Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

127. Notes of a Meeting¹

Moscow, May 19, 1990, 1:40 p.m.

G—Summarize on arms control.

JB—Human rights

Arms Control

New proposals in Bonn. Disc. since arrived. Some progress—not enuf. Not res. rem. issues in START GB hopeful we could reach agree. on ALCMs/SLCMs here Prog. on non-circumvention. NTT ready. CW progress

ES—Most diff. in START—ALCMs/SLCMs # US heavy bombers w. ALCMs. US made import. accom. step—in prin. allow limit. (1) #—180—too high. Maybe here compromise (2) Dist. features on SLCMs—US against No spec. verif. measures on SLCMs—agree none Not easy for us. (3) Exch. of info on sea launched weapons over 300 km range. (4) Except. For TACIT RAINBOW

G—Overall status of verif? Import. for ratif.

ES—Other than SLCMs, resolved

JB—prob. w. road mobiles

ES—No obj. Iin prin—but practical problems

G—US wants 40–50 notif. from us on road mobile, but give none on SLCMs?

ES—not comparable.

G—US once wanted no disc. of SLCMs. We said w/o clarity on SLCMs, no Treaty. We just trust US word?

ES—Declar. will be made—but take Am. word.

G—Why US not take our word + want stringent verf What do we tell Sup Sov

JB—Two weeks ago—major diff on ALCMs/SLCMs—(First) ALCM range # of 600 km, At Bonn told ES—if other aspects agreed (Tacit Rain) US come to 600. Met USSR on that issue (Second) overall SLCM limit—agreed in Bonn to limit of 1000. (Third) heavy bomber limit—agreed yes to prin. of counting bombers over # as equipped.

No agreement on #. Met your pos. on 3 major areas in disagree. as recently as 3 weeks ago. Still have ques. of range on SLCMs—declare all over 300 km. You 600. You raising ques. of declar of other weapons than SLCMs. Major problems with disting of SLCMs.

1 - Polit declare apart from treaty

Nuc. ALCMs in Treaty. Only US nuc. ALCMs—strat.

thousands of conv. ALCMs—indistinguish ALCM approach to diff. situation. Back door verifc. of SLCMs—not verifiable—arg. for hand. sep. from Treaty. You know from budget how many we have—

Also—US has met major Sov concerns in three areas.

ES—We too have made concessions—biggest on SLCMs—polit. declar approach.

G—How sell to Sup Sov?

ES—dropped demand to inspect US ships + subs

G—Are you worried about insp. of ships on SLCMs because you have SLCMs on many various kinds of ships—how about random inspection—perhaps 2 insp. a year. don’t want Sov insp on US ships

JB—Slippery slope—verif

G—Strict, small, surprise quota. Not right to verif? What bothers you about this.

JB—Whole question of SLCMs. Welcomed sep. declaration

G—No treatment of this threatens treaty. Limited verif.

JB—Is—max limit statement. If Treaty jeop. cause can’t verify SLCMs, then in jeop. Sell on same basis we sell. No ban on mod. of heavy ICBMs. Sought for long time—you say non-negot.

G—single out SLCMs for sep. treatment. More than polit. declar—more serious doc. If so, beyond limits, mech for inspection. Bothered by verif. of entire US Navy? Ok—respond. 2 insp. a year—100s of ships—insignif.

JB—If we go w. restraints under T, C. want to verify rest. Can’t verify SLCMs—no way.

G—random inspections.

JB—Not effective regime.

G—no verif at all?

JB—Yes—outside treaty. Mistake to agree to regime that Cong. sees can’t be enforced. Serious effort to move in your direction on ALCMs + SLCMs—ALCM range, limit on SLCMs, limit on heavy bombers.

ES—main concession by Sovs. SLCMs outside treaty

G—Impression—USSR—50% reduct—biggest concession. reduce heavies 50%. What you list is peanuts.

JB—Tell our Congress!

G—1st time I’ve been invited to speak to Cong. Sov mil forces—50%—dismant. 100s modern msls—US gets rid of junk. Legit question—People will say leader reducing msls that are backbone of our force. Conseq. of US position longer # of a/c, SLCMs? Previously sys. USSR didn’t focus on. Conseq—hinder arms control. Serious sit—planes, ships, SLCMs vague limit.

JB—You say big Sov concession. SLCMs outside Treaty. Accept that. Makes treaty poss. Now deal w. it that way. Have met major Sov concerns. Limit heavy bombers, etc. Don’t think reflects badly on future of arms control. Limits valid 15 yrs.

G—2 here from mil. What they say about bombers, CMs

AK—True—SLCMs break thru in Wash—take out of treaty—bas in—1987—decided should be limit—will find way to verify. If no way to verify found, Sov side tried, US didn’t. True, accept limit but no verif. poses prob. for USSR.

G—Sup Sov say we’re too soft + ques. US motives. Result—no ratif.

JB—decl. issued every yr. Polit. binding. Transparent US system

G—If so clear, why not know how many.

JB—do know. Not by accid. you propose 760—w/in two.

G. Out intell knows. Mr. Gates knows.

JB—Wash—will seek to find way to verify. Don’t think is a way.

G—Then say in dec. We will seek way to verify.

JB—repeat Wash. statement?

G—At least, if polit state, notif. Sides should say will cont. to seek ways to verify SLCMs. Then argue for Sup. Sov. If can’t record progress. at least restate old pos—or retrogressive—Barth.—hidden agenda Find way to combine Ak + B views. If add to polit. declar old lang—helps us get treaty. Think about this.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Robert M. Gates Files, Memorandum of Conversation Files, OA/ID 91166–007, I Bob Gates Memcons 1989–1992 [7]. No classification marking. Drafted by Gates, who handwrote the notes. No formal memorandum of conversation was found. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume.