept bounds or limits on cooperation with the UK which has gone on for decades. We will not enter into a treaty that destabilizes our alliance structure. This is not just a matter of decades-long cooperation with the UK, but the stability of the entire structure of alliances. We cannot subordinate this to START.

The US has gone a long way to meet your concerns, further than we have ever gone before. Cooperation with the US is not going to make the UK a nuclear superpower. If you tell us Trident II is the end of the line, that is a treaty blocker. I do not say this in a negotiating sense, there is nothing here to negotiate. This is the position of my leaders, this is what they will be saying.

Karpov: We do have a good basis for reaching agreement. We have agreed on a text of article XIII, agreed on a text of a joint statement, and we take note of the US text. The US statement leaves open the possibility of a situation concerning future cooperation with the UK concerning strategic offensive arms. What you want is totally unconstrained cooperation with the UK, even allowing expanded cooperation as compared with what we have now. We have talked about an exemption for current cooperation, we are not talking about future cooperation unconstrained. That is too much. What we advocate is to reach agreement with current practice, exempt the current practice as it exists, the Trident II program.

Burt: Let me add that what we have here is a situation where the glass is both half full and half empty. All we want to do is maintain a set of practices that have existed for many years, and have not interfered with the ability to complete strategic offensive arms agreements. Our program of cooperation with the UK predated the negotiations on strategic arms that led to agreements completed in 1972 and 1979. And in fact we have gone far further to meet Soviet concerns in non-circumvention than in any other arms control agreement. I will conclude by saying if you define our cooperation as expanded, you are unilaterally creating a problem. This should not be a problem unless you choose to make it one.

Karpov: Mr. Khromov has a question.

Khromov: My question is, isn’t the cooperation program with the UK going to create problems of verification of compliance? One of the possibilities would be the Kings Bay base, where we could be told a Trident II missile has nothing to do with the treaty because it belongs to the UK. This would be a problem, like in INF.

Bartholomew: We understand your concern, and have gone far to meet it. We will do nothing to prevent us from maintaining and modernizing an effective UK deterrent. Were we to do so, we would damage our relationship not only with that country but our whole position as a reliable ally. This we will not and cannot do. If the terms are as you describe them, then we will be unable to conclude and sign a START treaty.

If that were to happen it would be truly tragic. I think you would be sacrificing a major treaty for an artificial and theoretical problem. I have nothing further to say.

Karpov: I will note that we have our own problems related to ratification. Gen. Omelitchev is a deputy of the Supreme Soviet, and an expert in the way security issues are treated in the Supreme Soviet. The committee on security and armaments will certainly stumble on this hole. We will not defend a position like this, it is indefensible.

Bartholomew: Let me add that we will have our own ratification problems. This is artificial. No one is talking about making the UK a nuclear superpower. If we were to agree to anything like what you are proposing, we would not have a ratification problem because we would have no treaty we could sign. Look at this problem again in the sense of how real it is in terms of the limits in the agreement.

Karpov: I too have said everything I can say on this subject.

Bartholomew: Let us turn then to heavy ICBMs. From the outset of stragtegic arms negotiations, one goal has been elimination of heavy ICBMs. We are not seeking unilateral advantage, this goal is fundamentally in accord with the strategic stability objective this agreement is meant to achieve. I do not need to spell out why elimination of heavy ICBMs is a very important objective from the standpoint of stability.

At a certain point in the negotiations the Soviet Union said it was prepared to reduce heavy ICBMs by 50%. That did not mean total elimination, but it still represented a substantial step. We then looked for phased elimination via flight testing, production, and modernization bans. We said 50% is not 100% but it is a good step. In order to get at longer-term elimination and to prevent upgrade in the interim, there should be a ban on testing and modernization and production.

The Soviet Union said 50% reduction and that is it, we have paid enough. There we stayed for a long time—50% is enough versus 50% is good but should be accompanied by these additional bans. Then we saw the Soviet Union modernizing, upgrading the SS–18s. In Moscow we changed our position. Under our new proposal we would permit the current upgrade program and reliability testing. We proposed 2 flight tests per year, and a cutoff of production by 1993. The Soviet Union said no.

