126. Editorial Note
On May 18, 1990, the 11:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m. meeting of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Subgroup of the Arms Control Working Group (see Document 125) coincided with an 11 a.m.–4 p.m. meeting in the Kremlin among Secretary of State James Baker, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, during which they discussed the U.S.-Soviet relationship, German reunification, and unrest in the Baltic republics, among other topics, according to the memorandum of conversation drafted by Director of Policy Planning Staff Dennis Ross. Toward the end of that meeting, Gorbachev invited in members of the Arms Control Working Group for a one and one-half hour discussion on START, during which Ross did not take notes. (Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US/Soviet Memos of Conversation—1989/1990). The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
In telegram SECTO 7015 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Moscow, May 19, Baker transmitted a memorandum for President George Bush in which he summarized the portion of his May 18 meeting with Gorbachev absent from the official memorandum of conversation: “At this point, we invited a larger group in to join us and turned to arms control. We closed—or so I thought—on ALCMs, agreeing to count as ‘actually equipped’ heavy bombers over our preferred number of 150, and a ‘grandfathering’ of Tacit Rainbow. We agreed on 880 for the SLCM numerical limit, and got them to drop their distinguishability requirement for SLCM in return for our reaffirming the language of the [Page 706] Washington Summit of December 1987 on being willing to explore the possibilities of verification. The only remaining SLCM issue is range, where there is a built-in tradeoff in the works.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N900003–0340)
“Following the Gorbachev meeting,” Baker went on to report, “it looked like we were on the verge of closing out ALCMs and SLCMs and the remaining START issues. Unfortunately, in another example of walking back after the fact—in this case after Gorbachev had explicitly agreed—we were told that the grandfathering of Tacit Rainbow was agreed, provided we accepted a number of constraints on the missile. I told Shevardnadze we had agreed to the ALCM range only on the condition that Tacit Rainbow was exempted. Gorbachev had mentioned no conditions. He had simply agreed to exempt the missile. I said now the Soviets were jeopardizing the whole package if they let the military impose certain technical conditions after the agreement had already been reached. While I think we may still come to closure, we got another reminder of the military’s role in the process and what it’s like to do business now.” (Ibid.)