Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

138. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 29, 1990, 11 a.m.–1:30 p.m., 7–8:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• START, CFE

PARTICIPANTS

• Bartholomew
• Burt
• Hadley
• Graves
• Lehman
• Kanter
• Woolsey
• Smith
• Brooks
• Timbie (notetaker)
• Karpov
• Nazarkin
• Grinevsky
• Masterkov
• Koltunov
• Roslyakov
• Batsanov
• Sokov

Bartholomew: I suggest we immediately begin with the two joint statements related to START, beginning with the statement on future negotiations. We can ask Grinevsky and Woolsey to continue their work, and join us when we are finished with START. We also have John Hawes available, looking for someone to work with. Karpov: I would like to talk with him.

Bartholomew: Excellent. Now let us turn to the joint statement on future negotiations, and hear from our negotiators.

Burt: We have made good progress² on the START statement, and there are only a couple of problems left, and perhaps we could take them up here before we turn to the future statement. The first concerns SLCMs. We do have something to report on SLCMs, but nothing in the treaty talks about SLCMs. They are addressed separately in unilateral, politically binding declarations.

Bartholomew: Both substantively, and to avoid confusion, we need to add a sentence. Let me try one. “SLCMs will not be constrained in the START treaty.” Karpov: Brilliant.

Burt: We also need a sentence making clear the purpose of the reductions. I suggest “These reductions will be designed to make a first strike less plausible.” Karpov: OK.

Bartholomew: I want to close this by saying that with the exception of technical elements that we have not reviewed, this START statement is done. It is a good statement for the readers. The joint statement on START is agreed between us except for those technical issues Burt and Nazarkin have just done that remain to be addressed.

Karpov: After Yuri reports to me, I will say OK or not.

Bartholomew: Now let us hear from the negotiators on the future joint statement.

Burt: There is not as much success to report. There are some drafting problems, but I suggest we focus on three questions:

— The first concerns stabilizing reductions. Both agree the objective is to reduce the risk of war, and enhance stability. The US doesn’t want to mention reductions in this paragraph. The balance of this sentence and the next sentence say all that needs to be said.

— The second concerns ABM and space. The US would like to say the two sides will continue the negotiations without interruption, and discuss strategic stability issues including a cooperative transition to a proper balance between strategic offensive and defensive arms. We worked a solution in Geneva, but now the Soviet side has bracketed the entire paragraph.

— Third, the US wants to reduce the concentration of warheads on ballistic missile forces, beginning with a ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs, and looking to the elimination of all land-based MIRVed ICBMs, especially heavy ICBMs.

Karpov: Let me say this is news to me. Yesterday we discussed this document with Nazarkin. There is an additional problem in the first paragraph that you did not mention. I ask Rick to explain the problem of “ensure.”

Burt: This is a stronger, better word. It demonstrates that the two sides are working to get the proper relationship between offense and defense. Our language for the rest of this sentence was “a proper balance.” We made a concession by moving to “an appropriate relationship.”

Smith: We began with “achieve.”

Karpov: I believe this issue is related to the issue of offense/defense on the next page. If we solve the second, the first is automatically solved.

Bartholomew: Let me turn to that issue, and explain the rationale for our approach. In 1985 we wet up the NST negotiations in three parts—INF, START, and Defense and Space. INF is finished, and START soon will be. This statement addresses how we continue the process. We are in agreement that there is a relationship between offense and defense. We both have an interest in continuing the talks on defense as we continue talks on offense. We disagree on what that offense/defense relationship should be; that is precisely why we should keep talking in the Defense and Space negotiations.

Our objectives for this paragraph are straightforward:

— D&S will continue without interruption after signature of START.

— The sides will discuss the offense/defense relationship.

— The sides should express some sense of urgency in concluding an agreement.

When we began our work on this statement in Moscow, we had two entirely different paras. In Geneva, we reached compromises:

— D&S would continue, but clearly within the existing framework.

— We would use the phrase ABM and space to describe D&S, as the Soviet side wanted.

— We would express a sense of urgency, but not mention a specific date.

So coming out of Geneva, we had a carefully drafted compromise text with only one bracket. That one bracket went back to how to characterize the objective of the discussions on the offense/defense relationship.

Yesterday, I understand the Soviet side bracketed the entire Geneva compromise. This leaves us in doubt about what happens to defense and space when START is signed, and subordinates D&S to START. Burt and Smith are ready to offer a formula to resolve the one bracket in a manner favorable to the Soviet side. But Nazarkin was unable to agree to the rest of the para that had been previously agreed.

The para we propose is clear, simple, and a good balance on a difficult subject.

— D&S would continue within the NST framework—no more and no less independent than today.