In Moscow we said at a minimum let us have the limit of 2 flight tests per year. This would be enough to permit you to maintain the reliability of your system, and to continue to deploy the Mod 5 and the Mod 6. At least is would halt the development of the Mod 7, 8, and 9 while we continue to work in these negotiations. We have traveled considerable ground, and resolution of this would have a favorable impact on START. Why can we not agree to put a sentence in the joint statement on START that we have agreed to limit heavy ICBM flight tests to 2 per year?

Burt: I am interested in why if the Soviet side has agreed to no new type of heavy ICBM, why it is necessary to test heavy missiles more that twice a year?

Omelitchev: First I do not understand the number 2. Why not 3 or 4? Why do you think 2 is sufficient for our testing? You are correct we are willing to reduce by 50% and ban new types, reserving the right to modernize existing types. We need testing. The volume of testing is determined by the volume of combat training. 2 is not enough. One year maybe we do 3, one year 4, another year 5. It all depends on the organization of the modernization process, training requirements, and the necessary level of readiness.

Burt: We know from conversations on telemetry with Mr. Khromov and our own experts, who reached agreement that the readiness and reliability of a missile type could be maintained with 2 tests per year.

Omelitchev: I am not aware of any statements to this effect.

Bartholomew: Can I ask which branch of the service you are from? Omelitchev: The General Staff, which coordinates the training and readiness of all the services.

Bartholomew: Gen. Graves is on our General Staff, but he started as an engineer.

Khromov: Is General Graves prepared to say 2 flight tests are sufficient for readiness of missile forces? Graves: I was not in that conversation in Geneva.

Khromov: The Soviet side never made such a statement. If I were to add to what Gen. Omelitchev had to say, when operational problems arise specific launches are sometimes called for to ascertain the nature of the problems.

Bartholomew: Let us put a bracket around the particular number. We want a limit that would not stop the filling out of the SS–18 Mod 5 and 6, but would not permit the upgrade of the force further with the 7, 8, and 9. Let us hold the number, can we agree on this concept?

Karpov: Why should this be applied to heavy ICBMs alone? Why don’t we extend this to all ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles?

Bartholomew: First, because from the basic goal of strategic stability heavy ICBMs are a particular problem. Second, because the upgrading of the SS–18 force that has already occured has partically erased the good stability effect of the 50% cut. Why go further?

Karpov: Here we cannot agree. We have different approaches.

Bartholomew: You have heavy missiles and we don’t.

Karpov: We don’t regard heavy ICBMs as the foremost cause of instability. Taking into account your concerns, we have agreed to reduce by 50%. This has whetted your appetite. Any further limit cannot be considered.

Barthlomew: Reduce half now, and half in the next negotiation. Karpov: That is not the deal.

Bartholomew: 2 flight tests. The political importance of resolving this problem is not to be measured by those 2 flight tests.

Karpov: We are beginning to get heat from deputies in the Supreme Soviet, who believe we have sold out the Soviet Union, particularly the agreement to the 50% cut in heavy ICBMs.

Bartholomew: I know the article you are refering to.⁴ That article compared to what we get here is like an air gun compared to an artillery barrage.

Look at the concept I have advanced, and hold for now the number. We are saying OK to reliability testing to maintain confidence, no longer forcing these missiles to wither away. We are saying OK to the concept of the Mod 5 and 6 that are already developed. We don’t like these improved versions, but we accept them and look to fit them into START. We want a level of flight testing that would assure us no Mod 7, 8, or 9 would further erode the reductions. If we can reach agreement on this concept, we could look at other arrangements. If the problem is the number, we can get experts together to look at the number. I have no flexibility on the number, but we could have experts meet and argue the number. There may be different ways to fit the concept. If we can agree on the concept, we could get people together to see how it could be achieved.

Karpov: I told you already this approach singles out Soviet heavy ICBMs, the SS–18, I told you quite clearly. Let us talk about maintaining the readiness and reliability of all missiles—ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles. How many tests are required to maintain their reliability and readiness?

Bartholomew: Each of us has had occasion to single out particular concerns, we can add up the score if you want. Do one thing for me, make that two. First, don’t complicate the problem we are trying to resolve by generalizing. And second, please review what I have had to say on my own authority, and consider further the concept I have outlined. Let me remind you that Gorbachev said the problem of heavy ICBMs could be addressed in future negotiations.

Karpov: I am prepared to say that.

Bartholomew: The two go together—the ban on more than 2 flights per year and the specific problem for future negotiations. 2 flight tests is an interim step that holds the force at a certain level of capability while we try to solve the problem in future negotiations. You are saying nyet to 2 flight tests and proposing a reference to heavy ICBMs that sets no objective for future negotiations.

Karpov: We have made a major step, reductions of one-half, no other constraints are necessary.

Bartholomew: The mobile ICBM warhead number gap needs to be filled in the START joint statement. Let us tell our ministers we did one thing—we split the difference on 1000. Then we could tell Masterkov to leave the room with Brooks to make the change in the text.

Karpov: Let me recall, we don’t only have the warhead limit, there are other verification issues. I proposed three different options for resolving the issue of notification. In this context we could establish a mobile ICBM limit as part of a comprehensive package you are trying to tear apart. We have already moved from 1600 to 1200.

Bartholomew: We have moved from 0 to 800, and are ready to go 200 more to 1000. We should be solving what we can. Your verification options don’t do the job. I will restrain myself from temptation on linkage, let’s settle something. What’s the matter with 1000. You can tell Gen. Omelitchev that satisfies your program. 1000 doesn’t squeeze you, we are not trying to squeeze you.

Omelitchev: It is a relief to know you know our program so well.

Bartholomew: We are open about our programs, and you are becoming every day more open about yours.

Karpov: When we gave you 1200 from 1600, this was precisely rationalized on the basis of our program.

Bartholomew: General, think what you can say, the 1000 level includes your longer range plans and ours. In the longer term 1000 doesn’t squeeze you, and both of us have agreed that, as an interim step at least, it is good to have a sublimit.

Karpov: I have proposed a solution to you. We are prepared to have a sublimit. Let’s deal with verification. I have suggested various options and failed to hear a positive analysis.

Burt: The American side has done a lot of thinking about road-mobile verification. In the last two months in Geneva, no single subject has had more attention. We have looked hard at the various variables connected with road-mobile verification. We will address this further in Geneva.

Karpov: We already have clarity on Backfire. There will be a politically binding statement, we can agree to that. We can say no intercontinental capability, including by refueling. We can have the number 400, but naval aircraft are not included. Naval aircraft must be considered with other naval arms, we are not prepared to change.

Bartholomew: This reminds me of the saying what the right hand gives, the left takes away.

Karpov: Everything I am giving with both hands.

Bartholomew: This means we have no agreement, because of a hole big enough to drive a truck though. This is not a solution. This loophole is big enough not just for a truck, but a Sukhoi, a Mikoyan, a TU–22M.

Karpov: As a matter of principle, naval arms is ripe for negotiation. We should sit down and get to work. I will report a freeze, including on naval, could be considered. I will report that.

Burt: I didn’t understand what you just said. Would that be a freeze on all naval Backfire?

Karpov: Since we are not talking about a limit, we can consider a freeze. I propose to support this if you are prepared to consider it.

Bartholomew: This could achieve the same effect as a 400 number. You could say you won’t exceed 250 non-naval Backfire, with a freeze on naval Backfire.

Karpov: Gen. Omelitchev says the figure given you stands—400.

Burt: Let me ask roughly speaking how many naval Backfire does the Soviet Union have?

Omelitchev: I am afraid I may make a mistake. And that is not what matters. In this context we can discuss Backfire under air force command. Naval can be discussed in naval negotiations, they are not subject to this negotiation.

Bartholomew: There are two naval problems in the Backfire declaration. First, in the 400, and second, in CFE. Given that you are prepared to freeze naval Backfire, why not 400 for all and not raise naval armament, with the understanding that having the 400 cover all Backfire is without prejudice to your position regarding naval arms in CFE. The effect is the same. This would be very good. We note what you have said on naval arms, there would be no prejudice either way. You as well as we would be better off with one number. You and we would not have to worry about this, and not highlight the issue. We think 400 is right. If Gen. Omelitchev thinks it is not right, he should tell us.

Karpov: A freeze is not something I can propose as a solution, I must report it.

Omelitchev: The Soviet Union is prepared not to give this airplane intercontinental capability, including by in-flight refueling. 400 is the figure that will not include naval Backfire, which are not a subject of these negotiations and must be addressed within the framework of future negotiations on naval arms.

Bartholomew: One more try. Suppose we have language in the declaration that would say the Soviet Union would freeze the total number of Backfire at current levels as of the end of this year, which is supposed to be the time of signature. We would need an exchange on what that number is, but there would be a freeze at current levels.

