137. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- START, CFE, Open Skies
PARTICIPANTS
- Bartholomew
- Burt
- Hadley
- Graves
- Lehman
- Kanter
- Woolsey
- Brooks
- Timbie (notetaker)
- Karpov
- Nazarkin
- Grinevsky
- Masterkov
- Koltunov
- Roslyakov
- Batsanov
- Sokov
Bartholomew: I can give you a US text2 of a joint statement on START. It draws on the Soviet text, and reflects only issues that are already agreed. We hope to reach further agreement by the time it is issued by our leaders. I can list for you the areas where we hope to agree:
- —
- Backfire. We gave you in Moscow a politically binding statement.
- —
- PPCM. We gave you in Moscow draft elements of common ground.
- —
- Heavy ICBMs. We could record agreement to 2 heavy ICBM flight tests per year.
- —
- ICBM warhead limit.
- —
- Non-circumvention.
All of these can be addressed in the joint statement, and our agreement recorded there. Brooks and Masterkov should take on the START joint statement, Burt and Nazarkin should work the future negotiations joint statement, and they can report back to us. They can also review the list of outstanding issues and report back to us on that.
(Burt, Brooks, Nazarkin, Masterkov, Batsanov, Koltunov, and Roslyakov leave)
[Omitted here is a discussion of the CFE Treaty and Open Skies.]
[Page 741]Bartholomew: I will ask Amb. Burt to address START, and bring us up to date on the discussions with Nazarkin.
Burt: My review is fairly gloomy. Amb. Nazarkin and I reviewed non-circumvention,3 and the positions have not changed overnight. For us this is an issue that could mean no treaty on START.
On mobiles, verification and sublimit, there is a technical question to be addressed with verification. While the US did not like the Soviet ideas, there are possibilities we could work with. We can follow up in a technical group.
On heavy ICBMs, we are prepared to close with 2 flight tests per year. Nazarkin is prepared to close with a reference to heavy missiles in the statement on future negotiations.
On Backfire, I outlined the three elements of our position—no intercontinental capability, a ceiling of 400, and inclusion of all Backfire in the ATTU in CFE—and made clear the limit had to cover all Backfire.
On third country basing and warhead destruction, we reiterated existing positions.
On phasing of reductions and PPCM we made no headway, and I suggest the technical group should also address phasing of reductions as well as PPCM. I recommend the technical group get underway first thing tomorrow morning. Heavy ICBMs, non-circumvention, and Backfire could be handled at the political level, mobile verification, PPCM, and phasing of reductions by the technical group.
On the joint statement on future negotiations, we dealt with a draft text that became considerably more complicated as a result of the discussion last night. Despite that, I can report there are only two basic differences.
First, the third para deals with the discussion in future negotiations of the relationship between offense and defense. Here the Soviet Union has bracketed the entire para. We may have a solution to keeping the para, the only solution acceptable to us—continue negotiations on ABM and space, in which the sides will work toward the goal of an early outcome. We would maintain the existing framework of negotiations, with no subordinate role for defense and space in the overall NST negotiations.
Second, another para deals with the US effort to seek measures that reduce the concentration of MIRVs. The Soviets gave us some ideas and we will consider them. So now the sides have to consult among themselves.
[Page 742]Brooks says he had a useful session with Masterkov on the effort to merge the US and Soviet short statements. Brooks explained the merger we propose, and pointed out why this is better than the lengthier version. So the American side is ready when your side is ready to work the START joint statement.
Masterkov: We had a preliminary discussion of the short draft statement proposed by the US side. We did not discuss which statement to adopt—short or long. That must be taken up at a different level. With regard to the text of the short statement, our first impression is that it is a serious job. The US took into account many elements proposed by the Soviet side. Some provisions require closer study. We have to say very carefully and faithfully what has been achieved in START. We agree to continue as soon as practicable, hopefully this afternoon.
Nazarkin: Masterkov has reviewed the status of the joint statement on START. Amb. Burt reflected accurately the state of our discussions.
Bartholomew: I see here three procedural ideas. First, both sides need to consider further the joint statement on future negotiations tomorrow. Second, the technical group will convene tomorrow at 9:00, or whenever Brooks decides, to take up the list enumerated by Burt. Third, Masterkov and Brooks will arrange to meet to pursue further the joint statement on START.
We think the shorter START version is the best option. It does show how much we have done, it is presidential in tone and character, and it does publicize the essential and critical elements. We don’t want to precipitate ratification problems in either country.
You and I will meet tomorrow at 11:00. We can begin with the statement on future negotiations, review progress on the joint statement on START, take stock of CFE, review CW, and review where we are on Open Skies.
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, Soviet Summit Memcons, May 1990. Secret. Drafted by Timbie on June 19. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary’s Conference Room.↩
- Not found.↩
- No memorandum of conversation was found.↩