Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

136. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 27, 1990, 11 a.m.–1:30 p.m., 3:30–5:30 p.m., 7:30–9:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• START, CFE

PARTICIPANTS

• Bartholomew
• Burt
• Hadley
• Graves
• Lehman
• Kanter
• Woolsey
• Brooks
• Clarke
• Timbie (notetaker)
• Karpov
• Nazarkin
• Grinevsky
• Masterkov
• Koltunov
• Roslyakov
• Batsanov
• Sokov

Bartholomew: Our goal is to assure a successful summit between our two Presidents. For our part, this means achieving certain arms control objectives. First, we want to reach a meeting of minds on ideas we brought to Moscow for bringing CFE to an early conclusion. We will want to consider a possible joint statement on CFE our leaders might issue. We will also want to resolve the outstanding START issues that were discussed in Moscow—heavy ICBMs, mobile ICBM sublimit and verification, Backfire, ICBM sublimit, and non-circumvention. We can pursue two joint statements on strategic arms, one recording the progress that has been made and the second on future negotiations. On Open Skies, we aim to reach an understanding on the essential elements to open the way to a new meeting that might conclude a treaty, and we have drafted a joint statement to reflect and record this. I see Batsanov, but note that the Chemical Weapons and nuclear testing work seems to have been successfully accomplished, and don’t see what is left to do.

We need to complete our work by Wednesday.² We should plan to meet daily as required. We would like to hear your views on the agenda for these meetings. I propose that we discuss all subjects today, starting with CFE. Would like you to begin, both because you are our guest and because we want your views on the ideas we put forward in Moscow on CFE. Finally, I propose that we move to a smaller group, with the others available on standby as needed.

Karpov: We believe we have already laid good groundwork in the draft joint papers for the summit. Perhaps it would be a good idea to finalize work on those papers, and proceed to negotiations on further issues. What I have in mind is that the document on START is basically agreed, but portions require additional work. This has been largely worked out with Amb. Burt in discussions in Geneva. In addition, there could be a more concise document for the press, etc. We share that approach, and have some ideas to propose.

We also have not yet completed work on a statement on future negotiations on strategic arms and strategic stability. And we have a number of proposals and considerations to raise for discussion. It would be a good idea to establish a working group to close on those two statements, and report back to us. We need not involve Burt and Nazarkin in that endeavor. On our side would be Masterkov and Koltunov. That group could report back to us tomorrow, perhaps with an agreed text.

Second are chemical weapons and non-proliferation. Almost all points are agreed upon, there is one outstanding issue. Lehman and Batsanov can put their heads together. There is a minor point with regard to CW, whether on not Presidents will issue an appeal to the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate work on the Chemical Weapons Convention. The US and USSR have demonstrated a desire to complete the CWC, and others should accelerate work as well. We have in mind a brief, concise, energetic call on others to accelerate their work on the CWC.

We also have a statement on SLCMs that is almost agreed upon. We have some editorial changes. The group with Masterkov and Koltunov could work on that as well.

Turning to the joint statements on Open Skies and CFE, with regard to the Vienna negotiations, it is not only the Soviet side that owes an answer. During the ministerial in Moscow the US proposals were not the only proposals, there were Soviet ideas as well. I hope you have come up with responses. I note regretably that on some CFE issues I did not have complete clarity when I left Moscow. I hope to have answers by 5:00 to 6:00 this evening.

Finally, another issue that should be addressed is a statement by Presidents that the two sides meet in September to discuss further limits on the number and yield of nuclear tests.

Bartholomew: We have raphrochment on ideas on how to prodeed. I ask as a point of information what the one issue is on CW.

Batsanov: When we parted with Ledogar on Friday,³ there was not complete clarity on the results achieved at that time. In particular, there is one formulation in the bilateral agreement, in para 1 of article VI of the draft agreement. It conveys the sense that the multilateral convention may provide other levels than 500 tons. This could provide an incentive to others to press for other levels.

Karpov: We would like to avoid creating an impression that the pace of reduction in the CWC could be more leisurely than the US and Soviet agreed solution. There are no substantive changes. But we want another look at that language. Batsanov: Another point to address is the procedure for signing.

Bartholomew: We want to begin with CFE, because of both its political and military significance. But we will wait until 5:00–6:00. And let me simply say that you heard more from us in Moscow on CFE than we heard from you. On CW, I suggest we leave that to Batsanov and Lehman to work out, they can arrange to get together to discuss the question you have raised. I take note of your ideas on the START statements, and how to tackle them in a subgroup.

(The meeting continued in a smaller group following the departure of Woolsey, Grinevsky, and Batsanov)

Bartholomew: On the joint statement on agreed START issues, we have reflected on the question of whether we should have a detailed statement or a shorter version. Our conclusion is that the second approach may be better. All of us appreciate that the Soviet draft⁴ is a fair-handed statement. This is not a reaction to your draft. We understand you have prepared a shorter version.⁵ Perhaps Masterkov and Brooks can look at it. We too have a shorter version.⁶ We need to look at both drafts for shorter statements and review where we stand.

Karpov: We have prepared a shorter four-page draft, which I could hand over. While we were working on this draft, we did not lose sight of the broader document. Both have a right to exist. They would enable our Presidents to describe concisely what has been achieved, and set the objective of completing the treaty by the end of the year. The longer version would allow those with more interest to get into more detail. That kind of paper would be useful, and help avoid misunderstandings such as in the Smith article in the Washington Post in early April. We do believe we need to weigh this carefully and take a considered decision, taking into account the sort of questions that may be raised in the final press conference and in the media after that.

Bartholomew: I take note of your statement. We have an equally strong interest in avoiding factual errors and tendentious criticisms made by the outside world. The question we have is whether a detailed joint statement is the best way to meet this need, whether the best course is not a shorter statement. Let us have Masterkov and Brooks look at your shorter statement, and we have one to look at as well, and then we will have to discuss this further. I will report to Secretary Baker and others what you have to say on this point.

Karpov: OK. Our idea is to parallel the short statement with a longer one.

(At this point Brooks left with Masterkov, Roslyakov, and Koltunov.)

Karpov: A solution to a number of outstanding issues is necessary for the summit. Let us begin with mobile ICBMs, including notifications and a sublimit.

The disagreement on notifications concerns how detailed they should be—every day notifications when a launcher left and returned, or aggregate notifications for one or two weeks without specific details. Let me note we are talking about routine movements that do not involve launchers leaving the deployment area. With regard to instances where launchers leave the deployment area, notification would be required, this is dealt with separately. Col. Koltunov tells me there is agreement on exercise dispersals even within the deployment area. So we have a very clearly defined subject to discuss—movements of a routine nature. I have three options for your consideration:

— 1. Notification once a month on the overall aggregate number of mobile ICBMs outside restricted areas, for each 10-day period of the preceding month, for all deployment areas in sum.

— 2. Notification once a month on the aggregate number of mobile ICBM launchers outside restricted areas, for the entire preceding month, plus notification for one deployment area chosen at the descretion of the verifying side.

— 3. Provide notification once a month with regard to the overall number of mobile ICBM launchers on routine movements outside restricted areas, separately for each day in the preceding month, for all deployment areas together.

If we could agree on one of these options, we are ready to lower the 1200 level. That is the essense of our approach.

Bartholomew: First, technical though it may be, this will be a crucial issue politically here, and affect the view taken of START by the Senate. This issue will bear on us more immediately than on you. My second observation is that is why it was so difficult for Washington to agree to the line Burt took in Geneva. I note the range of options you have laid out, but they don’t put us in reach of a solution.

Burt: We have two guiding principles. First, we are searching for effective verification, without in any way undermining the security, the survivability of mobile ICBMs. Second, we want no undue burdens. We need an approach to notification that, together with tagging and other provisions, all taken together can guard against illegal missiles. Perhaps your options might provide us something we could build on. For example, every two weeks, or once a month, for each deployment area, there could be notification of how many missiles were outside each restricted area on a daily basis. That would be something we could consider. Break down the deployment areas into restricted areas and notify the number of mobiles outside each restricted area each day. Let me emphasize these are post-notifications, not pre-notifications. They would not affect survivability, and would impose no undue burden. I suggest later this evening when you are addressing CFE, Nazarkin and Koltunow and I could explore this subject in more detail.

