Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

139. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 30, 1990, 8–9 a.m.

SUBJECT

• START, CFE

PARTICIPANTS

• Bartholomew
• Burt
• Hadley
• Graves
• Lehman
• Kanter
• Woolsey
• Smith
• MacEachin
• Brooks
• Timbie (notetaker)
• Karpov
• Nazarkin
• Grinevsky
• Masterkov
• Koltunov
• Roslyakov
• Sokov

Bartholomew: Let me hand over to you a redraft² of the joint statement on future negotiations, putting all the new material in brackets. I want to be clear where we are, and have in front of us an accurate representation of where we left it last night.

Karpov: As we agreed, let us address the TU–22M, or as you say, Backfire. I would like to hand over to you a draft letter³ from the Soviet Foreign Minister to the US Secretary of State.

Bartholomew: The first problem I have with this is the form. We propose a politically-binding declaration. You have given us a letter. There is a strong argument for parallelism on the formality of the undertaking with what we have agreed to do for SLCMs—a statement of a politically-binding nature that applies for the duration of the treaty.

Second, regarding para 2, our declaration has a specific reference to in-flight refueling or in any other manner. We wish to specify in-flight refueling.

Third, the number does not include naval Backfire.

Fourth, in the last para, are you speaking of naval Backfire or all?

Karpov: We are ready to say we will not give the TU–22M the capability to operate at intercontinental distances, and we are ready to say no more than 400.

Bartholomew: Are you saying that naval Backfire in the ATTU region should not be dealt with in CFE?

Karpov: What I want to emphasize here is that we will not give any Backfire the capability of operating at intercontinental distances, none at all. With regard to the 400 aircraft, they are related only to land forces. If we want to discuss naval Backfire, that has to be done in the context of naval armaments.

Bartholomew: Your proposed omission of naval Backfire vitiates the work of any numerical limit in START. In effect, it vitiates the work of any inclusion of Backfire in CFE. It all comes down to a simple question. If aircraft outside the limits are the same aircraft as those that are covered, and are included or not included solely on the basis of assignment to one service or another, this vitiates the effect because either side can decide whether the aircraft is a lion or a tiger by simply applying different colors.

This is a real and serious problem. We know that the Soviet Union has been resubordinating combat aircraft from Frontal Aviation to the Soviet Navy. These resubordinated aircraft include light bombers and fighter bombers of the Sukhoi type, as well as fighter bombers and ground attack aircraft of the Mikoyan type. Soviet resubordination of these air units has taken place several times over the past year or two, and the total number of aircraft resubordinated is in the hundreds. Many of the resubordinations have been carried out while the CFE negotiations have been underway.

It is hard to conceive of a more vivid illustration of our concern over your insistence on excluding land based naval aircraft from the reductions and limitations of CFE and START. Land based combat aircraft of exactly the same type as those in the Warsaw Pact Frontal Aviation, and based at airfields in the ATTU would—according to your position—be excluded by the simple device of changing their subordination. At the very same time you are insisting on this position in CFE and START, you are in the process of moving large numbers, hundreds of combat aircraft into this category that you insist be excluded from the limits.

If you say it’s naval, it doesn’t count. This is a commitment without a commitment, a limit without a limit, both here and in CFE. If I tried to sell this, I would get no further that the first burst of laughter.

Karpov: Let me say this, there may be only one solution. That aircraft is not, has never been, and will not be a strategic system. We know that it has been your wish to have the TU–22M limited somehow in connection with the START treaty. We are ready to give you a unilateral commitment, even though it is not required. We are giving it in order to resolve other issues. The commitment would be not to give this aircraft the capability to operate at intercontinental distances. We are also ready to say we will not exceed a numerical limit on that aircraft. That we are ready to do with regard to an airplane that is not intercontinental and not related to strategic armaments. We want to do that and are ready to do that to ally fears and concerns.

Bartholomew: Let’s not repeat 15-year-old arguments. You know this is a problem to be solved. The question is whether you appreciate the problem to be solved, as we appreciated SLCMs as a problem to be solved. The issue is not inside or outside START. The issue is the form and content of the outside commitment. The form and content you propose is not a solution. The form does not give a politically binding commitment as we are prepared to do on SLCMs. The content omits refueling, and most important the number omits naval Backfire.

Karpov: I don’t understand why a letter by the Secretary of State on Tacit Rainbow is binding, but a letter by the Foreign Minister on the TU–22M is not.

Bartholomew: I will make you a proposal: we will make the SLCM deal a letter.

Karpov: Such a letter on Tacit Rainbow was given by Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. If you would like something like that on Backfire, we are ready to give it.

Bartholomew: To put Tacit Rainbow in the same category as Backfire makes me wonder if you want to solve this problem. Whether you like it or I like it, this is an important issue. The question is whether you are going to cooperate with us on Backfire, as we cooperated with you on SLCMs. In form or content you have not shown the effort to solve this problem. And you have not spoken at all on the problem of resubordination.

Karpov: After all, we proposed from the outset that CFE include naval armaments. So why don’t we stop this discussion and address this specific statement and what you need for that statement. What I said, and I am ready to confirm, with regard to Backfire, is that we are ready to give a pledge not to give it the capability to operate at intercontinental distances. We can consider a reference to refueling. “In any manner” would appear to cover all possibilities, therefore it would appear that a reference to refueling would be redundant. With regard to naval aircraft, this can be discussed in the context of naval forces.

Bartholomew: Don’t import the problem of naval Backfire from CFE into the START declaration. You haven’t addressed the problem of omission of naval aircraft. This allows you to change air force Backfire to naval Backfire, as you have for hundreds of other aircraft. This is hilarious. Both range capability and number are important to us.

If you want naval force reductions, you are not helping your cause here. This is not much of a cause, and you are not helping it. Why don’t we resubordinate the F–16s in Europe to the Navy? In fact, we can move the same number of B–52s to our Navy as there are naval Backfire in the Soviet Union. How do I answer this problem when I get hit with it?

Karpov: Allow me to say the problem of naval armaments has been on the agenda for a long time. We have long proposed naval negotiations. The US opposes this. As you proposed, naval aircraft are not covered by the mandate of CFE. More specifically, we are ready to make a pledge not to give the TU–22M intercontinental capability in any manner. We are ready to pledge not to increase the number above a limit, but we cannot include naval aircraft, these are not on the agenda of CFE. If you are ready to begin negotiations on naval aircraft, we are ready to begin today.

Bartholomew: SLCMs are naval armaments, SLBMs are naval armaments, what you are saying is contrary to your mission on the eve of the summit, which is finding solutions to problems.

Karpov: We are proposing to find a mutually acceptable solution. You say it is no good. If we take the same attitude, we will not make progress on anything. We have proposed a solution, and are saying we are ready to allay your concerns.

Bartholomew: You must know such a crass attempt to use such a sensitive issue as Backfire to leverage naval armaments talks cannot succeed, and can only hurt other efforts. And you have no word on other issues?

Karpov: If we do not arrive at any solution here, that would not be a disaster for the summit.

Bartholomew: Take another look at the draft declaration.⁴ We gave you a considered effort to find a solution. You have not responded on the fatal flaw—that any aircraft can be omitted by calling it naval. This issue has to be resolved.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, Soviet Summit Memcons, May 1990. Secret. Drafted on June 26. The meeting took place in the T Conference Room.
2. Not found.
3. Not found.
4. Not found.