Karpov: I don’t have this possibility in my brief. If you propose it, I will report it.

Bartholomew: You check this ad ref, and I will too. This is not in my brief either.

Bartholomew: Let us return to the joint statement on future negotiations. Consider the following: We have agreed language through “strategic delivery vehicles,” and on highly survivable systems. Let us delete everything else up to the “In particular” paragraph. Now on the bracketed paragraph, you have said this goes beyond the commitmenmts your president has made. But we both agree your president did say he was prepared to discuss this subject. We can add one word, “addressing.”

Karpov: That does not change anything.

Bartholomew: Look again. I cannot believe the Russian language cannot capture this nuance. It must say something different in Russian. Your president said he was prepared to discuss this.

Karpov: Here is what our president wrote to yours—“the whole range of issues which each of the sides considers important in achieving the goals of the negotiations could be examined. In particular, we believe it is possible to consider the question of considerably reducing the concentration of warheads on all ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and of ALCMs on heavy bombers and the number of delivery vehicles.”

Bartholomew: He said this is not a subject for discussion in the current framework, but it was clear that this is a subject to be addressed in the subsequent phase. We should say in this statement what we are “addressing.” The whole value of the statement is clarity on how we begin the future negotiations. This does not commit you, we would be “beginning with addressing.”

Karpov: These problems will become the predominant problems. We don’t feel these are the predominant problems. There are other problems, such as reductions.

Bartholomew: Reductions are mentioned, and the subject is all strategic offensive arms, “beginning with addressing.”

Karpov: You indicate three elements—mobile ICBMs, heavy ICBMs, and land-based ICBMs.

Bartholomew: No, the sentence refers to ballistic missile forces, without qualification.

Karpov: And cruise missiles and heavy bombers. We want “including mobile ICBMs and heavy ICBMs.”

Bartholomew: This statement is about priorities, and we should be “beginning with addressing.”

Karpov: Your approach prescribes the systems we are addressing.

(Break until 8:30)

Bartholomew: Have you reflected on Backfire? I have no instructions other than those I have set forth before.

Karpov: I also have no instructions other that those I have set forth before.

Bartholomew: This ingenious idea of a freeze. (Gives him a new draft Backfire declaration.⁵) This draft has a new paragraph on the number. Rather than a specific number, it would freeze the number.

Karpov: I see no real change in the new text. The number is the same but not identified. What we have set forward before still stands.

Bartholomew: There is an implicit difference here, related to the point in time when the freeze comes into effect. I am also saying we need to know that number that will be frozen. If you have better language or different language, tell me.

Karpov: There in no real difference here, and no difference between the treatment of aircraft assigned to the air force and naval aircraft.

Burt: We are not placing ceilings on these categories of aircraft.

Karpov: Everything is prejudged. First, you put together naval and air force aircraft. Second, you establish limits. Nothing changes compared to what we discussed and criticized.

Bartholomew: Under what I have given you it is your business what is naval, what is air force. It doesn’t say naval or not naval, just TU–22M period. The effect is to establish an upper limit on air force and naval Backfire that will not be exceeded. It seems to me that separating them only highlights the problem of naval aircraft. This way for these purposes we do not need to know and you do not need to tell us which services have which.

Look at the paragraph again. Tell me how you would express your idea of a separate naval freeze. Maybe I am missing something, but I think the general way is better. Tell me how you would fix our general language, tell me how you would implement your naval approach.

Karpov: I have given you the text of a letter to the Secretary of State. The ideas in that letter deserve attention. We can find a place for a naval freeze, somewhere on the first page. That is the general idea.

Bartholomew: We have an idea. Let us review the basis on which are are working.

1. We are agreed the form will be a political declaration.

2. It will include constraints on upgrade.

3. We are prepared to replace the paragraph on number with two sentences rewritten from your draft letter. “As regards the numerical limit on TU–22M airplanes, the Soviet side will not possess more than 250. This number does not include naval TU–22M airplanes, the number of which does not exceed the number as of December 31, 1990.”

Karpov: Where does the 250 come from?

Bartholomew: We had assumed the number 400 we originally proposed was more than your Backfire force, both air force and naval. And we further assumed this was roughly divided into 250 air force and 150 naval, for a total of 400. In fact, we think these numbers may be higher than what you actually possess, especially the air force number. We propose not to reduce Backfire. This does what you were talking to me about—a number on air force Backfire and a freeze on naval. If you think there is a problem with this number, I’ll listen. I am trying to go as far as I can to meet your concerns.

