Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

112. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, May 4, 1990, 3:30–7 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

• USSR

  • Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Sergey Tarasenko
  • Interpreter

Baker: There are three principal issues that I’d like to spend our time on today. One is arms control, the other is German unification, and the last is Lithuania. If there are any others you’d like to talk about just let me know.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Baker: We’re running out of time now. And I have some important items on arms control to discuss. And I think we really need to do it because we are getting so close to the Ministerial and the Summit. But before I go to that, I’d like to make one final comment. You say you want us to stay at least for the near term. And what I want you to understand is that the raison d’etre of our presence is the existence of NATO. That’s why NATO is so important. Let’s move on to arms control.

You mentioned in Washington that the letter from President Gorbachev² was not the final word on the MIRVing idea. When I raised banning mobile MIRVs in Namibia,³ I said I thought it would be a stabilizing move that would benefit both of us. But I also said I did not want it to impede the negotiations. We’re coming very close to the Summit, and I really need to know how you would like to proceed. Should we put it aside? Or is there some chance that you have an interest still in exploring it even now? In other words, is this idea still alive at this point and should we pursue it or is it really not realistic for the current treaty and should we put it aside for the time being?

Shevardnadze: We would favor all questions being discussed, including this question. Realistically speaking, we believe it would be difficult given the amount of time remaining to address that question. I believe we have to focus on the remaining issues in START. As for how we go further, we could agree on the declaration of intent that could be initialed in Washington about the next phase of START and the tasks we are setting for it. I believe that all aspects of strategic stability should be discussed and be an important part of that declaration.

Baker: I should say to you that we would consider signing such a statement, but we’ll need to know that we have a general agreement on the goals for START II before we’re able to do so. There are some things we already agree on. In any case, I raise this issue or this question because this is the kind of thing that we’d like to see included in the follow-on to START if we’re not going to get it in this initial START treaty. You will recall that the suggestion was really of two parts. (1) There would be a ban on mobile MIRVs in the treaty; (2) There would be a complete elimination of all land-based MIRVs in the future. That could be one subject of START II. The only reason I’m raising it now is to see if there is anything new since you did say to me that the Gorbachev letter did not represent your last word on the subject. And also I just want to know that if we are not going to consider it in this treaty, we probably will have to consider some limits on mobiles. We’ve been keeping that issue on hold and unless I hear from you soon on the suggestion of the ban of mobile MIRVs and the elimination of land-based MIRVs, it’s something we are going to have to address in the future. We could simply continue in START I and put this issue to the side.

If you want to discuss this issue at the Moscow ministerial, please let me know before I come. If you want to put it aside for START II, then we’ll still need to address limits on mobiles. We began to discuss that before but we really put that on hold when I raised the banning of mobile MIRV idea in Namibia.

Shevardnadze: Yes, I remember. Anyway, please give us a few days and we’ll send you our thoughts when you come.

Baker: I know you want, and we want to resolve the major issues before the Summit. The Washington Ministerial did not move us forward, did not move us in the right direction. I very much appreciate your sending us Karpov, but it didn’t undo some of the problems of the Washington Ministerial. We badly need to resolve the ALCMs and the SLCMs issues, and I told my colleagues that I do not want to go to Moscow with these issues still hanging open. We need a successful ministerial if we’re going to have a successful Summit.

Shevardnadze: You’re right.

Baker: I want to settle these issues, and I am going to give you a package on ALCMs and SLCMs that represent the maximum effort on our part to close these issues out. I would appreciate hearing your reaction now, but I understand that you may well need to go home to think about it before you give me a formal answer. But I will ask you to come back no later than the beginning of next week, given the shortage of time. If you say you’ve got a major step, I believe you.

Baker: Well I hope you’ll say that. What I’m about to say is enough to make a deal because I need to know where we are before I go to Moscow. Here are the elements of common ground that are in our package. Let me tell you what’s in our package, and what’s left out of the package that Karpov gave to us. The fact is there are only two things that we did not include in our package that Karpov presented in his.

First, is that we do not want to count tactical aircraft carrying conventional ALCMs in START. As you know Akhromeyev raised this. This is one of the two things we simply cannot go along with. START is about nuclear weapons, not about conventional weapons and if you insisted on this, this would be a treaty blocker. Indeed, if it were the only issue that was outstanding, we simply couldn’t agree to it even then. Second, the only other thing that was in the Karpov package that is not in our package is that we cannot go along with a limit on the number of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. We think this is a request that is really walking back from the agreement we made in Moscow and that it will not add to stability.

Having said that, let me now go through this new package. I’m going to hand over a piece of paper that outlines it all, but let me simply go through it quickly and make it very clear that it includes most of the new Soviet proposals that Karpov had brought and it reflects an effort on our part to be as forthcoming as possible.

— Attribute eight ALCMs and a maximum of 12 for future Soviet ALCM heavy bombers.

— Adding B–2 to the list of existing US bombers in the counting rule.

— 107 converted heavy bombers, versus our 115.

— Only heavy bombers of types in service for at least 10 years can be converted to conventional bombers.

— A minimum separation distance between bases for converted bombers and nuclear weapons storage areas.

— Exchange of information and exhibition of non-nuclear ALCMs as well as nuclear ALCMS.