Bartholomew: I have a question on the mobile sublimit. You know our preference was to ban mobile ICBM MIRVs, as part of a program to reduce the concentration of MIRVs, leading eventually to elimination on land-based MIRVs. Your side said this is a subject for subsequent negotiations, and our side is prepared to have a sublimit as an interim step. Your side proposes 1200 and we propose 800. Secretary Baker said in Moscow let’s split the difference. Why don’t you say da?

Nazarkin: Let us split the difference between 800 and 1600.

Bartholomew: There are two serious negotiating proposals—first your 1200, then our 800. The ball is in your court.

Karpov: Our 1600 proposal was serious, and our drop of 400 from that was serious.

Bartholomew: You know your program. I have some knowledge of your program. You know that I have some knowledge of your program. The split solution does good things for START, and does not cause a problem for you.

Karopv: Our position on a warhead sublimit for mobile ICBMs takes into account the solution on mobile ICBM notification.

Bartholomew: You have the linkage backwards. I could offer you flexibility in warheads, as I have on 1000. This should be an inducement to you not only to resolve the mobile ICBM sublimit, but to come to terms with us on essential verification measures as well.

Karpov: We do not believe we need sublimits on mobile ICBM warheads. Mobility means survivability, provides a means for assuring survivability. So we regard the issues of verification and sublimit to be related, and should take into account survivability.

Bartholomew: I need to underscore, as Burt did, we have no interest in any arrangement that would threaten survivability. Nothing we have proposed would come near that. Verification is critical both substantively and politically. The number is important, but verification is critical.

Karpov: This is a question of interpretation, of how each side sees the threshold needed for survivability. We need to ensure operational conditions that allow for survivability. We support verification that will provide confidence to the US that there are not mobile ICBMs beyond the limits. Why don’t we ask our two ambassadors to take a closer look with a view to providing both survivability and verification.

Bartholomew: I invite you in the time remaining to address heavy ICBMs.

Karpov: We did study this subject carefully in Moscow, taking into account the discussion at the Moscow ministerial, including the points Gorbachev made to Baker. We think the solutions that have already been agreed upon—reduce heavy ICBMs to 154 with 1540 warheads—are effective and serve the purposes of the treaty. In addition, we have also agreed to ban new types of heavy ICBMs, leaving the opportunity to modernize within agreed limits. And we have also agreed on the need to ban mobile heavy ICBMs. As for other constraints on heavy ICBMs, they need to be addressed in the next stage of negotiations dealing with further reductions and strategic stability. We are ready to make a reference in the statement on future negotiations, a reference to the problem of heavy ICBMs in the context of future negotiations.

Bartholomew: We need to focus on heavy ICBMs for stability reasons. I don’t need to underscore for you the political importance of this issue as well. That is a matter of record. After the Moscow ministerial there has been a great deal of attention here on this issue. This is not an easy issue for you, we understand that. We persevere because of the importance on heavy ICBMs both politically and for stability, an importance that goes beyond START. That said, what we are looking for here is movement on your part to close this off.

We are prepared to drop our Moscow proposal for a cutoff in production of SS-18s if we can establish a limit of 2 heavy ICBM flight tests per year, and on the assumption that the question of these missiles and their elimination will be specified in the statement on future negotiations.

Karpov: You will note I did not say reference in the joint statement to elimination. We will refer to the problem of heavy missiles.

Bartholomew: Let me explain why we need the flight test limits. Two flight tests a year would not only allow you to maintain the viability of the SS–18 force, but to continue its modernization with the Mod 5 and 6. This is a major change in the US position, accepting the inevitability of the modernization program now underway. What 2 flight tests would not permit is development of Mods 7, 8, and 9. In light of where we want to go in future negotiations, and the evolution of the international situation we want to see, there is no reason to pursue Mods 7, 8, and 9. Two flight tests per year allows the Mods 5 and 6, and puts a hold on further modernization past that point. This limit on flight testing also prevents development of new, more capable types of heavy ICBMs, as we have have agreed would not be done, while maintaining confidence in existing types.

