Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

115. Memorandum From John Gordon of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, May 10, 1990

SUBJECT

• US/USSR Statement on Follow-on Negotiations

During our May 9 discussions² concerning how we should deal with START II and de-MIRVing at the upcoming Ministerial, you asked that we develop a joint statement that was very short and very general. The draft is at Tab I.

You will recall that the concept developed in your meeting of principals was that Secretary Baker would attempt to negotiate Soviet commitment to a de-MIRVing initiative in START II in exchange for the US foregoing additional limits on heavy ICBMs and mobile RV sublimits in START I. To this end, Baker would seek Soviet agreement to a joint statement on START II that recorded the de-MIRVing initiative.

As you pointed out while reviewing an earlier draft of a joint statement, it will be very difficult to come to agreement on the outlines for START II at this time—the Soviets are unlikely to accept de-MIRVing without some US commitment to deal with SLBMs and SLCMs, and we are unlikely to be able to agree to anything along these lines within the US in the time remaining before the Summit.

As an aside, the Navy POM has no funds for TRIDENT beyond the 18 boats now under construction. Further, General Powell is developing a post-START/START II strategic force structure with about 5000 total strategic weapons. That in itself will require a reduction in SLBM warheads below numbers permitted in START. In brief, agreeing to START II constraints on SLBMs may not be as difficult as we thought.

Our proposed draft may meet Secretary Cheney’s concerns that any statement concerning follow-on negotiations include a reference to strategic defense—it does this by stating that the future negotiations will deal with strategic systems rather than strategic nuclear weapons.

One point you should focus on in the draft statement is when the new negotiations would begin: “as soon as practical” or “soon after Treaty ratification.” Negotiations that get underway before ratification may prove politically difficult; delaying START II until after START I is ratified could imply a negotiating hiatus of between several months to a year or more. “As soon as practical” is a deliberately vague phase that does not prejudge the question of when START II talks would begin. “Soon after Treaty ratification” would make clear to the Soviets that we were not prepared to concede their objective of early follow-on negotiations.

At a minimum you will need to discuss this proposed statement with Baker because it is much less ambitious than his tactic for closing off the mobile RV sublimit and the heavy ICBM issues. In essence, if we do not intend to negotiate a substantive START II statement, then we will be telling the Soviets that we are simply and unconditionally deferring limits on heavies and on mobile ICBM warheads. Even this broad statement may give the Soviets the commitment they want to follow-on negotiations without locking in a statement of our objectives.

Condi Rice and Rich Davis concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you talk with Secretary Baker urgently about how best to handle the issue of follow-on negotiations.

Tab I

Draft Statement Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT

Follow-on Strategic Negotiations

The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to pursue, following the completion of the START agreement, further bilateral negotiations on strategic systems. The primary purpose of the follow-on negotiations will be to enhance stability and to reduce further the risk of nuclear war. The measures the two countries take to strengthen stability will result in additional reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries. Successful results of the current negotiations will provide a solid foundation upon which to build.

These new negotiations will commence [as soon as practical] [soon after ratification of START]. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give these subsequent talks the highest priority so that greater stability can be realized as soon as possible.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, USSR Chronological Files, START Files, OA/ID 91122–005, Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe—Strategic Arms Control (May 1990). Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Kanter and Blackwill. A stamped notation indicates Scowcroft saw the memorandum. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum.
2. Not further identified.
3. Secret. All brackets are in the original text.