Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

103. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 6, 1990, 8:30–9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.:

  • Secretary Baker
  • Ambassador Bartholomew
  • Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

• USSR:

  • Eduard Shevardnadze
  • General Akhromeyev
  • Pavel Palazhenko
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

Shevardnadze: I would like Akhromeyev to report to you on the discussion that he and Bartholomew had last evening.²

Baker: Fine. Please proceed.

Akhromeyev: As you and the Minister instructed us, we informally had a discussion last night and this discussion was clearly something that bound neither side. It was purely informal, and we discussed the ALCM issue and also SLCM issue. Both Bartholomew and I decided that if you don’t accept what I am about to lay out, then we can just assume that what I’m presenting never existed. We see, for our part, a package on ALCM in which everything is interrelated. You accept all of it or you reject it. Let me outline the elements of our positions.

One, that the range of the SRAM-type missile, ALCM for you, would be 600 kilometers.

Two, that the numbers of Soviet and US heavy bombers within the 1,600 level would be floating but there would be an upper limit set at a certain level—there would be a sub-ceiling. The Soviet side proposes that there be 90–115 bombers.

Third, we agree on the counting rule for heavy bombers that has the US with ten with a maximum number of twenty. For our side the respective figures would be eight and a maximum of twelve. And the Soviet side would have the right to have 40 percent more bombers.

Shevardnadze: If we take this approach what would the difference in the numbers of warheads be—the numbers of actual ALCMs deployed?

Akhromeyev: Well, it’s difficult to say because it depends upon the actual deployment of the bombers.

Shevardnadze: I’m asking only for the maximum. In Moscow, we saw very big numbers.

Akhromeyev: Yes, but that was strictly an internal count. We don’t know what the actual numbers would be.

Bartholomew: My colleague is summarizing our agreement and differences. Note that if we look at the agreed common elements from Moscow, you’ll see that we’ve returned to agreement on all of those elements with two exceptions. What the Marshal is saying is not any different from that.

Shevardnadze: Yes, this is what was agreed in Moscow and we do stand by it.

Akhromeyev: I am simply reporting on what our position is and what we have agreed. The fourth element is on the counting of long range future bombers and for our part we want to have that governed by the same rule as the counting rule for existing bombers. That is ten for the US bombers, twenty maximum. Eight for Soviets, twelve maximum with the right to have 40 percent more bombers to compensate for the additional number of ALCMs that the US would have.

Bartholomew: We had said, for future bombers, that rather than using the counting rule for existing bombers, that we would have ten/twenty split for both the US and the Soviets when it came to future bombers. They’re saying, keep the same counting rules applying for the existing ones and simply apply that to the future as well. And that means that 40 percent would also apply—in the future they would have the right to have 40 percent more bombers.

Baker: I understand that. What you are suggesting is a new position from what existed in Moscow.

Akhromeyev: Yes, I’m simply saying that we should use the same rules that we are going to apply for the existing bombers and apply that to the future bombers as well. That would be our proposal.

Baker: Yes, I understand that. That’s the proposal that differs from the agreed common ground in Moscow. I am not rejecting that. I am simply saying that it is important for us to understand and identify at this point they differ from what it is we had agreed to in Moscow. That’s important for us because in our determination of what we can try to do with you and what we could not do with you, we are going to need to see where there has been a divergence, where there are now new proposals from what had been agreed to in Moscow. Like you, we would have difficulty, in effect, having to pay twice for the same concession or similar concession. I know that would be hard to sell with our arms control community.

Akhromeyev: But, Mr. Secretary, we have different perceptions of what was agreed to in Moscow. I said directly to Burt in Moscow, and I said here, that the bombers should be counted in terms of their actual equipment. You’ve brought from Moscow a different understanding. Now we are prepared to agree on a new approach and you say that we have retreated from your approach.

Baker: I know that’s what you are saying, that’s what you understand. But if you recall I very carefully had read into the record the precise element of common ground. You may have had a meeting with Burt or with others where you express that position, but we have a record of what the precise elements of common ground were, and we are going to have a problem when we begin departing from that. In any case, it is important for us to identify the specific areas that remain in disagreement.

Shevardnadze: I agree with that. But there is no disagreement on the fourth point.

Akhromeyev: We’ve agreed on the counting rules for the future, we didn’t retreat.

Baker: What I’m saying is that our whole delegation understood that there were certain things based on the elements of common ground and on the joint statement. I just don’t want there to be another misunderstanding. I don’t think we could afford that.

Shevardnadze: Whether or not there has been a retreat from Moscow, let’s continue our discussion after the meeting with the President.

Bartholomew: Now, we don’t agree on this point. We maintain the position of agreed common elements from Moscow. So we have one position and you have another.

Akhromeyev: Fifth point. The sides would agree on a ban on MIRVed ALCMs. The sixth. Outside the 1,600 ceiling. It would be a certain number of heavy bombers with a range over 600 kilometers and that number would be 90–115. The Soviet Union is withdrawing its proposal that nuclear ALCMs have clear functional related differences from non-nuclear ALCMs, we accept in general the US proposals for non-technical means of verification and for the procedures for inspections. But we would like there to be outside visible differences, but we agree in general. There may be legal and technical details that are going to have to be specified, but this is the package as I understand it.

