Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

125. Telegram From the Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State¹

22081.

Moscow, July 2, 1990, 1901Z

SUBJECT

• Official—Informal

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. Embassy’s draft Memcon for the Moscow Ministerial Arms Control Working Group’s Third START Subgroup Meeting, Para 3.

3. Begin Text

SUBJECT

Moscow Ministerial, May 15–19, 1990: Arms Control Working Group—START Subgroup

TIME: 11:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m.; May 18, 1990

PLACE: Osobnyak, Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

US: Richard Burt (NST), Linton Brooks (NST), David Smith (DST), Read Hanmer (ACDA), Col Michael Wheeler (JCS), Greg Thielmann (Embassy)—Notetaker.

USSR—Yuriy Nazarkin (NST), Lem Masterkov (START), Gennadiy Khromov (Council of Ministers), Gen-Maj Aleksandr Peresypkin (General Staff), Col V. S. Koltunov (START), Yu. I. Roslyakov (START), Nikolay Sokov (MFA Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration)—Notetaker.

— Ambassador Nazarkin opened the session by returning to the two joint statements on future strategic negotiations, noting that each side was using a different title. Ambassador Burt suggested a new compromise formulation: “joint statement on strategic stability and agreement on nuclear and space arms.” Nazarkin commented that, in both the title and text, Burt was focussing mostly on strategic stability. This could give rise to the erroneous impression that the current START treaty had nothing to do with strategic stability. Burt observed that in the two original titles, the word “stability” appeared only in the Soviet draft. Nazarkin then proposed inverting the word order to read: “Joint statement on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and strategic stability.” Burt said this formulation looked acceptable to him.

— Working off of the U.S. draft which Burt had provided on May 17 (dated May 16), Nazarkin said he had no comment on the first sentence, but advocated a fuller statement on the objectives of the negotiations. There were two omissions in the existing language: No explicit mention of reducing the risk of nuclear war; and, no mention of further reductions in strategic arms as a goal. He added that the components of a future agreement should also be discussed in the joint statement.

— Nazarkin said the second paragraph had the same problem as the title; it focussed on stability as if it would lead to reductions. The Soviet side believed that stability would result from further reductions. Reductions were not the only way to achieve stability, but they were a major way.

— Nazarkin said that the emphasis on ICBMs created another difficulty for the Soviets. The initial Soviet START document included a broader component, banning other kinds of offensive arms. Since the Soviets would soon be taking the difficult step of reducing heavy missiles, it would be desirable to identify the other issues which constituted a subject for future negotiations—without prejudicing the outcome. The joint statement could refer to the possibility of discussing the limiting/banning of all missiles with MIRV’s.

— Nazarkin expressed dissatisfaction with the last sentence in paragraph two which promised the beginning of future negotiations “as soon as practicable.” He would suggest a more definite and pratical formulation, according to which, discussions would begin immediately after signing the treaty and negotiations immediately after the treaty entered into force.

— Burt commented that the draft’s reference to reducing the concentration of warheads on ballistic missiles and banning mobile MIRVed ICBMs was obviously related to President Bush’s suggestion that these objectives be achieved in the current negotiations. The Soviet response had been that this objective should be left to the next stage of strategic negotiations. It was thus very likely that the American President would like to see language along the lines of the U.S. draft in the joint statement. Nazarkin said he understood that this was an important element of the U.S. approach, but that the U.S. side also knew the Soviet reaction to President Bush’s proposal. The Soviets had expressed a readiness to consider such limits in future negotiations—but talking about all ballistic missiles, not just land-based. It would be up to future negotiations to decide the scope and categories of limits.

— Burt said it was important to be candid about the American perspective on such missiles, since the sides tentatively agreed to highlight strategic stability in future negotiations. In the U.S. view, MIRVed land-based missiles were not particularly stabilizing. They had “C-Cubed” elements more adaptable to a first strike than was the case with sea-based missiles. Moreover, fixed land-based systems were more vulnerable to a first strike. Fixed heavily-MIRVed ICBMs, combining both features, were the most destabilizing of all. In a crisis, either side would be tempted to use them before they could by destroyed in a first-strike attack. Therefore, it was difficult for the United States to equate land- and sea-based forces in terms of stability.

— Nazarkin contended that any concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles was destabilizing; the more the concentration, the more the temptation for a first strike. Mobility served to make missiles less vulnerable, and in this respect, the Soviets saw some commonality between land- and sea-based systems. In any case, Nazarkin concluded, the sides would not be able to reach a decision during the next few days on the very serious issue of which systems should be banned.

— Regarding the third paragraph of the U.S. draft (on defense and space), Nazarkin advocated a non-classical, pragmatic approach to arrive at mutually acceptable language. According to the classical approach, he observed, the Soviets would have to counter-balance the American paragraph by bracketing it and proposing an alternative paragraph with a pure version of the Soviet argument.

— Ambassador Smith expressed agreement that the sides should use a pragmatic approach to paragraph three. He said that the beauty of the logic of delinking START from defense and space was that it allowed talks to continue. Nazarkin affirmed that the Soviets viewed positively the continuation of negotiations, “because they did not agree with the U.S. defense and space language.” Smith emphasized the urgency of these negotiations as reflected in the use of 1992 in the joint statement, and asked if Nazarkin had any problem with that date.

— Nazarkin noted that the U.S. side had always rejected so-called “artificial deadlines.” The Soviets also opposed artificial deadlines, but would be willing to set a date when the end was in sight. It would not be an exaggeration to describe the difference between START and DST in terms of being able to foresee their conclusion. In the space group, the sides differed on fundamental issues. Establishing an ending date would thus constitute an artificial deadline. Concerning the other language in the paragraph, Nazarkin said that while it posed problems, a compromise could be worked out.

— Nazarkin expressed agreement with the idea in the last paragraph of the U.S. draft. He noted that the joint statement should also make clear what the future negotiations would entail. Explaining that the Soviet text already constituted an attempt to incorporate U.S. views, Nazarkin admitted that he was having difficulty knowing on which text drafting efforts should now be focussed. Burt said he would prefer to use a merged text based on the two drafts which had been exchanged in Moscow.

End Text.

4. Ambassador Burt did not have an opportunity to clear this cable before departing post.

Matlock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D900605–0510. Secret. Sent for information to Geneva.