— Our approach accepts the Wyoming phrase “ABM and space” which the Soviet side wanted.

— It uses Soviet language to characterize the offense/defense talks, in particular by droppping the reference to a cooperative transition. The fact we are prepared not to insist on these words is a measure of our effort to resolve this.

Why can’t we resolve this paragraph on this basis?

Karpov: Maybe we should let Burt and Nazarkin have some more discussion about that. They have some formulas to offer each other.

Bartholomew: I’ll be frank. There is a limit to how many times I want to do the same work twice. Why look at alternatives to this paragraph, why not settle this now?

Karpov: It does not reflect our understanding of what we are going to discuss on the relationship between offensive and defensive arms. We should look for another formulation.

Bartholomew: The paragraph says we will discuss the relationship between offensive and defensive arms, as you just said.

Karpov: (Reads from a text) We agree that the framework of the existing negotiations on NST in Geneva is the right place for negotiations on defense and space and the second phase of START. Thus in the future talks the two sides will discuss strategic stability issues which will be of interest to them. Each side in these future talks will be free to raise those questions related to strategic stability that it feels necessary to raise, including the relationship between offensive and defensive arms.

Bartholomew: In principle we can work with that. I propose that work be done by Burt, Smith, and Nazarkin.

I want to turn to the question that starts on page 2 to the top of page 3. This section should make clear what we are trying to do on heavy ICBMs. Heavy ICBMs are the greatest threat to stability, and their first strike potential can be enhanced through further modernization. We are agreed that the next phase of the talks should concentrate on measures to enhance stability, and elimination of heavy ICBMs is the single most important step we can take to do that. This statement should make clear that we will work the problem of heavy ICBMs.

Nazarkin has made some suggestions concerning this para on objectives for the future negotiations that take away everything we are trying to say in this para. This is the place to say specifically what objectives we will pursue. The US proposes to set the specific objectives of banning mobile MIRVed ICBMs, and eventually eliminating all land-based MIRVs. This is the way to enhance stability, which we agree should be the focus of these talks. Mobile MIRVs can be eliminated first, because they are now deployed in very limited numbers. Fixed MIRVs will take more time, we recognize that, and that is why we characterize this as a longer-term objective. Elimination of fixed MIRVs will solve the heavy ICBM problem as well, and we should say that.

Soviet leaders have responded to our proposals for eliminating mobile and fixed land-based MIRVs by saying that is something that can be considered but not in the current START framework. Here we are talking about future negotiations, and this is the place to say that one of the objectives of future negotiations is to eliminate land-based MIRVs.

Karpov: I share your view that this statement on future negotiations must express a view on the objectives of those negotiations, but these must be objectives that we both share. When you talk about reducing the concentration of warheads, we agree and this can be recorded. Elimination of mobile MIRVs and heavies is not in the realm of the agreed. You will recall there was an exchange between our two Presidents. When the issue of mobile MIRVs was raised, we said we agreed that could be addressed and discussed. This is a concept we are ready to incorporate in the joint statement on future negotiations. Therefore, we are ready to mention both mobile MIRVed ICBMs and heavy ICBMs as issues to be discussed, but cannot say they will be eliminated. That is a subject for the negotiations.

Bartholomew: I understand this is your position. The targets we are talking about—a ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs, elimination of all land-based MIRVs, the specific problem of heavy ICBMs—a strong case can be made that these are the core of the problem of stability. That is the place to begin.

MIRV mobiles can be captured now. We have not deployed any, you haven’t deployed that many. We can catch relatively early a certain capability. There are advantagee in catching at that point.

I am not going to go through the arguments about the rationale for focussing on fixed MIRVed land-based ICBMs. That stands out in any analysis. We have crafted the language to focus the attention of the negotiations. It also tells outside audiences how we intend to concretely advance the goals of stability. “Reducing concentration of warheads” does not give guidance and direction to the negotiations, nor does it inform the outside world, as our proposal does. We have a strong interest in a formula that captures that objective. The strength of our view on this should not come as a surprize, these ideas were introduced at the highest levels by the President.

Karpov: We should not prescribe the future negotiations. We can indicate the items to be discussed, but not the decisions. That would be counterproductive.

Bartholomew: We are not making all the decisions, we are pointing in a certain direction—to the stable situation we seek.

Karpov: We doubt elimination of mobiles stabilizes the situation. Mobility guarantees survivability, which contributes to stability.

Bartholomew: We are interested in getting at MIRVs.

Karpov: Why not silo based?

Bartholomew: We should begin with both.

Karpov: Silo-based ICBMs, SLBMs, cruise missile equipped bombers. We should enumerate them all.

