Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

102. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 5, 1990, 8:45 p.m.–1:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• START

PARTICIPANTS

• Bartholomew
• Burt
• Kanter
• Timbie (notetaker)
• Karabovsky (interpreter)
• Akhromeyev
• Nazarkin
• Peresypkin (joined later)
• Popov (interpreter)
• Karabovsky (interpreter)

Burt: Do you have any comments on the US-proposed list of issues to be resolved in Geneva by the May Ministerial. Nazarkin: I haven’t yet seen it.

Burt: It would give important impetus to Moscow, Washington, and Geneva if Ministers can agree on this list and give instructions to negotiators and staffs tomorrow. Akhromeyev: I will report this to Shevardnadze tomorrow morning.

Akhromeyev: Let me tell you of my directives from Shevardnadze. My minister has come to the conclusion that circumstances demand an informal exchange between the sides now to expand on possible solutions to the ALCM and SLCM problems. I have no directive to proceed, and this exchange is absolutely informal. If you become interested in our approaches, then tomorrow morning in our presence Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze will look at these options. They would decide for themselves how to proceed further. If our propositions are not acceptable to the US, they should be forgotten and buried in this room. Neither you nor we would refer to them in the future.

Bartholomew: My instructions were that you had some ideas that I am to listen to and react to. I am operating on exactly the same basis as you are, free from instructions. This is a matter for Ministers. We have an open mind and are ready to listen.

Akhromeyev: In all candor I should say one more thing. We have not received any directives. Shevardnadze and myself are aware of attitudes of political leaders. I have taken the maximum of what our leaders might settle for. Beyond that maximum would be reckless for you to press or for us to accede. This is my personal judgement.

Akhromeyev: Let me address the grounds for resolving ALCMs. First, the counting rule for ALCMs proposed by the US is acceptable to the USSR. American heavy bombers would be attributed 10 long-range ALCMs, provided the maximum capability is 20 long-range ALCMs. For Soviet heavy bombers, the attribution would be 8 long-range ALCMs and they could carry up to 12 long-range ALCMs. Under these circumstances, the USSR would possess the right to deploy within the framework of the 1600 limit 40% more heavy bombers than the number possessed by the US.

For future heavy bombers we would agree to a counting rule for both sides attributing 10 ALCMs per heavy bomber, while actually they could be equipped with up to 20 ALCMs. This would apply to both the US and the USSR.

We would withdraw the provision on functionally defined distinctions to distinguish nuclear from non-nuclear ALCMs, and accept the American proposal on this score. We would take out of the 1600 limit on delivery vehicles for each side up to 100 heavy bombers equipped with non-nuclear missiles or gravity bombs.

We would establish a sliding level on heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs for the American side, and the permissible ceiling on the number of each side’s aircraft would also be established, and this ceiling would not be exceeded. There would be a floating level on the number of these aircraft. At the same time there would be a ceiling, and the floating level would not exceed the ceiling.

Finally, this approach would apply to ALCMs with a range in excess of 600 km.

Bartholomew: It is important to have a full picture of what your thinking is. Before I respond, can you describe your thinking on SLCMs?

Akhromeyev: These are separate issues. I would like to invite a discussion of ALCMs, then proceed to SLCMs.

Burt: What has become of the proposal for verifying aggregate levels of ALCMs? Akhromeyev: I am removing it.

Burt: Second, the elements of common ground called for 115 converted bombers, and called for a continuing right. It would apply not just to existing bombers, but in the future we want the continuing right to have 115 bombers outside the START limits. Can you accept the concept of continuing right?

Akhromeyev: My position is in the negative. The elements say 115, I can say 100. And not new types of bombers.

Burt: The idea is not to convert new types of bombers. Say 10 years from now bombers that are now new would be older and could be converted, but the number would never exceed 115. Bartholomew: The number would never exceed 115. As bombers are converted, earlier converted bombers would be retired. Burt: For example we would not now declare B–2s for conversion.

