124. Telegram From the Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State1
19591.
Moscow, June 13, 1990,
1506Z
SUBJECT
- Official—Informal
1. Secret—Entire Text.
2. Embassy’s draft Memcon for the Moscow ministerial arms control working group’s second START subgroup meeting, para 3.
3. Begin Text
SUBJECT
Moscow Ministerial, May 15–19, 1990: Arms Control Working Group—START Subgroup
TIME: 9:30–11:00 a.m.; May 18, 1990
PLACE: Osobnyak, Moscow
PARTICIPANTS
US—Richard Burt (NST), Linton Brooks (NST), David Smith (DST), Read Hanmer (ACDA), Col Michael Wheeler (JCS), Greg Thielmann (Embassy)—Notetaker.
USSR—Yuriy Nazarkin (NST), Lem Masterkov (START), Gennadiy Khromov (Council of Ministers), Gen-Maj Aleksandr Peresypkin (General Staff), Col V. S. Koltunov (START), Yu. I. Roslyakov (START), Nikolay Sokov (MFA Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration)—Notetaker.
Heavy ICBM Reduction Rate
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- Ambassador Burt opened the session by remarking on the utility of the sides understanding the Ad Referendum agreements which had been reached at the ministerial. Nazarkin began with a suggestion that non-circumvention and heavy ICBM reductions be discussed. On the latter issue, Burt reiterated the U.S. side’s proposal that heavy ICBM [Page 700] reductions proceed at a continuous rate, with a specific “band” of maximum deviation from this rate. He urged that this arrangement should be part of the overall phased reductions approach. Nazarkin then asked: “in other words, you’re not prepared to consider our guarantees about the sustainability of the rate?” Burt responded: “not until we get assurances on your commitment to continuous reductions.” He added that if the Soviets could not accept continuous reductions, the U.S. side would have to go back to its original proposal. Nazarkin said he understood.
Road-Mobile ICBM Verification
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- Referring to the Soviet proposals on ground mobile launcher limits which had been presented by Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov, Nazarkin said he had nothing to add. Burt reacted by concluding that the sides were at a real stalemate; the issue would have to be discussed by ministers or at the Summit. He reminded Nazarkin that the U.S. willingness to lift the ban on mobile launchers was based on finding a solution to verification problems. He recalled that a rail-mobile launcher agreement was reached Ad Ref., and then approved by capitals. He said there was no way he or anyone could tell the President that verification provisions for mobile ICBMs were adequate without some form of notification. The Soviets had said they had two concerns with the notification provisions: that they not jeopardize the security of the mobile force; and, that they not interfere with operational flexibility by overburdening the operators. Burt said he had believed the American plan had satisfied Soviet concerns, as well as those of the United States. He urged Nazarkin to look again at the Ad Ref Agreement, noting that there had been provisions for notification under various approaches suggested by the Soviet side. If the Soviets now said “no notification,” it would become a major obstacle to agreement. Nazarkin responded that the Soviets had taken careful note of what Burt had said, but he had nothing to add to Karpov’s remarks.
Reduction of Warheads
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- Nazarkin raised the subject of warhead reduction in START, noting that Burt had not reacted the day before to the Soviet position. Burt replied that Nazarkin’s points had not been new, and that Burt had already addressed the subject previously. He then repeated that the USG did not yet have a position on destroying warheads.
Strategic Nuclear Forces on Third-Country Territory
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- When Nazarkin brought up the Soviet proposal for a ban on strategic nuclear forces in third countries, Burt said that he had nothing to add to previous discussions of the issue; the U.S. side did not see a problem.
Throwweight Limits on ICBMs
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- Nazarkin commented that he saw no prospect of dealing with the ICBM throwweight issue until the sides agreed on principles for [Page 701] counting throwweight. He then proposed drawing attention to the issue during the next meeting with Undersecretary Bartholomew and Karpov. Burt expressed U.S. concern about the danger of undercounting potential throwweight. He opined that the Soviet approach did not take into account the testing of future missiles with less that the maximum potential payload. Nazarkin said the sides had basic differences on the issue, and the issue was very complicated technically. It would therefore be worthless to discuss the issue further in this forum. Burt noted that the issue was not just technical; it was conceptual—whether or not to deal with potential rather than actual capabilities. Nazarkin concluded that he did not see any possibility for resolving the issue at that time. He then mentioned in passing that the Soviets were still considering U.S. proposals on PPCM, Backfire, and heavy ICBM testing, but that the subgroup could usefully do work on the draft statement on follow-on negotiations.
Soviet Inspection of U.S. Heavy Bomber
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- Nazarkin then raised a subject which he said had only emerged that day, the Soviet inspection of the U.S. heavy bomber at Grand Forks. Nazarkin asserted that Soviet experts conducting the inspection had expressed dissatisfation that they had not been given possibilities comparable to U.S. inspectors examining a Soviet heavy bomber. Specifically, the B1–B bomber was not shown with a full complement of weapons as the TU–95 had been. The United States had not given an adequate explanation of possible locations of ALCM pylons on the forward edge of the wings for over 24 ALCMs. Moreover, U.S. photos of the aircraft and agreed procedures did not allow adequate understanding of internal mounting procedures. Nazarkin said the Soviet side would like to discuss the issue in Geneva in more detail. Gen-Maj Peresypkin added that, while the operational B1–B shown was not officially equipped for ALCMs, Soviet experts determined it capable of carrying ALCMs externally without modification, and internally with only minor modification in the field. Burt said he understood what the Soviets had said; it would have to be examined in Geneva.
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- Peresypkin then provided an acknowledgment that the U.S. side had done what had been promised. Nonetheless, he explained that the visit did not remove Soviet suspicions that B1–B’s not equipped with nuclear ALCMs would not have adequate distinguishing features to show that they could not be so equipped. When Col Wheeler challenged Peresypkin’s complaint about the adequacy of U.S. photographs, Peresypkin responded that it was impossible to be fully confident of anything on the basis of photography; this was why experts on-site were necessary.
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- The subgroup then adjourned for an informal discussion between Burt and Nazarkin on rail-mobile ICBM verification provisions.2
4. Ambassador Burt did not have an opportunity to clear this cable before departing.
Matlock