Karpov: Let me say again that we have weighed carefully all the proposals made by the US, and we can’t go further than what we have proposed. President Gorbachev made this clear to Secretary Baker in Moscow. We cannot limit heavy missiles further in this negotiation, we can return to this in future negotiations.

(Break to 3:30 p.m.)

Bartholomew: I invite you to address the question of Backfire.

Karpov: I expect to receive some information from Moscow and suggest we postpone this subject to this evening, when I will be prepared to engage on this question.

Bartholomew: Let us then turn briefly to non-circumvention. In Moscow our negotiators worked out a solution. The Ministers reviewed that solution. Your minister said he wished to consider the documents further. Can you tell me this issue is now closed?

Karpov: I believe it would be premature to say the issue is closed. During the Moscow ministerial Minister Shevardnadze suggested the US should make a more detailed statement regarding its strategic cooperation with Britain. And the way that material was proposed in the US draft drew criticism from Minister Shevardnadze. Additional study did not remove concerns regarding the additional document with the US statement on its commitments to Britain. It appears that this commitment has been couched in very broad terms, and provides for expanding cooperation with the UK over and above Trident. In that connection we propose the following complete solution to the non-circumvention problem:

— The tentatively agreed text for Article XIII, as agreed in Moscow, we can consider an agreed text.

— We should also propose to consider the draft agreed statement an agreed text with some editorial changes. In particular, we confirm that the word “numerical” has been dropped. This text can be considered agreed.

— We are ready to take note of the US statement regarding cooperation with Great Britain with respect to Trident. At the same time we believe the US doesn’t have any patterns of cooperation with countries other than Great Britain that apply to transfer of strategic offensive arms, and the program of cooperation with Great Britain applies only to Trident. Therefore, we believe the text must explicitly rule out transfer of any other strategic offensive arms besides Trident to Great Britain, and must rule out transfer by Great Britain. Regarding the proposal that was made by the US in Geneva, concerning the agreed statement on transfer, the existing provisions of the conversion or elimination protocol do not contain provisions for transfer. This is consistent with paras II. 9 and VII. 1 of the joint draft text.

— For our part, we are prepared to make the following statement: In connection with the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the USSR is hearby confirming it does not have existing commitments or patterns of cooperation involving transfer of strategic offensive arms.

This would constitute a basis for agreement.

Burt: Do I understand you to say under the approach you are proposing the US would be able to follow through with the Trident II sale to the UK, but beyond that no further cooperation would be permitted?

Karpov: Future cooperation can be continued, but must be limited to existing practices. In making an exemption from the ban on transfer, we always talked about existing practices. Even in the future, that must be the limit, from which we are making an exemption.

Burt: So that cooperation cannot go beyond Trident II?

Karpov: Practices that exist today cannot be expanded, and must not apply to other strategic systems.

Burt: I am extremely disappointed and worried by what the Soviet side has told us today. As I have explained in Moscow and in Geneva, US cooperation with the UK on these issues goes back many, many years, to World War II. The US Polaris program with Great Britain did not interfere with SALT in the 1970s; the US program went ahead. The year we concluded SALT II we concluded the agreement to transfer Trident I. The program evolved as arms control also went ahead. Subsequently the program evolved again, this time with Trident II. In December 1989 we made a detailed statement to your delegation on our cooperation with the UK. The UK has a legal sovereign right to maintain an independent nuclear deterent. The US attaches great importance to that right. We are committed to a broad pattern of cooperation aimed at maintaining and modernizing that capability.

