Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

105. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 6, 1990, 9:30 a.m.–1:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• ALCMs

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Brig Gen Gary L. Curtin USAF
  • Col Michael Wheeler USAF
  • Eleanor B. Sutter, EUR/SOV (notetaker)
  • Deborah A. Garretson (interpreter)

• Soviet

  • Maj Gen Aleksandr S. Peresypkin, Soviet General Staff
  • Feliks F. Popov (interpreter)

* * *

After welcoming remarks and introductions, Peresypkin expressed the hope that as military colleagues this group would be able to find a common language faster than civilian diplomats.

Curtin asked Peresypkin to describe the results of the April 5 evening meeting between Under Secretary Bartholomew and Marshal Akhromeyev. Peresypkin highlighted several points.

Counting Rules for Existing Long-range Nuclear ALCM-carrying Heavy Bombers (LRNHBs)

Within the 1600/6000 total, each U.S. LRNHB would count as carrying 10 warheads, and its actual carrying capacity would not exceed 20. For the Soviets the comparable numbers would be 8 and 12. Further, the Soviet side would have the right to deploy 40% more LRNHBs than the U.S. side at any given time. Peresypkin said this was part of a package, a big concession which had been offered in exchange for U.S. concessions on other issues, notably range. He stressed that it gave the U.S. side an advantage since, for example, if the U.S. side deployed 100 LRNHBs it would be charged only 1000 warheads under the ceiling while actually being able to deploy 2000 warheads; in this example the Soviet side could deploy a maximum of 140 LRNHBs, but would only be able to deploy a maximum of 1680 warheads.

Counting Rules for Future LRNHBs

Peresypkin described the U.S. proposal that for future types both sides’ LRNHBs would count at 10/20, and the Soviet right to 40% more LRNHBs would disappear. He raised the problem that would arise if, for example, the Soviet side kept 139 older-type LRNHBs in its force but deployed one new type. Would the 40% right disappear immediately at that point, or after deployment of some higher number of new types?

Peresypkin raised a new Soviet proposal concerning the point at which the Soviet side would switch from the 8/12 counting rule with the right to 40% more LRNHBs than the U.S. side to the “future types” counting rule of 10/20 with no 40% advantage. He said that at present the Soviet side had no plans to deploy a future type with the capability to carry 20 ALCMs, but that it wished to preserve the option. Until the Soviet side actually deployed a LRNHB with this increased capacity, however, he proposed that the 8/12/40% counting rule continue to apply to future Soviet LRNHBs. He noted that this proposal would be part of the Soviet package under which the Soviet side would also retain the right to have 100 heavy bombers in non-nuclear roles.

Curtin said the U.S. side had no authority to accept a change to the formula agreed in Moscow, under which all future Soviet LRNHBs would be counted at the 10/20 rate without the 40% advantage. However, he said the U.S. side would study Peresypkin’s proposal. Wheeler added a personal comment that Peresypkin’s proposal would extend an unusual situation indefinitely into an unknown future. By retaining the 40% advantage far into the future, the Soviet side could eventually have significantly larger numbers of LRNHBs than the U.S. side. Considering the fact that air defenses remained unconstrained, and that Soviet air defenses, for historical reasons, were significantly more developed than U.S. air defenses, this could prove a problem in defending the START agreement before Congress as being an equitable one. Wheeler noted that current systems on both sides had been designed before a START Treaty was envisioned. It was necessary to find a formula that dealt with current inequities, while ensuring that equity would be achieved in the future as future systems were designed with START provisions in mind.

Peresypkin pointed out that under the rule for existing types the U.S. side would be able to deliver more ALCMs than the Soviet side despite the 40% rule. Wheeler countered that warhead numbers, which were most often cited in public discussions, were not the whole story; military leaders knew that carriers, weapons, destinations, defenses, tactics, tanker capacity, and numerous other factors went into determining true equity. Military planners also had to recognize that, no matter what rights were accorded in the Treaty, they would be limited to the kinds and numbers of weapons their civilian leaders would provide them. He noted that the principal U.S. ALCM carrier, the B–52, was a very old aircraft against which Soviet defense capabilities had increased significantly in recent decades.

Peresypkin countered that “old” aircraft such as the B–52 or the TU–95 would be carrying new types of ALCMs. Moreover, these aircraft would not be operating within the range of Soviet air defenses. Since the ALCM had a 4000-km. range, the U.S. should not be concerned; stealth designs would render air defenses useless in any case. Peresypkin said the Soviet side was willing to accept certain disadvantages as long as its real concern—the 600—km. range—was met.

ALCM Range

Wheeler said he didn’t see how range was relevant to this issue, since nuclear ALCMs would be able to fly more than 600 km. Curtin asked why 600 km. was such a magical number for the Soviet side. Peresypkin replied that, as had already been explained to Gen. Powell, higher ranges rendered Soviet air defenses useless because they would have to fight not the carriers, but the ALCMs themselves. This was a longstanding situation dating back to the SALT II Treaty. Air defense capability could not be upgraded quickly, and improvements would be very costly.

Wheeler appealed to Peresypkin to see Soviet air defenses from the U.S. point of view; the U.S. side had very few air defenses. Marshal Akhromeyev had asserted that current Soviet heavy bombers could reach the U.S. with difficulty, but this might not be the case for future heavy bombers.

Sliding Ceiling on Number of LRNHBs

Peresypkin said Bartholomew and Akhromeyev had agreed that a numerical ceiling on LRNHBs would have to be set, but an actual number had not yet been agreed. (Comment: The U.S. record of the Bartholomew–Akhromeyev meeting indicates that the U.S. side did not agree in principle to such a ceiling. End comment.)

Former Heavy Bombers

Peresypkin said the Soviet side had accepted the U.S. right to deploy, outside the 1600 ceiling, 100 heavy bombers (HBs) converted for non-nuclear armaments; he acknowledged that the U.S. side had proposed 115. Curtin corrected this formulation, saying the U.S. position was that this represented a combined total of aircraft converted to carry conventional arms plus former heavy bombers. Peresypkin acknowledged that this was the U.S. position, but said that under the Soviet position an aircraft converted for reconnaissance, tanker or jamming purposes which was not capable of delivering any kind of weapon would not be subject to Treaty limits and thus should not be counted at all; he recalled that this had been the case in SALT II.

Distinguishing Features of Long-Range Nuclear and Non-Nuclear ALCMs

Peresypkin said Bartholomew and Akhromeyev had agreed that the distinguishing features of ALCMs should be only external, but reiterated the Soviet view that the distinguishing features should also be functionally related. He added, however, that he had some questions the sides needed to discuss.

After a lengthy exchange, both sides agreed that there was in fact a need to find a convincing method of distinguishing physically between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs. Wheeler reviewed with Peresypkin the ALCM common elements, which included the sides’ agreement at the 1988 Moscow Summit that for currently existing types whose nuclear and conventional variants could not be physically distinguished, all ALCMs of such types would be considered nuclear. Wheeler said that the sides had yet to agree on the appropriate kinds of physical distinguishing features, for instance length, width, placement of fins, or other aerodynamic details which were part of a system’s design.

U.S. Rationale

Wheeler presented the context in which the U.S. side had formulated its positions on these issues, reinforcing the explanation with points made by General Powell to Marshal Akhromeyev earlier that week in a meeting at which Peresypkin had been present. He stressed the need to strike a balance between effective verification via monitoring of treaty-limited items and both sides’ interest in avoiding exposure of design features not related to the need for treaty monitoring. He said the sides should seek to achieve a standard of verification that was reasonable, effective and adequate; “fool-proof verification” was a loose phrase sometimes used in public, but a phrase which could lead to nothing but endless debates.

Wheeler said that after a long and hard look at the question of whether there were functionally-related differences which would satisfy verification concerns, the U.S. side had come to the conclusion that functionally-related distinguishing features did not guarantee that a nuclear weapon could not be placed in the cavity of a cruise missile originally designed and used as a conventional cruise missile. (Peresypkin acknowledged that such technology could be created, but noted that this would be a treaty violation.) Wheeler explained that the logic behind the American approach was that since it was impossible to ensure that a system was incapable of being surreptitiously converted for nuclear use, it was necessary to design a regime whose purpose would be to provide assurance that no prohibited items were deployed. Such a regime would be based on such concepts as data exchange, initial exhibitions and OSI. Wheeler explained that this was the rationale for establishing a reasonable quota of short-notice inspections—to see how a side actually was deploying its systems over the course of time. Wheeler pointed out that the U.S. side had made a major concession in Moscow by agreeing to OSI at designated weapons storage areas at bases for heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear ALCMs, so that the sides would have confidence that no prohibited systems were actually deployed; there would be procedures whereby inspectors could satisfy themselves that a cruise missile designated as conventional was not nuclear-armed.

Wheeler stressed that the U.S.-proposed regime was not designed to demonstrate that a system was not capable of being converted for nuclear use, since it was not possible to achieve such certainty, but rather to provide confidence that systems were actually being deployed as declared.

Peresypkin asked whether he had understood correctly that a side would have the right to pick a missile at random to see that no nuclear charge could be installed in it. Wheeler said this was not the U.S. concept. Under the U.S. approach, if inspectors saw a conventional missile at a weapon storage area, they could see at that time that it did not actually have a nuclear weapon installed in it. In the U.S. view there was no way to inspect the interior of a missile to see whether the missile was capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. In the U.S. view, he said, this regime of short-notice inspections would be convincing because, over time, it would be possible to verify the operational activities of both sides.

Soviet-proposed FRODs

Noting that, despite numerous queries in Geneva, the U.S. side had not yet received a concrete Soviet reply to its request for examples of the kinds of functionally-related differences the Soviet side had in mind, Wheeler asked Peresypkin for specifics.

Peresypkin said that external physical differences were not sufficient to ensure that a missile declared to be conventional could not be nuclear-armed. He said the external differences cited by Wheeler would not provide the necessary certainty. The key to distinguishing nuclear from conventional missiles, he said, lay with the warhead; all other parts of the missile assembly could be essentially identical, but the warhead’s position in the missile could show whether it was nuclear or conventional. Wheeler asked whether Peresypkin was referring to the location of the nuclear warhead compartment. Peresypkin stated his understanding that the placement of the warhead was determined by the aerodynamic design features of the missile in general. For example, it could not be on the tail.

Peresypkin added that the functional connections were different for nuclear and non-nuclear warheads; the arrangement and the wiring revealed whether a warhead was nuclear or non-nuclear. By observing a missile’s functional design—the warhead’s control system, the manner of interface with the payload, the interface of the payload to the missile’s guidance system—an expert could tell the nature of the payload.

Peresypkin also cited the points of attachment of the warhead to the missile as a way of distinguishing nuclear from non-nuclear missiles. He noted that a nuclear warhead is smaller than a conventional warhead, and that its attachment points are different. He asserted that it would be possible to determine whether a conventional or nuclear warhead could be placed on a given missile based on observation of the attachment points.

Further, Peresypkin cited the volume of the payload compartment as a distinguishing feature, asserting that the compartment for a conventional warhead would be larger than that for a nuclear warhead. He also stated that the architecture of the payload compartment would be different for conventional and nuclear payloads. He said the Soviet side favored demonstrating these features in the missile exhibitions. He asserted that the missile would not be dismantled during the exhibition; all this could be demonstrated in the course of the technological cycle of missile maintenance procedures.

Peresypkin also cited the points of attachment of the missile to the body of the aircraft as a way of distinguishing heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear missiles from those incapable of carrying nuclear missiles. If these were designed differently for nuclear and non-nuclear missiles—for example, if the spacing were different—the two could be distinguished.

On-site Inspection of ALCMs and of Heavy Bombers

Peresypkin said this was a question that should be addressed by technical specialists, and that the sides should not rush to resolve it under pressure without consulting experts.

Peresypkin offered his personal concept for OSI, stressing that this had not yet been discussed by the delegation: it would include random monitoring of missiles in storage areas and random selection of missiles for close examination to determine whether they were nuclear-armed or conventionally-armed. It would also include procedures to determine the missiles’ externally observable differences, including proof they did not and could not contain nuclear warheads. It would thus be possible to conclude that these missiles could only be attached either to nuclear or to conventional heavy bombers.

Wheeler said Peresypkin’s concept went beyond U.S. thinking in at least two ways:

— The U.S. side advocated EODs because we had found no convincing FRODs which satisfactorily balanced the need for effective verification and the need to protect design features of the missile, and which would clearly demonstrate that a cruise missile declared to be conventional could not carry a nuclear weapon.

— The U.S. side could not accept the principle that one would inspect the heavy bomber itself in all cases to see that it was not capable of carrying a particular kind of weapon. In other words, Wheeler said, the U.S. side did not find placement points to be an acceptable solution for all categories of heavy bombers.

Wheeler cited two aspects of Peresypkin’s concept where the U.S. side could agree:

— Random visits to declared storage areas at bases for heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear ALCMs; and

— Random inspections of missiles for closer determination; what would tend to guide that selection would be the EODs on the missiles.

Peresypkin asked why not include interior distinguishing features such as the interface of the control mechanism with the missile payload, and why the U.S. was concerned about looking inside missiles. He noted that the advance of technology had brought missile designs closer; both sides’ designs were subject to the same laws of aerodynamics and used similar design and architecture of ALCMs and the placement of warheads in compartments. He said it was important to be convinced regarding the internal missile assembly. Without this, an element of mistrust would appear, since a side could circumvent the Treaty by making a missile with the same EODs as a conventional missile, but which would be nuclear-armed.

Wheeler asked whether Peresypkin’s concept for inspections inside missiles envisioned a single-occasion inspection—for example, when a new cruise missile entered the inventory—or whether it envisioned more frequent inspections. Peresypkin replied that there would doubtless be an initial exhibition to demonstrate that a missile was non-nuclear. But a side would also have the right to challenge inspections in cases where it had doubts. This applied to missiles associated with heavy bombers and to conventional missiles, he said.

Peresypkin asked Wheeler to clarify why, when the U.S. side did not object to the inspection of nuclear weapons during initial displays of ICBMs and SLBMs, it objected to similar procedures with respect to ALCMs. He presumed that during such an inspection it would not be possible to see, let alone steal, the technology for the engine or the guidance system. Wheeler pointed out the difference between looking at mounting stations on a PBV and looking at the insides of a modern cruise missile. Peresypkin acknowledged the concern, but said it had no place in an effort to provide certainty that no violations were occurring.

Curtin acknowledged Peresypkin’s concern over the possibility that a conventional cruise missile could be converted for nuclear use, but said the Soviet ideas would not be effective to address this problem. Attachment points would not make much difference; the control mechanism, which relates to the weight of the fuel (the biggest variable in a cruise missile), would also not be very relevant. Differences in design technology might not equate to differences in mission. Therefore the U.S. side had concluded that all these inspections would not warrant the effort. The important thing was to verify, without intruding inside the missile, that nuclear weapons were not being inserted into conventional missiles. Though the Soviet proposal was very intricate, Curtin concluded, the U.S. side was not sure it was very effective.

Peresypkin replied that the Soviet inspection proposal was not very intricate, and an interior inspection could be accomplished in five minutes. Curtin replied that the U.S. side did not have zippers on its missiles. Peresypkin said that, having operated these systems, he knew—and as air force specialists the U.S. side also knew—that it was possible to check the interface of the payload with the guidance system, by means of which a missile’s entire flight program was controlled throughout its trajectory.

Peresypkin asked whether his understanding was correct that the U.S. side had concerns in two areas:

— There was a technical concern that even with interior inspection of a missile there would be insufficient guarantees that the missile could not be armed with a nuclear warhead; and

— The U.S. side was concerned that the other side would gain access to technology.

Wheeler said he would state the U.S. concerns somewhat differently. Regarding the latter issue, he said the purpose of monitoring in the Treaty should be related to the item that is being monitored and should not go beyond that. Peresypkin said the main Soviet concern was that these weapons must remain conventional, and could not be converted to nuclear use; the goal was to see that no nuclear weapon was placed in a compartment designated as non-nuclear. He said the U.S.-proposed regime would not provide sufficiently convincing evidence that such a switch was out of the question.

Turning to the issue of EODs distinguishable to NTM, Peresypkin asked whether this could also include some features that would permit determination of functional military capabilities—for example, attachment points could be such that a nuclear ALCM could not be attached onto the points for a non-nuclear ALCM. He said this was important because, even if inspectors established that at a certain base only non-nuclear ALCMs were deployed, unless EODs were functionally related to some extent, this would not constitute clear proof that the heavy bombers at that base could not possibly also be used to carry nuclear ALCMs. In other words, at the point in time when an inspection took place there might be no nuclear ALCMs at a base, but a short time later they could be shipped there and mounted onto the bombers if the attachment points were identical. He urged that this possible avenue of circumvention be closed off. Wheeler said he understood the Soviet position, but maintained that even this would not be sufficient to close off possible circumvention. This was why the U.S. approach was designed to enable monitoring of how ALCMs were actually deployed at heavy bomber operating bases, rather than seek to use extraordinarily intrusive inspections to seek to close off hypothetical possibilities.

Peresypkin countered that the Soviet side could not accept this position because it was important to construct heavy bombers not equipped to carry nuclear ALCMs in such a way that their mounting stations would be incapable of switching for nuclear use; if they could switch, they would have to be counted as LRNHBs.

Conversion of “Older” Bomber Types for Conventional Roles

Peresypkin noted that in the previous evening’s discussion Amb. Burt had called the Soviet proposal on the conversion of older bomber types for conventional roles a fair one, but had said he wanted to consult on it. Peresypkin asked for the military point of view. He noted that the concept of “older” types of bombers would change with time, and said the Geneva delegations would have to work out criteria for what constitutes an “older” type—for example, from what year a bomber would be considered an older type. Peresypkin suggested that one criterion would be the aircraft’s length of service in the air force; this could be ten, fifteen or twenty years as the sides might agree. This was necessary, Peresypkin said, to prevent the conversion of “contemporary” types of heavy bombers so that they would not count under the 1600 ceiling.

Curtin noted that such converted bombers could be used to carry non-nuclear weapons or as reconnaissance, tanker or jammer aircraft. He thought it unlikely a side would build a new heavy bomber for such missions, and therefore asked why such a rule was necessary. He said Congress would laugh the Pentagon out of Washington if it proposed to buy B–2 aircraft for conventional-only missions; he said the natural trends of force structure evolution over time should resolve this question. In time, however, the B–1 might be converted to conventional uses. Peresypkin said that new types of heavy bombers, even if converted for conventional roles, would pose a significant air threat to the other side. It was one thing if older heavy bombers carried conventional loads, but quite another if new types, which were more effective and had larger weapon-carrying capability, were used.

Wheeler noted that the principle behind the START Treaty was to deal with nuclear weapons. He asked whether the Soviet concern was that conventional bombers could be converted to carry nuclear weapons, or whether the concern was that air defenses might be ineffective against them even if they were used in conventional roles. Peresypkin said he was not saying that air defenses should be equally effective against both types of planes—only that over 1600 they should be both numerically limited and not permitted to be contemporary types.

Curtin said the U.S. side agreed there should be a ceiling on such aircraft. Peresypkin pointed out that in Moscow the U.S. side had proposed to expand the list of convertible types beyond the B–52 and the TU–95, and added that criteria must be worked out so that what constituted an “older” type did not become a disputed question.

Wheeler noted that the START Treaty would have agreed procedures for converting heavy bombers from a nuclear to a non-nuclear role. Peresypkin merely replied, “I know convertibility.”

Tactical Aviation

Wheeler asked Peresypkin whether the Soviets were concerned over the ALCMs that would be carried on heavy bombers, or whether they were concerned over conventional weapons that would be carried on aircraft that were not heavy bombers. He recalled Akhromeyev’s mention to Powell of aircraft on the borders of the USSR—i.e, tactical aviation. Peresypkin declined to elaborate on this subject, which he said would be a diversion, but stated his personal opinion that the subjects were closely related.

Personal Note

In introducing himself, Peresypkin said he was a Major General in the Soviet Air Force serving on the General Staff, working on arms control and air force issues. During a lunch break, he said his background was as a pilot, and that he had switched to the General Staff with regret.

1. Source: Department of State, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation Subject Files, 1983–2005, Ministerials: Washington April 4–6 1990. Secret. Drafted on April 20. The meeting took place in Room 7511 of the Department of State.