Karpov: We are proposing a version to you. It could be a statement with some editorial changes. The commitments may remain as formulated in that document.

Bartholomew: How do you do the naval freeze?

Karpov: Of course if the freeze idea is accepted, we can reflect it.

Bartholomew: I’m being very specific.

Karpov: All your ideas do not go beyond your position.

Burt: Let us assume you accept the idea of a freeze we have written in. The issue between us then is 250 versus 400.

Karpov: As to 400, we confirm that.

Bartholomew: 400 fits the total size of your force. We don’t want a recipe for a build-up, we want a recipe for an assurance.

Karpov: I am responding to the numbers and language you have produced. I can only confirm my statement. I can take something from you, your paper, but as to the main contents we stick to the position in our letter.

We are proposing additional assurances with regard to a Soviet medium bomber which is not a strategic bomber. We have proposed a statement by the Soviet side, as a gesture of good will. We reflect in the text that this is a medium bomber, not a strategic bomber; we will not give it intercontinental capability, including refueling; and we will have a phrase about numerical limits. Finally, we would indicate that this aircraft is the subject of discussion in Vienna and can be considered in negotiations on naval forces.

Bartholomew: If we cannot solve this issue along the lines we propose, we will be missing an important opportunity and this will have a negative impact on this meeting of our leaders.

Bartholomew: Let us continue on the path of trying to be the engine for progress, and turn to heavy ICBMs. This too is an issue the US highest authorities believe we should settle at this summit. We are going to offer you a proposal that would solve all of the heavy ICBM issues. We can give you something on flight testing and on phasing of reductions, which is still outstanding.

First, we listened carefully to the considerations, particularly Gen. Omelitchev’s considerations, you put forward on testing, training, and maintaining the Soviet heavy ICBM force. As I understood it, the problem is that requirements for testing may vary from year to year. From time to time problems come up requiring testing that hasn’t been planned for. What we could do to meet this is instead of an agreed number of tests each year there could be a limit of 7 tests over each 3 year period. This gives you both one more test over three years compared to 2 tests per year, and perhaps more important more flexibility.

On the phasing of reductions, our understanding is that the Soviet side has stated it prefers not to put the reductions schedule for heavy ICBMs in the treaty itself, but is prepared to give assurances that the reduction of heavy ICBMs will parallel those of other forces. We will accept an exchange of letters or an agreed statement for the phasing of reductions of heavy ICBMs provided there are specific numbers for the three- and five-year points.

With these two steps—more flexibility on testing and phasing of reductions not in the treaty—and with language on heavy ICBMs in the joint statement on future negotiations, we could consider the heavy ICBM issue closed. This is a fair resolution, and would put a difficult issue behind us.

Nazarkin: I would like you to be more specific on your phasing proposal.

Bartholomew: We need a plan for reduction of heavy ICBMs, with precise points for years 3 and 5. The Soviet side has told us it will reduce SS–18s proportionally with the other reductions. It is not clear exactly what that means. We could clarify this through an agreed statement or an exchange of letters, including the specific points at 3 and 5 years. We wouldn’t have to include the SS–18 numbers formally in the treaty text dealing with the reductions.

Karpov: Two points. On the schedule of reductions, I don’t see a serious problem. We are prepared to confirm that the reductions will be proportional—at the end of 3 years, 50; at the end of 5 years, 50; and at the end of 7 years 50; at a minimum for a total of 154.

Burt: The concept is continuous reductions. 50 per period is about in the ball park. There is a three-year period and then two and two. The three-year period should have more than 50, we will look at that. Beyond that I won’t say.

Karpov: The flight testing issue seems to be more difficult for us. Roughly you are suggesting the same requirement as 2 tests per year. From that standpoint, 7 tests per 3 years does not change a lot. The question is why Soviet heavy missiles are to be limited while other missiles—the MX and Trident II—are not so limited. In the case of Trident and MX, missiles with many RVs, they are about the same as the SS–18. I fail to understand why there should be limits on flight testing of the SS–18 and not the others.