Barthholomew: There is no debate about the negative effect on stability of fixed, land-based MIRVed ICBMs, particularly the SS-18s. Fixed land-based MIRVed ICBMs are in a special category. Regarding mobile MIRVs, there are two distinct characteristics that promote the objective—the MIRVs and the state of the program.

Karpov: Our experts have great concerns about Trident II, which compares with MX. And MX compares with any first strike missile. Why ignore Trident II? Why not start with them?

Bartholomew: There is no question about land-based fixed MIRVed ICBMs. You make a comparison between mobile ICBMs and SLBMs. But SSBNs are the most survivable systems, and land-based mobile MIRVs are capturable because of the early state of the program.

Karpov: Why not Trident II? It is mobile. I can now say these items are a matter for negotiation. We shoudn’t prescribe solutions.

Bartholomew: We will continue discussing this issue, in the first instance between Burt and Nazarkin. This subject is of considerable importance at the top levels.

Karpov: Of my government too. We need neutral language that makes these items for discussion.

(Woolsey and Grinevsky return for CFE discussion)

[Omitted here is a discussion of the CFE Treaty.]

Karpov: I would like Nazarkin to address the joint statement on future negotiaitons.

Nazarkin: This morning Amb. Burt, Brooks, Masterkov, and I discussed the future negotiations statement. The phrase that deals with stabilizing reductions is not yet agreed upon. In the sentence following that we resolved a minor problem; we wish to confirm agreement.

In the first section we reached tentative agreement. Afterward, following home analysis, we now wish to address this section further. There are problems in the bracketed language on page 3. We will need to continue exchanges to resolve the outstanding issues.

Burt: It is unclear what unilateral changes your side wants to make.

Karpov: We can continue with the future joint statement, but first I want to know if the chemical weapons documents are finished. Lehman: We met today to address the outstanding issues in the bilateral agreement. We resolved all issues. We exchanged English language texts and Russian language texts. We are also ready for signature of the non-proliferation statement. A compromise was worked out on missile language, it is now closed. Batsanov: I can confirm as far as the bilateral agreement and the non-proliferation statement are concerned, they are ready. Some technical checking and proofing are continuing, the negotiation is over.

Bartholomew: In all seriousness, both governments owe some recognition to the efforts of Batsanov and Lehman. Let the record show they worked on this one. Batsanov: Include on that list Ledogar.

Karpov: I would like to confirm the text of the CFE statement, and say it is ready for our bosses. Bartholomew: We can confirm what we did this afternoon.

Karpov: Let us return to the joint statement on future negotiations. We are suggesting changes to satisfy concerns expressed during discussions between Burt and Nazarkin. We suggest “stabilizing reductions” be accepted.

In the first section, we accept “without delay.” We would like to add “on nuclear and space arms,” substitiue “resumed” for “begin,” and add “and other related issues.” We propose to drop the first sentence of the next para.

Burt: The bulk of the statement is about offense. We ask for one paragraph on defense. You are sweeping an important subject under the rug. Karpov: My people want a framework. Burt: We should separate offense from defense.

Karpov: There was an impression that talk on defense and space can start without any delay, but talk on offense can start only after ratification of the initial treaty. There would be consultation without delay on offense, but talks later.

Burt: We have no agreement on defense and space, like we hope to have on START. What is wrong with continuing the negotiations? Are you saying because of the delay in START, D&S should stop?

Karpov: We should have defense and space at the same time as START. Offensive and defensive arms should be dealt with at the same time, and have the same status. When there are consultations on offense, there should be consultations on defense. When there are negotiations on offense, there should be negotiations on defense.

Burt: Because the cycle is different doesn’t mean they have different status. This is a new concept we are hearing. Are you saying that the day we complete START, until we continue future negotiations on START, there will not be negotiations on defense and space?

Karpov: There can be consultations, but not negotiations.

Burt: We talked about just the opposite in Geneva. This is not an acceptable concept.

Bartholomew: We have been repeatedly clear about our view that defense and space must continue without interruption. These talks should continue within the existing framework. I was pleased when I saw this solution had been achieved in Geneva. It establishes continuity. What you have proposed here reverses the field. It wipes out all the changes we have been prepared to make earlier. We are in fact not entirely content with the Nazarkin/Burt approach. We made big adjustments—especially on omitting reference to cooperative transition. We were already wondering whether we could get by with this language. You have made it easy for me. Your proposal does not protect the framework and continuity of defense and space. You have told me it doesn’t.

Karpov: In 1985 we established the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, with three elements. Now we have two issues—offensive arms and defense and space. That is the framework. We should negotiate on both at the same time.

Bartholomew: We are reaching conclusion on one element of the nuclear and space talks—START. We will then pause for ratification. The words in the draft about resuming at the earliest practical date—that is what that means. The whole statement is about continuity.

