104. Draft Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
- Richard Burt
- Linton Brooks
- Edward Ifft
- David Smith
Soviet
- Yuriy Nazarkin
- Lem Masterkov
- Gennadiy Khromov
- Yuriy Roslyakov
- Victor Koltunov
Burt: I would like to raise some questions with regard to road-mobile ICBMs. Mr. Khromov at our first meeting raised one idea for verifying road-mobile ICBMs, i.e., a small restricted area (5 square kilometers), and a large deployment area (16,000 square kilometers). Notification of movement outside the restricted area would be for visits to maintenance facilities, etc. Yesterday you proposed a new approach. Please explain the second, and its relationship to the first.
Nazarkin: The two are alternatives; they are independent of each other. Col. Koltunov will explain them.
Koltunov: In the second variant, the territory of the restricted area is determined by the number of launchers in it: 1–2 road-mobile launchers per 25 square kilometers. Routine movement and training would be within the deployment area. Notification would be provided when a road-mobile launcher leaves its restricted area for routine movement if, at the moment when the launcher leaves the restricted area, the total number outside the restricted area is greater than 50% of the total number in that restricted area. Notification would take place no later than 24 hours after the launcher left the restricted area. There would be no limit on the number of road mobile launchers outside the restricted area, but all would be in the deployment area.
Burt: Thank you for the very clear and competent presentation. I have a few questions. Personally, I am attracted to several elements of the proposal, particularly that having to do with notification. But I am confused about several things. First, in the paper2 you talk about a restricted area on the basis of 1–2 mobile launchers for each 25 square kilometers. What does that mean for the total size of the Soviet restricted area; for example, if you are talking about 10 launchers?
[Page 629]Koltunov: It would never exceed 250 square kilometers or ten missiles. The minimum would be 125 square kilometers for 10 missiles. However, if a restricted area contains fewer than 10, the total territory of the restricted area becomes smaller. If the restricted area contains 1–2 launchers, its size would be 25 square kilometers, not less.
Burt: Your old position was that the restricted area should be 100 square kilometers, with notification of all out of area deployments.
Koltunov: Yes, but there was no deployment area. We have accepted the deployment area, and are trying to solve the problem with notification.
Burt: The restricted area is far too large.
Ifft: What is the relationship between the existence of a deployment area and deployment out of the restricted area.
Koltunov: The same as before. There is no change in our position.
Ifft: But when a launcher comes out of the restricted area, it has to stop at the edge of the deployment area, or if there is no deployment area, it can go further. What does that have to do with notification out of the restricted area?
Koltunov: In this option, if the number of launchers outside the restricted area is greater than 50%, each next launcher leaving the restricted area would have to be notified. I emphasize that all routine movements would be covered under the MOU; the launchers would not leave the confines of the deployment area. But you’re right—no deployment area means no confines on movement.
Burt: I note that in your old position, you would give notification prior to movement from the restricted area; in this option, after.
Koltunov: You are right. The purpose of the notification is to verify the number of launchers in any restricted area. If notification is done before, then for one reason or another, launchers would not leave the deployment area. The notification process would be encumbered. It’s better to provide notification after.
Ifft: Would notification also be possible after the launcher returns to the restricted area?
Koltunov: In principle, we do not exclude that type too.
Brooks: If a side has 10 launchers in the deployment area and 4 were outside the restricted area and 2 more go outside for 24 hours we would be notified—that I understand. But suppose you go out and come back within 24 hours—would there be notification?
Koltunov: You would be notified of their departure if at that moment in time over 50% of the launchers of that restricted area were outside of it—for the 6th, 7th, 8th launchers, etc.
[Page 630]Brooks: Notification would be made regardless of how long they were outside?
Koltunov: Right.
Brooks: I am confused on the size questions. For each 10 launchers, the restricted area would be no more than 250 square kilometers and not less than 125 square kilometers. But if five years from now you wanted a smaller restricted area, why should that not be allowed?
Koltunov: It is not excluded even now.
Brooks: One more question on size. The size of each restricted area would be specified in the MOU and limited by the size outlined here.
Koltunov: Absolutely right.
Horne: Please explain why notification only takes place after 50% of the launchers are outside the restricted area.
Koltunov: The reasoning is simple. We believe that with the existence of deployment areas and restricted areas, and with all training activities taking place within those boundaries, verification would be effective. But since the U.S. side insisted on this notification approach, we have come forth with this proposal.
Horne: My understanding of the 100 kilometer square restricted zone was that all the launchers would be there, and that notification would occur when they moved outside that area. Help me to understand why, with a larger restricted area, you could not notify of all movements outside the restricted area.
Koltunov: We have lots of options: a 5 square kilometer restricted area, 25, 100—a complete spectrum. Our original option is still on the table, i.e., a restricted area of 100 square kilometers is still on the table.
Horne: So there is no military reason for the inability to notify all movement under the last proposal?
Koltunov: We are not dealing with military reasons, but with what should be verified under the limits of the treaty we are working out. All of the options are based on the goal of keeping mobile systems mobile and establishing effective verification. That is why there are various options.
Burt: We will return in Geneva to this subject.