116. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- DST—Where are the Soviets after five years?
We have passed the fifth anniversary of the Defense and Space Talks (DST). Some would say they have long been deadlocked, others would point to major advances. Both are correct. The Soviets have repeatedly fallen back from unsustainable tactical positions, but their asserted substantive views have changed much less. They still strongly oppose SDI, especially any space-based part, probably fearing SDI would give us strategic advantage. At times, the Soviets openly imply their technological and economic weakness, and their fear of being unable to compete in this Ultra-High-Tech area. Main features of the Soviet negotiating position have been its inconsistency with active Soviet programs in the ABM area and the great secrecy about them. Following are key changes and constancies over five years.
- —
- The Soviets began DST hoping to execute the Shultz-Gromyko mandate of January 1985 to “prevent an arms race in space.” They sought a ban on “space-strike arms.” The Soviets were then conducting a strident worldwide anti-SDI campaign. Debates raged in Europe and the U.S.
- —
- Many in the west found favor with a “grand compromise.” SDI would be given up as a bargaining chip to get START and INF. Private experts said SDI would never work. Some advised that SDI be traded away while there was still time to get a quid. As late as a year ago many analysts still predicted that the Soviets would not accept START without a D&S agreement on Soviet terms. They (and I) foresaw a Soviet squeeze play on DST in the START endgame.
- —
- Now, in retrospect, Soviet outrage and threats about SDI in the mid- and late 1980s may have been as hollow as those on INF in the early 1980s turned out to be. In five years the Soviets have jettisoned a stunning array of demands—a ban on space-strike arms, a ban on purposeful SDI research, no INF and START treaties unless SDI is killed, stringent constraints on SDI testing in space, a period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM treaty, and a new D&S accord as a price for START.
- —
- The Soviets may be signaling even more flexibility. In recent weeks they have spoken less often of the need for agreed statements on START-ABM linkage, and for a permitted-prohibitted deal on the narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty. (Not until October 1989 did the Soviets accept U.S. narrow language, but they still refuse to say how it would be applied in practice, which is key.) We should expect to hear more about these matters, however, for they are not yet put to rest.
- —
- Is is now clear that the Soviets want an early, separate, and “neutral” predictability accord. They acknowledge that it will help START ratification and probably think it will enable them to keep a finger on the pulse of SDI and bring technological insights. Soviet ABM advocates probably also see an accord as helping them to sustain budget support (just as Soviet space bureaucrats like U.S. space cooperation). The Soviet predictability proposal has an ABM treaty focus the U.S. cannot accept. But the Soviets appear ready to make an accommodation, although they still will not accept our provision on the broad interpretation.
- —
- As for their fundamental position, the Soviets maintain that START will be put at risk if SDI goes beyond the ABM Treaty. Soviet leaders appear to need START, however, far more than U.S. leaders, so we may have considerable leverage if we remain unintimidated. Future internal changes in the USSR could change this calculus, but it seems that no “grand compromise” is needed to get START. For some years we may be able to have our START cake without having to eat SDI.
- —
- This said, it is difficult to make predictions about immediate Soviet behavior. Many factors are at stake, some beyond our control. If we stick to our current DST and delinkage positions and take advantage of the real opportunity for progress on predictability measures, however, we may emerge generally unscathed from the START ratification process. If SDI continues to make technological progress (which it can do even with a tight budget), the Soviets will in a few years face a more difficult set of decisions about strategic arms control and the strategic balance. They seem to know this and do not expect SDI to go away.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D900434–0331. Secret; Priority; Stadis. Also sent to Moscow.↩