I am amazed at this turn of events. Six months ago we made clear that we would help Britain maintain and modernize their independent nuclear deterent. At the Washington ministerial we discussed language for article XIII. We were never told the Soviet position is that cooperation cannot go beyond Trident II. In Geneva, we worked on an agreed statement. Again the Soviets never said we could not go beyond Trident II. In Moscow we listened to minister Shevardnadze, and talked to you and Nazarkin and others, there was no mention of limiting cooperation to Trident II. Aside from the substance, which jeopardizes the treaty, there is a procedural problem. We are being told on the eve of the summit that US/UK cooperation, which goes back to World War II, now must come to a end as a price for this treaty. I urge the Soviet side to take a look at this position. It pushes the United States to make a choice between its traditional ties to a close ally, or entering into START on those terms. I don’t think you want us to make this choice.

Karpov: Let me merely say this question was brought up by Minister Shevardnadze when at the last plenary he said he took a critical attitude toward the US unilateral statement, and it required further study.

Nazarkin: I merely want to say I am surprized at the statement by Amb. Burt, who says this is the first time we have raised US cooperation with the UK. We expressed our concern over US/UK cooperation in strategic offensive arms as far back as last year. The December US statement was a result of that Soviet concern. Later on when in 1990 we returned to non-circumvention, I did explain that we still have concerns regarding cooperation with third countries other than the UK, and cooperation with the UK on systems other that Trident II. I remember clearly you told me that you have commitments with respect to the UK, not only Trident II but also maintaining the UK deterent. I noted this but did not agree to it. During the last ministerial in Moscow, you made a statement which removes our concern regarding countries other than Britain. In Moscow Minister Shevardnadze and Mr. Karpov and I mentioned we still have concern regarding the pattern of US/UK cooperation other than Trident II.

Bartholomew: I need to be very clear. The government of the United States will not enter into a strategic arms treaty that (as the terms you just stated) require it to sacrifice its cooperation with the UK. We will not bound or limit our cooperation with the United Kingdom. Point two, we have been open and clear about this since the negotiations began, even before the current START negotiations. Point three, this issue has been followed closely and carefully at high levels. I must tell you I cannot understand the position you are presenting to us at the 11th hour. My fourth point is that the proposal that we have made and you have agreed to, and the US statement, is the path to resolving this issue consistent with what we are trying to achieve in START. The path you have today opened for the first time leads to no treaty. Finally, I would ask you to give full weight to what I have said, to look again at this question and your position, and ask you to consider the fact that what we have done with your representative involves more movement by the US than any other agreement on this question.

Karpov: This question has been raised and we want to reaffirm that this is a complex issue, not easily resolved. We appreciate that. This will be a 15-year treaty. It imposes limits on US and Soviet forces, and we must be certain there is no loophole for transfer of equipment to third countries. Therefore, the treaty which we are negotiating must not open up a new channel for expanded transfer of strategic offensive arms to third countries. We do appreciate that the US made a statement to the effect that it does not have a pattern of transfering strategic offensive arms to countries other than the UK. However, we would like stated in no uncertain terms that there is no possibility of further expanding across the spectrum of treaty limited items.

That is the essense of our position. There is not an insurmountable problem here. We want existing practices not expanded, no expansion to other types and kinds of strategic offensive arms.

Burt: I have one question. What you have said now sounds different from what you said earlier. Are you suggesting that the real Soviet position is that the US can provide SLBM technology to the UK indefinitely, but not other systems? Is that the real position? Every time we meet Soviet concerns, the Soviet position changes.

Karpov: No, our position has not changed. I am talking about a point you brought up. There is one exemption from the ban on transfer of treaty limited items—the pattern of cooperation regarding Trident II. There is an exemption for that pattern of cooperation. Otherwise the ban applies to all treaty limited items without exception.

Burt: Your statement about what we agreed to is not accurate. We said our program of cooperation is to maintain and modernize the independent nuclear deterrent of the UK. There can be no misunderstanding, we are holding open the option for Trident III, Trident IV, Trident 24, any step necessary to maintain and modernize the independent nuclear deterrent of the UK. It goes beyond Trident II, and goes beyond SLBMs.

Karpov: Let me make a comment. You refer to your December statement. However, in addition there was also a statement that described the essense on your cooperation on the Trident system. If you were to transfer cruise missiles, that would represent an expansion of existing practices. Trident III, Trident 24 causes considerable doubt. You say the USSR must not modernize its heavy missiles, no 7, 8, etc. Yet you hold open the option to modernize and transfer missiles to the UK.

