Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

113. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

4955.

Geneva, May 8, 1990, 1711Z

SUBJECT

• START: Run-up to the Summit

1. Secret—Entire Text.

2. The sides continue to push hard on the 32 issues, with two meetings each day involving the ambassadors and numerous technical meetings supporting them. Results are mixed. Nazarkin has been reasonable, but unable to gain the support of his military or Moscow on some of the AD referendum deals he and Rick have made. The U.S. Del has been handicapped by the continuing lack of U.S. positions on key items on the list. Thus we have gone as far as we can pending further guidance on about 12 items. It will clearly be necessary for the ministers to deal with some issues we had hoped to settle here.

3. If we are lucky, we may be able, before the ministerial, to add to our list of Geneva triumphs, phasing of reductions, road-mobile issues (if Moscow accepts our AD Ref Agreement), restructuring of the inspection protocol, basing terminology, cooperative measures to assist NTM, produce vs develop and pre-inspection movement restrictions.

4. I assume planning for the ministerial is well along by now. It would be difficult at this stage to predict which issues will be settled at the ministerial and which at the Summit. However, if we are to make a credible claim that we have resolved all “major” START issues by the end of the Summit, I believe we need to focus on the following:

— ALCM range

— Sublimits on ICBM and SLBM warheads

— Sublimits on mobile ICBM warheads

— Schedule of reductions (if not resolved in Geneva)

— Heavy ICBMs

— SLCMs

— PPCM installations

— Non-circumvention (see below)

— Whether there will be a requirement to eliminate missiles

— Follow-on negotiations.

5. Naturally, the details of some of these issues (e.g., telemetry, PPCM) can be dealt with after the Summit in Geneva. My point is that definite progress is needed in all these areas if we plan to announce that all major issues have been resolved. I believe this can be achieved, though not without some pain on both sides.

6. Since we are coming to the end of our tether on the 32 issues, we have identified a list of about 20 additional less important treaty text issues which we may start on with the Soviets while the ambassadors are away. Below are some scattered points which you may not have picked up in recent reporting cables (in some cases because they were not there).

Non-Circumvention

7. As predicted in the last O–I, the AD Ref deal on non-circumvention has started to come unraveled. The Soviets have proposed changing “existing patterns of cooperation” to “obligations of cooperation existing at the time of treaty signature.” This would narrow the concept to those agreements that exist in writing, e.g., the Polaris sales agreement, and may not be consistent with our broader pledge to maintain the UK nuclear deterrent as contained in our talking points last December. This subject will definitely come up at the ministerial and I believe our side should be prepared to deal with the following questions:

— What exactly are the existing patterns of cooperation between the U.S. and the UK?

— What U.S.–UK cooperation beyond the trident program is to be allowed?

— Does the U.S. have existing patterns of cooperation with any countries other than the UK?

— Does the USSR have any existing patterns of cooperation with other countries?

Produce/Develop

8. We have had a protracted and emotional battle here over this one. The issue is how to formulate the bans on a series of mostly obscure and unwanted weapons in Article IV. This would be easy except for the tangled history of the ABM treaty and the Soviets’ determination not to get burned again. Our current position draws the line at the production of the first copy of the prohibited item. The Soviets want to draw the line much earlier in the sequence of research, development, testing, production and deployment. However, they have been rather incoherent and unable to draw the line at some point that makes sense and is verifiable. It appears to be when the item first appears outside the laboratory, as in D&S.

9. One AD Ref compromise formulation we put forward was that the sides agree not to engage in “activities that result in” the prohibited item. After taking the unprecedented step of pulling their military reps out of the middle of negotiating sessions in both START and D&S to consider this, Nazarkin said he was recommending it to Moscow. It is not entirely clear whether the interpretation we attached to these words was fully understood, although Rick and our lawyers explained it several times. This interpretation is that the point at which the violation occurs is the first appearance of the prohibited item—the same point as in our original position. The novel idea is that, at that point, all activities which preceded this act would retroactively be understood to have been illegal also.

10. Some of us are a bit uneasy with this approach, because of the rectroactive guilt angle and the impossibility of knowing whether today’s activity will be made illegal by some action in the distant future. This could lead to some unpleasant compliance debates in the future—perhaps more of the internal U.S. variety rather than U.S.–Soviet.

11. Rick, Lint and the ACDA lawyers believe this is a good outcome and I defer to them, of course. We have informed David Abramowitz in L of the situation. In addition, Paul Lembesis, one of the authors of the approach, is back in ACDA and could be consulted.

12. We also offered the Soviets another alternative. This would be just to say the sides agree to ‘‘prohibit” the offending item with no further elaboration, on the grounds that, like pornography, a violation would be apparent if it occurred. After saying he would recommend the first option, Nazarkin now says he recommended both to Moscow and no response has been received thus far.

13. I can offer only one other possibility, in case this AD Ref deal falls through. I believe the U.S. does not, in fact, insist on the right to go right up to turning the last bolt on these prohibited systems, nor should we want the Soviets doing this. The problem is to find an earlier point that makes sense. Perhaps we could draw the line at producing not just the complete prohibited item, but at producing any components unique to the prohibited item. The emphasis would, of course, be on “unique” in this formulation. There are such unique components for some prohibited systems—a first stage for a new type of heavy ICBM, launch tube segments for a heavy SLBM, etc.

Both the practical and legal implications of all these possibilities need careful consideration. One further angle to think about is that, depending upon how the long-awaited decision on initial accountability of ballistic missiles deals with early flight tests, we could end up legalizing several flight tests of a prohibited missile.

Liquid-Propellant Mobile ICBMs

14. We pushed the Soviets last week on our proposed ban on liquid-propellant mobile ICBMs. This issue has been dormant for a long time and we were surprised to encounter strong Soviet resistance. Our DOE analysts here say this could be related to Soviet concerns about SDI. [5½ lines not declassified]

Heavy Bomber/ALCM Exhibits

15. There seems to still be some confusion on this topic. As I read the treaty, all strategic systems, including the B–2, are subject to OSI during baseline inspections. These inspections are to bear some relationship to technical characteristics specified in the MOU. In addition, as new types of heavy bombers and long-range ALCMs appear in the future, they will be exhibited. On our last visit to SAC, we were told there were no problems with this. However, the JCS people here say that this is not agreed and seem determined that no Soviet inspectors will be allowed near the B–2 or ACM. JCS is also resisting any display of the B–2 as part of cooperative measures to assist NTM. Since the U.S. language now in the treaty provides for both baseline OSI and exhibits of new systems, if this is no longer the U.S. position, we need to be instructed accordingly. If we pull back on these heavy bomber/ALCM provisions, it will be very difficult to sell the analogous provisions we want for ballistic missiles. In any case, clarification is needed.

Deep Reductions in START II?

16. You may have noticed the interesting TV interview given by Akhromeyev. He defined “reasonable sufficiency” as requiring only 400–500 ballistic missiles with one-megaton warheads, plus 200 in reserve. As I recall, this is roughly what Alexi Arbatov came up with in an article some time ago. The Soviet del here continues to trash Akhromeyev, but his remarks could be a preview of future Soviet positions. He apparently did not say what would be done about third-country forces under such deep reductions.

Burt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D900419–0683. Secret; Immediate.