Burt: That is very clear. Unlike the Trident II, unlike the MX, unlike every other system, the Soviet Union has agreed it will not deploy a new type of heavy missile. We have proposed not only no new types, but that the existing types wither away. The Soviet side did not accept this concept, and in a major concession we dropped the concept of withering away. We are now prepared to accept testing sufficient to maintain the reliability of existing systems. We heard earlier that 2 flight tests per year did not provide sufficient flexibility. So now we have provided you more flexibility, over a three year period.

Bartholomew: The need for flexibility made sense in the terms you spoke of, so we increased the number and spread it over a three year period. We thought that the main step for us was for more flexibility, so we added one test and cast it in a way that provides for additional flexibility. So you tell me how we could make this work. Do we have the right number of years? The right number of tests?

Khromov: We have still heard no answer to Mr. Karpov’s question about why make an exception for the SS–18. As of today, the United States and the Soviet Union have committed themselves to not test missiles with more reentry vehicles than declared. Given the limitations the Soviet Union is to assume under the treaty which deal with the rate of reduction, the number of warheads, and openness of telemetry, the potential the SS–18 poses does not exceed that of the MX or Trident II, which also are tested with 10 reentry vehicles.

Bartholomew: Victor, this is the only missile where we are agreed there will be no new types. I’ve shown flexibility on tests, and on reductions. Help solve this, negotiating takes two.

Khromov: On heavy missiles, only the Soviet side made concessions. I can repeat them all. The US has not made a single concession. You should not try to ascribe our concessions to your side.

Karpov: The question of heavy missiles is a question which has from the beginning been dealt with through limiting such missiles. Naturally, those were one-sided unilateral limitations. This doesn’t make our concessions to you less valuable.

Bartholomew: At 10:30 we shouldn’t count concessions.

Karpov: I invite your attention to the characteristics of heavy missiles, the MX, and the Trident II—CEP, yield, and hard target capability. They don’t differ much from the SS–18. You believe the treaty should not regulate your missiles, yet you wish to regulate the SS–18.

Bartholomew: I have taken a straightforward Yankee approach—took steps, opened doors, extended a hand. It doesn’t seem to be useful.

Karpov: Our view is if we limit flight testing, we should limit it for all types.

If we could turn to the joint statement on future negotiations, there is a problem on page 2. The problem is still there.

Bartholomew: You are my guest.

Karpov: Let us try the following approach to section 2. I suggest the following: (reads from a text) “For the purposes of strategic stability, priority shall be given to highly survivable systems, for example single warhead mobile ICBMs, and to measures reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic offensive arms, including heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs with MIRVs.” With this elaboration, we could end the preceding sentence at “first strike.”

Bartholomew: Don’t single out single-warhead mobile ICBMs.

Karpov: This is a gift to Scowcroft.

Bartholomew: Do more work for me. The whole point of our structure is to find a way both to say we have an interest in reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and to give some direction as to where to begin that process. In what you just read, the emphasis on reducing the concentration of warheads on ballistic missile forces is lost. And your reference to heavy ICBMs and to mobile MIRVed ICBMs is no more than a reference, and what we need is the direction in the US formula.

Karpov: We believe we should only identify relevant directions, and leave how to the negotiating process.

Bartholomew: Why don’t you see what I am offering you with the one word “addressing.” I am offering you an aim, a direction. I am not requiring or prejudging the results.

Karpov: The word “addressing” does not change the substance of your position. It prejudges the outcome.

Bartholomew: Let me back up. There is a special weight and priority to solving the heavy ICBM and MIRVed mobile ICBM problem. My President wanted to get this done in START, to put in a ban on mobile MIRVs. Your president said no, this is for the future. It is not unfair to have language in the future statement that gives some direction.

Karpov: My president did not say that, I spoke out what he did say.

Bartholomew: Speak also of the exchange between Secretary Baker and President Gorbachev in Moscow.

Karpov: The question of a ban on heavy and mobile MIRVed ICBMs was not directly discussed between Secretary Baker and President Grobachev. It came up only in a general way, in the second stage of negotiations, in the context of all strategic arms.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, Soviet Summit Memcons, May 1990. Secret. Drafted on June 26. The meeting took place in the T Conference Room.
2. No memorandum of conversation was found.
3. According to the President’s Daily Diary of May 30, Bush participated in a briefing on arms control issues in the Cabinet Room from 10:50 a.m.–12:04 p.m. No minutes were found.
4. Not found.
5. Not found.