Bartholomew: Let me summarize briefly the outcome of our discussions and this will be the same summary I gave to Akhromeyev.

With two exception, the elements that we agreed to on ALCMs in Moscow are still agreed to. These were elements that were read into the record by Kanter in the meeting of two ministers. These agreed Moscow elements are agreed here with the exceptions of the future counting rule and also the number of ALCM-carrying bombers. And that’s the question of 100 versus 115. These were the agreed common elements that we gave you in Moscow.

Shevardnadze: You were speaking about a so-called Moscow agreement. I want to know what is not agreed to now.

Bartholomew: Well, there are two questions in addition to those two major issues. One you are very familiar with and that’s range. The other is the sub-ceiling on heavy bombers. In our view there is a third issue that the Marshal does not mention. The Soviet side now proposes to count as a heavy bomber in START any tactical aircraft carrying a non-nuclear ALCM above the agreed range. This means that suppose we agreed on a range of 600 kilometers, if we took a conventional aircraft like the F–16 and took a conventional ALCM of over 600 kilometer range, all of a sudden this would become a strategic nuclear weapon to be counted against our strategic nuclear numbers.

Shevardnadze: But over 600 kilometers.

Baker: But it is conventional, it’s not nuclear.

Bartholomew: This would be a major new issue on ALCMs.

Akhromeyev: It wasn’t discussed in Moscow. We left it to Geneva.

Shevardnadze: Well, it’s a new question, it’s not a simple one. It is a complicated one. Lots of things change. It could be a key problem when we conclude everything.

Akhromeyev: At best this could only be discussed at our next meeting in Moscow.

Baker: We’re only seven weeks away from the Summit. If we don’t discuss things now, when are we going to do it?

Shevardnadze: Well, we can approach this everyday. Every meeting, we can give new instructions to our delegations. Maybe you and I can stay in touch continuously, but we are going to have to work intensively.

Baker: I agree. But the first thing to be done is to see where there are areas of disagreement. Why don’t I try to summarize where I think the real outstanding issues on ALCMs are. It seems to me that you can identify five differences on ALCMs.

First, whether the 40 percent rule should also apply to future bombers. Second, whether you are going to 100 or 115 heavy bombers outside of the limits. Third, is the range. Fourth, is there going to be a sub-ceiling on ALCMs carrying heavy bombers. And, fifth, are conventional ALCMs and tactical aircraft to be counted as a heavy bomber if they have ALCMs with a range of over 600 kilometers. As I read through the elements of common ground and I read what was put into the record, these are the essential differences now.

Bartholomew: But the Marshal agreed as part of our discussions, we went over things element by element, and we agreed with the exception of two questions.

Akhromeyev: Yes, that’s right. The two questions were one on range and the other is on the floating limit or sub-ceiling on bombers which we say should be between 90 and 115. On this question the US proposes nothing.

Shevardnadze: The US proposes no limit for the upper end. I mean you could float with no end?

Bartholomew: We have a difference on the very concept of floating of it or a sub-ceiling. The fact is that we simply reject that. It’s not really a number that we can find.

Baker: Let’s put it simply. We’ve never agreed to a sub-limit on bombers. It’s not a difference in numbers, we just haven’t agreed to that concept.

Shevardnadze: Well, what does the floating concept mean—between some limits?

Bartholomew: We say floating because we are free to set the level of bombers that we deploy.

Baker: That number will float. It doesn’t need the acceptance of either side. You’ve got an overall number of 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles. That’s it. Somewhere under that ceiling we’ll determine the number of bombers that we want to have.

Akhromeyev: Yes, it is true that you said three times in Moscow that there would be no sub-ceiling. And three times when you said there would be no sub-ceiling on bombers, we didn’t give you an answer. We felt we had to study the problem. We’ve done, so and concluded that we can’t accept an agreement where there is no limit on bombers.

Shevardnadze: If you agree that there should be bombers with non-nuclear ALCMs outside the limit, it’s a quite different situation.

Akhromeyev: This we do agree on. Formally, we both have the right to have bombers outside the limit. The difference here is that we say there should only be 100 and you say 115.

Shevardnadze: Let me say that if we want to reach agreement on the entire package we have to reach agreement on range. I said this in Moscow, I said this in Wyoming. As for the sub-limit, well we have to know the issue. We have to know how range is going to come out.

Baker: Bombers are going to float within the 1,600 limit. You can’t be suggesting that I ever suggested that there should be a sub-ceiling. Let’s go on to SLCMs.

Akhromeyev: Let me try to report on SLCMs. There is a common view on SLCMS on the following aspects. First, we’ll exchange politically-binding statements on long-range SLCMs that would be in effect for the entire duration of the START treaty. Second, each side, every year, will make a declaration on the planned numbers of SLCMs that they would have and they would include a statement on the maximum number for each in the next five years. Third, each side would give information on the specific types of ships and submarines capable of carrying long-range SLCMs. This would be confidential information. Fourth, there would be a ban on MIRVed long-range SLCMs.