Bartholomew: Rather than respond, let me come back to the essentials. I invite your attention to the carefully considered statement of our policy. We have been clear and open about this for a long period of time. The US government will not enter into a treaty that would require it to sacrifice our cooperation with the United Kingdom or limit it to the present program. We proposed a solution which goes beyond previous solutions. This represents the only path to conclusion of a treaty. There is nothing further to say.

Do you have anything to tell us on other START issues?

Karpov: I would like to address the ban on stationing strategic offensive arms on third country territory. This is not a new subject, it has been discussed in Geneva. A ban on stationing would not prevent port calls of warships or carrying out joint maneuvers involving strategic offensive arms, or prevent testing of strategic offensive arms in the territory of third countries. The ban would represent a ban on stationing, and not interfere with freedom of navigation, the practice of flights above open seas, of the passage of warships. These comments are meant to exclude any possible misinterpretation of a ban on stationing.

Bartholomew: Let me simply say that you are aware of our position, and I note the points you have made. Burt and Nazarkin can address this.

Karpov: With respect to elimination of warheads, let me emphasize that in the process of reductions, it is necessary to eliminate the frames of warheads and ALCMs. This is important for ratification by the Supreme Soviet. What are actually reduced are not only the delivery vehicles but also the warheads.

Bartholomew: But ALCMs and ALCM warheads are not limited in the treaty.

Karpov: I am refering to ALCMs, refering to the counting rules. Each nuclear cruise missile is counted as 1 warhead within the 6000. We are proposing that when we eliminate a heavy bomber, we also eliminate the number of long-range ALCMs attributed to that type of heavy bomber. For example, if 10 ALCMs are attributed, 10 ALCM warheads and frames would be eliminated. If 8 ALCMs are attributed, 8 ALCM warheads and frames would be eliminated.

Bartholomew: Amb. Nazarkin and Masterkov know from the discussion in Geneva that we do not agree to ALCM elimination. This will have to continue to be discussed among them.

Karpov: We are aware of this. This is a very serious issue. It serves as a litmus test of the seriousness of the treaty, the destruction not only of delivery vehicles but warheads themselves.

(Break until 7:30 p.m.)

Karpov: If we reach agreement on the problem of heavy missiles on the basis of what is already agreed, the Soviet Union can consider the possibility of taking a commitment not to render the Tu-22M capable of operating at intercontinental distances, and does not intend to exceed a certain numerical level. Since this is a medium range bomber, it must be addressed in CDE. The question regarding inclusion of naval aircraft, including Backfire, is not subject to discussion, this will be discussed in the framework of naval armamants.

Bartholomew: I am not going to go to square one, to the dawn of the negotiations, to decide who has made the most concessions. Since Malta, our leaders agreed we are going to make a special effort to meet each other’s particular concerns. You had three major concerns—ALCM range, overall SLCM limit, and ALCM heavy bomber limit. On all three, we made a special effort to accommodate you. On all three we reversed long and strongly-held American positions. At no point did we try to define the anatomy of the negotiations. Now we hear about linkages and leverages. We need something on each—heavy missiles and Backfire. I can permit Burt and Nazarkin to examine Backfire on its own terms. I have a question—what’s the number?

Karpov: I have listened with interest to your dissertation on linkage.

Bartholomew: If we could reach agreement on a politically binding Backfire statement, we are prepared to withdraw our proposal to list Backfire as a heavy bomber in START.

Karpov: We never recognized the legitimacy of counting TU–22M as a strategic heavy bomber. The tradeoff you propose is artificial. In SALT II the US recognized the TU–22M was a medium-range bomber, and the only restriction was on rendering intercontinental capability. Amb. Burt and Nazarkin can handle this.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the CFE Treaty.]

Bartholomew: Let us continue tomorrow with START and Open Skies.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, Soviet Summit Memcons, May 1990. Secret. Drafted on June 5. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary’s Conference Room.
2. May 25.
3. Not found.
4. Not found.
5. Not found.
6. Not found.