The most important of all of these to us, and I hope to you as well, is that while the package talks of 800 kilometers, if you could tell me that you accept all the rest of the package as it is and you can tell me that you would grandfather an existing conventional ALCM that we’ve called Tacit Rainbow which has a range over 600 kilometers, then I can tell you that we will agree to the range threshold of 600 kilometers for ALCMs.

Let me say, as you might well suppose, this has not been an easy thing for me to get. I told the President that you had said that range was the key and that everything depended upon. I also told him of the conversation that we had with Akhromeyev in Moscow when he referred to the understanding that he had worked out with Nitze about this, and I also mentioned what he said about the difficulty of transforming your air defenses. In light of all that, I’ve now been authorized to say that we will go to 600 if you will accept this package and take care of Tacit Rainbow. But I have got to tell you that I don’t have a happy military.

Shevardnadze: On the question of numerical limits for heavy bombers, there’s no changing of your position?

Baker: Yes, that’s right. And also on this issue of the tactical aircraft carrying conventional ALCMs. We’re not willing to accept that. But the rest of the elements that were mentioned by Karpov were included in that package. Now for SLCMs. Here is our proposal in the form of a draft declaration. Most of what it has is what we agreed to in Moscow. When we left Moscow we were left with two issues—one was range and the other was the issue of whether the declaration would be covering nuclear or conventional. You then came back after Moscow in Washington and made your proposal. This package that I’m presenting to you in the form of a declaration is designed to cut through the differences that we have. This declaration touches only on nuclear SLCMs. The declaration covers SLCMs over 300 kilometers in range. You wanted 600, we preferred no range thresholds. We’re moving to 600 on ALCMs, your number. Now, this declaration is merely a declaration and isn’t going to impose a restriction on your SLCMs of over 300 kilometers. Our preference would be to include all nuclear. We’re going to include those with a range of over 300.

On verification, there is no language which is something that we agreed would be the case in Moscow. But we do pick up on your idea of referring to future possible cooperative measures. We’re also saying here the sides will exchange information on which kinds of ship and submarines would be capable of deploying or carrying SLCMs, and we also agree there would be no MIRVed SLCMs. Most importantly, we’ve tried once again to respond to your concerns, because we’re now coming in with a common limit on nuclear SLCMs that will not be exceeded for the duration of the treaty.

Shevardnadze: That’s very important.

Baker: This, too, required the breaking of a lot of china on our part. And I am going to present it to you on the same basis of the ALCMs. If you can tell me that this declaration as it stands is satisfactory, then I can add the following sentence to it. And that sentence reads: the number of declared SLCMs will not exceed 1000 for the duration of the treaty. It may be a higher number than you had in mind, but it contains a number that is good for the life of the treaty. You know that the presentation of a number, is something we said we really couldn’t do, but now we’re doing it. We’re doing it because we’ve heard what you’ve said. We heard what Gorbachev said in Malta. We’ve heard you talk about the difficulty of ratification before the Supreme Soviet, and I’ve pushed as far as I can go.

The commitment to meet the 600 kilometer range in ALCMs and have a common numerical limit on nuclear SLCMs are two big issues that I understood from both you and Akhromeyev were the key issues from your standpoint. I think, and I hope, that this ought to bring agreement now on ALCMs and SLCMs. At the very least, I’m hoping that you will give me a very early response by next week. As I’ve said before, I don’t want to come to Moscow with these issues unresolved. Now, I have basically given you everything that I had in my bag, and my bag is now empty.

Shevardnadze: Well, maybe I’ll not comment on everything you’ve said one by one. Just like you, we have our own military, and they’ve been very critical. I’ve spent a lot of time discussing these things with them. But I have to say on some aspects, on range and others, you have moved in a major way. Let me study what you’ve said. I’ll make sure you get an answer very, very soon. And I welcome the way in which you have presented this. We can see now that it is possible to discuss this and other issues before your visit, and I think to do it very productively. I don’t want to be in a position like I was after Washington, having to come back empty-handed, but it is clear we need to use our time more efficiently than we did in advance of the Washington Ministerial. The most difficult thing I can see at first sight is that you are rejecting any limit on the number of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers, and that leaves open the channel in the arms race. At least that’s a preliminary kind of comment.

Baker: I just hope that what I’ve done closes out the issues. I’ve moved as far as I can; our people feel very, very strongly about the issue of no bomber limit. Primarily, because they thought we had passed this issue and we had resolved it already.

One other item in arms control that I’d like to bring up right now. I know that we are very short in time but let me just mention the chemical weapons one. We are very close on this, but what I really need to know is if you are going to agree with us on the two percent question, and if so we will be able to agree with you on ceasing production and working with you on a technology for destruction.

Shevardnadze: We understand your position very well. Personally, I believe that some reserve until others have joined the convention is something that makes sense. I would like to keep that as a personal view between us. I’ve asked our chief delegate at Geneva to sound out others on the idea of the reserve at two percent, and I must say unfortunately that the attitude of others was negative. So, maybe you might want to take a look at this again.

Baker: You know, if you and I agree on it, I think that will make a big statement and that will have an effect on others. We really need to be leaders and not followers on this subject.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US/Soviet Memos of Conversation—1989/1990. Secret. The meeting took place in the Hotel Maritim Koenigswinter. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
2. See Document 91.
3. See Document 88.