Bartholomew: Let me just say that the idea of a ban on MIRVed long-range SLCMS is something that we haven’t addressed. We’re not saying yes to it, we’re not saying no, we simply haven’t addressed it.

Akhromeyev: Our differences are the following. The main differences that the US wants each side to determine independently and declare independently what it will deploy each year and for the succeeding five years. The Soviet side believes we should establish a certain specific number, and that should be agreed between the two sides and recorded in the records of the negotiations. If that number is agreed, each side could then declare it in its own statement.

Another difference is that the Americans, while agreeing to specify the types of ships and submarines capable of carrying SLCMs, do not want to declare the numbers of SLCMs on each ship. Meaning the surface and sub-surface types. We want that kind of a declaration. Another difference is that the Soviets believe that there should be verification of production facilities, and verification of the ships and submarines capable of carrying the SLCMs. And the US side agrees. Last night, to solve our differences we proposed the following: That the US would agree that the binding numbers of SLCMs, while the Soviet would withdraw its problem of verification, we also propose that the US understand that the range structure would be 600 for the SLCMs. And then the Soviet side would agree that only nuclear SLCMs would be covered by the declaration.

Baker: Let me again summarize what I think the differences are between us on this and I am not saying they are equal but I think there are outstanding differences in six areas.

First, there is a difference on the issue of a legally-binding limit. Second, there’s still a difference on verification. Third, there is a difference on range. Fourth, there’s a difference on do you declare nuclear and conventional or only nuclear. Fifth, do you declare an overall limit and also declare a number for each type of vessel? And, sixth, is there going to be a ban on MIRVed SLCMs? So, what I see is that there are five ALCM issues and there are six SLCM issues. That suggests there are eleven outstanding issues on the two.

Now, when we left Moscow, relying upon the elements of common ground and the joint communique, we thought that there were three outstanding issues. We thought there was one for ALCMs—that was range. And we thought there were two for SLCMs—that was range and the nuclear versus conventional.

Now I think we’re going to have to decide how to approach this problem. First, let me address the issue of a legally and binding limit on SLCMs. The reason we are so adamant on having only a politically-binding declaration outside the treaty is because if we put it in a treaty, if we make it legally binding, then we’re going to need ratification on this issue. And because there is no effective means to verify SLCMs, we will create an insuperable ratification problem for us. We can’t send up something to the Hill and at the same time say we can’t verify it. However, under our system of government, if we make a public declaration that says we’re not going to exceed a certain number of SLCMs, there is zero chance that the Congress will fund the construction of SLCMs in excess of that number. This is a major bar. If we can’t conclude this, this is going to be a major bar to a successful START agreement. That’s the reason we worked so hard to craft a form of declaration that we reviewed with your people on Moscow.

Shevardnadze: I know why you are worried. There is a Congressional factor and there is the problem of verification. But we in the Soviet Union now have the same problem. If we accept all of your conditions and report to the Supreme Soviet, then they’re not going to ratify this agreement. They will say there are two very bad elements in it. One, they will say there is no upper limit on the number of SLCMs, and two, they’ll say there is no verification, and that’s even more important to them. The question that we agreed on in the December 1987 summit here in Washington included a reference to on-site inspection. And it said we would look to practical solutions to this problem. We’re trying to take into account your concerns and our differences. Our requirement that there be some upper limit established is very logical.

Baker: There is one. We state it. It’s in our declaration. We say it. We say formally to the Soviet Union every year the number we will have, and we will not exceed it.

Shevardnadze: Would you identify the ceiling that would not be exceeded? The numbers of SLCMs would never exceed say 600 or some other figure. That’s what we want to see. If we don’t agree on the number that would not be exceeded, then you have an open channel to the arms race. And that’s what the Supreme Soviet will say to us. We’ve already heard that from the Supreme Soviet.

Baker: Now you’ve got a basic question here. Do we want to reduce strategic systems by 50 percent or not. If we put SLCMs into a START Treaty, then we’re not going to have a START Treaty. And what you are asking is, in effect, to put it into the START Treaty. That’s the same argument we have had for many years. Basically, we’re in a situation where either we’re going to take advantage of everything that’s been agreed to now and reduce numbers in this way or we won’t be able to do it.

Shevardnadze: You always said that you don’t regard SLCMs as strategic arms. We use to say that it had to be part of an agreement. Gorbachev said this. So when we say we are ready to have just a politically-binding declaration, you know that had the effect of a bomb exploding within the Soviet Union. We’ve done some good work on this. We should continue on it.

Baker: Why don’t we go up stairs then. This is the time to break.³

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Russian Affairs, Russia Desk Files, Lot 99D344, Baker-Shevardnadze Washington 4/4–6/90. Secret. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Office at the Department of State.
2. See Document 102.
3. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Bush met with Shevardnadze and the Soviet delegation in the Oval Office at 10:04 before escorting them to the Rose Garden at 10:04 and the Cabinet Room at 10:10. At 11:47, Bush returned to the Oval Office for a private meeting with Shevardnadze and Baker that lasted until 12:20 p.m. Memoranda of these conversations are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.