Karpov: The negotiations on offensive and defensive arms are linked. Let me just remind you what was agreed upon at the beginning of those negotiations. The joint statement says the sides agree the subject will be considered as a complex, and all aspects will be considered in their interrelationship. If we are going to preserve the structure of the talks in Geneva, this is what we are preserving.

Bartholomew: I would like to insert after the phrase “strategic stability issues which will be of interest to them” the words “including a cooperative transition to the proper balance between strategic offensive and defensive arms.”

Karpov: You know we cannot accept that.

Bartholomew: Our insert is part of the formal US position. There is already a serious question whether we will have a joint statement on future negotiations. We are going backward very rapidly.

Karpov: We are trying to clarify points of interest, find common ground.

Bartholomew: What have Burt and Nazarkin have been doing? Already what they had achieved was on a knife edge.

Karpov: Here we have a balance between offensive and defensive arms.

Bartholomew: This clarification helps with the framework, but does nothing for my concern about continuing without interruption. In fact it is intended to interrupt. When INF stopped, START went on and defense and space went on.

Karpov: INF finished everything for INF.

Burt: Why should there be an artificial halt to defense and space when START ends. We understand the concept of interrelationship. But you are taking it in a mechanical way to an absurd degree, your approach is unsustainable.

Karpov: Let us move on to the second section, and add at the end “including heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs.” Then we should include a clarification, giving priority treatment to highly survivable systems, “for example, mobile ICBMs.”

Bartholomew: This does nothing to narrow our differences, in fact it sharpens them. Burt: Your language takes the focus away from the important objectives. The objective is not to reduce the concentration of warheads on heavy ICBMs, but to eliminate them. And sea-based missiles are a better example of highly-survivable systems. Your three suggestions ignore the US desire for a ban on heavy and MIRVed ICBMs.

Karpov: Trident II is very accurate, and doesn’t differ from MX.

Bartholomew: First, this formula is nowhere near satisfactory in addressing heavy ICBMs. Second, We are saying the objective should be a ban on MIRVed mobiles. I said to you earlier³ that this fits into a general pattern—looking to the future, which is what this statement is all about. Our proposal is not that on day one the elimination of all fixed MIRVs must be agreed. We sense that we will need to move progressively. The place to begin is mobile MIRVs—first because they are land-based, which has special characteristics, and second because of where they are in the program of both sides as compared with other systems. This is not something to be arrived at overnight, but is something that is feasible and practical because of the state of our programs.

Karpov: Let me say if we want to reflect the common understanding to reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, we should use the Soviet formula. Whether we shall begin with land-based ICBMs or submarines is something we ought not to prejudge, that is the subject of the negotiations.

Bartholomew: This too raises the question of the validity of having a joint statement on future negotiations.

Burt: We feel it is legitimate to raise elimination of heavy ICBMs. Whenever we raise this we always hear back that we cannot go further in this agreement, but this can be addressed in future negotiations. When we bring up a MIRV mobile ban, you say that too is a subject for subsequent negotiations. What we have written is an accurate reflection of our dialog.

Karpov: Never in the course of our discussion has the Soviet Union said future negotiations should prejudge the fate of Soviet heavy missiles or eliminate Soviet heavy missiles. We are ready to move toward further limitations. We are ready to discuss elimination of MIRVed mobiles, but not prejudge the outcome. We want to outline the subject matter without prejudging the outcome. We will take a closer look and get back together.

Bartholomew: You understand what we are saying. This is a grave difference indeed, we have not done as well as Burt and Nazarkin. Before this meeting I thought we were going to be able to answer positively whether there will be a joint statement on future negotiations. Now there is a serious question as the the value on having a statement.

Karpov: If there is no common ground, perhaps we don’t need a statement. We can report to our superiors that since we have been unable to find common ground, we make the recommendation that this approach be adopted.

Bartholomew: I cannot recommend adoption of a statement predicated on the changes you have proposed.

Is there anything else we can usefully discuss this evening? I note we do have a statement on START. But the START statement is not complete until we have reached agreement resolving the rest of the outstanding issues. I invite you to address the Backfire declaration we have given you.⁴

Karpov: Regarding Backfire, the ball is in your court. I have nothing to add to the remarks I have made.

Bartholomew: I am interested in your specific views on the declaration language on Backfire, what the points of agreement and disagreement might be. We will discuss this tomorrow. I will also wish to hear further from you on heavy ICBMs.

Karpov: I have said what I can say.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, Soviet Summit Memcons, May 1990. Secret. Drafted on June 21. The meeting took place in the T Conference Room.
2. No memorandum of conversation was found.
3. No memorandum of conversation was found.
4. Not found.