Akhromeyev: This is an entirely new question. Let us not add new points to our exchange. Let us settle the questions we have before us.

Burt: This is not a new issue, we have addressed it in Geneva. Akhromeyev: Let us discuss Moscow questions, not Geneva questions. Burt: It was in the elements of common ground. Akhromeyev: I cannot answer on the subject of continuing right. I can answer on the number of aircraft outside the 1600. Other aspects can be clarified in Geneva.

Bartholomew: Do I understand that we would be agreeing on a number outside the START limits that would not be exceeded. The US is talking about transferring some aircraft into this category while taking others out, so the total never exceeds the agreed number.

Akhromeyev: I understand. In case of malfunction, aircraft could be replaced. Burt: We were talking about replacing aircraft that age. Akhromeyev: That is different, there I cannot answer.

Burt: Our view is that if these converted heavy bombers are carrying non-nuclear ALCMs that are distinguishable, they would not count against the 1600. Of course these converted bombers would count against the 115 limit, but if equipped with non-nuclear ALCMs would not count against the 1600.

Akhromeyev: Those 100 heavy bombers would be outside the 1600 limit. They would be equipped with non-nuclear missiles, and there would be up to 100 of them. They will be regarded as strategic delivery vehicles, but not nuclear.

Burt: One more question. What happens under your approach if an aircraft that is not a heavy bomber is equipped with non-nuclear ALCMs? Is such an aircraft excluded from the agreement? Akhromeyev: Automatically it becomes a heavy bomber. Burt: The missiles were non-nuclear. Akhromeyev: Once an aircraft carries an ALCM over 600 km it becomes a strategic delivery vehicle. We don’t want to add more problems. You keep torturing me.

Burt: We have had our hands burned on this issue and we are being cautious. We cannot accept an agreement that counts aircraft with non-nuclear ALCMs as a heavy bomber.

Akhromeyev: There are limits to our discussions. We are not about to sign an agreement tonight, or find a solution to all Geneva issues. I am aware of this issue and invite you to address it with Nazarkin in Geneva.

Bartholomew: I need to underscore this for you. We are here to solve the ALCM problem, and need to address this issue. We could not accept a settlement of the ALCM problem that said if I put a conventional ALCM over the agreed range on a tactical aircraft it counts as a heavy bomber. Burt: The definition of a heavy bomber includes a bomber tested or deployed with nuclear ALCMs.

Akhromeyev: Once again it was foolhardy of me to try to answer this question. I don’t think we should raise this now. We have half a year ahead of us. If we raise more and more issues we will not be able to find any solutions.

Bartholomew: We came to this Ministerial thinking there was only one ALCM issue. We are not looking for trouble. We will have to return to this, it is a serious issue and not a detail for the US. And we will not be able to say in June we have settled all the important issues with this issue outstanding.

Burt: One more question, concerning the proposal for a maximum ceiling for the floating limit on ALCM heavy bombers. Do you have a number in mind? Akhromeyev: Our concrete proposal is 90–115. We are open to your proposal.

Burt: I am not interested in your concept, I just want to know your proposal. Bartholomew: Speaking for the US, we don’t accept the concept. Akhromeyev: You say you don’t accept the concept. Does this mean 90–115 converted heavy bombers or the entire package? Bartholomew: All I am addressing is whether there is a ceiling on ALCM heavy bombers.

Bartholomew: A point of clarification on your package. Your second point said you would withdraw your proposal for functionally-related observable differences on non-nuclear ALCMs and accept the US proposal. It would be simplest to ask whether accepting the US proposal means accepting these five elements of common ground. (He showed Akhromeyev a copy of the Moscow agreed elements of common ground with paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 10, and 12 marked. Nazarkin produced for Akhromeyev the Russian language text of the same document and marked these paragraphs.)

Akhromeyev: On the whole we agree. There might be minor points that require clarification. In the main, we support your proposal.

Bartholomew: In this area the devil is in the details. Akhromeyev: I agree with you. But I cannot say more than I have said. There might be some minor devil that could spring out and need to be attended to. We are not signing a treaty tonight. I am responsible for the figures. As for language, there may be details that would have to be resolved.

Bartholomew: We can move on, but will leave question marks by this part of your position. Akhromeyev: Any points we discuss tonight might require clarification. In principle we have agreement on some of the figures.

Bartholomew: Can you look again at the first five tics of the Moscow agreed elements of common ground and tell me if you believe they state the counting rule as you agree to it. (Akhromeyev read the Russian text and made the following remarks after each tic.)

— I agree with the first point.

— I agree on Soviet bombers too.

— I agree on American bombers, B–52 and B–1.

— I agree on the 12 number for Soviet bombers. As for the future, the number should be 20.

— I agree on the 40% advantage.

Akhromeyev: I consider the first five paragraphs agreed upon. As for the remaining paragraphs in principle I support this approach, but they remain to be clarified.

Bartholomew: I invite you to look at the last three points in the Moscow agreed elements of common ground and give me your views. Akhromeyev: I will need Gen. Peresypkin, an expert on Air Force matters. (Akhromeyev sent for Peresypkin and suggested that in the interim they discuss SLCMs.)

Akhromeyev (taking out the Soviet position paper on SLCMs he had provided the previous night): In the course of our first conversation we reached agreement on the first three points (in the Soviet paper):

— The US and the USSR will exchange politically-binding statements on long-range SLCMs effective for the entire duration of the START treaty.

— Each of the sides would make annual declarations of the planned stocks of long-range SLCMs, with the maximum number specified for each of the next five years in advance.

— Third, the sides would exchange information on the types of ships and submarines capable of carrying long-range SLCMs. This information would be confidential.

Bartholomew: I want to make sure these three points are saying what is here in the bracketed text. (He held up the Moscow bracketed text of the SLCM declaration. Nazarkin gave Akhromeyev a Russian language text of the same document.) Akhromeyev: The language might be different.

Bartholomew: Do you see any difference with the bracketed draft declaration? Akhromeyev: In substance there is no difference.

Akhromeyev (moving on to paragraph 4 in the Soviet paper): Agreement would be reached in the negotiating record (versus a Protocol to the treaty in the Soviet paper) on the number of long-range SLCMs and the number of long-range SLCMs per type of ship.

Bartholomew: Our difficulty with this is not a lack of understanding. Our difficulty is with the concept of agreed numerical limits on the total number and the number by ship type. This is unacceptable. Akhromeyev: So you disagree with point 4 entirely. You are not supportive of an agreed number and number per ship type. So you are against this point entirely.

Akhromeyev (moving on to paragraph 5): Only nuclear-armed long-range SLCMs in excess of 600 km would be limited. All current long-range SLCMs would be regarded as nuclear SLCMs. Our agreement to limit only nuclear SLCMs is contingent upon US agreement to limit long-range SLCMs with a range in excess of 600 km.

Bartholomew: I assume the figure of 600 km applies only to nuclear SLCMs. Akhromeyev: We are confronting the same type of problem as in ALCMs. Here we have in mind only nuclear missiles. We can deal with conventional missiles in Geneva.

Burt: Unlike the situation for ALCMs, the US is presently deploying long-range conventional SLCMs. Are all of these counted as nuclear under your approach? Akhromeyev: That is true, unless they are made distinguishable. Burt: That is bad news.

Bartholomew: Let me say this is a bomb. This would not just get me reassigned to a small, hot country. This would get me lynched. Akhromeyev: I am aware this is not acceptable to you today. But there is no other option. This is a point of difference between us.

Bartholomew: The other option is our position that only nuclear SLCMs above a certain range be declared. Akhromeyev: I understand. You think conventional SLCMs are beyond the reach of agreement and you will be free to deploy as many conventional SLCMs as you want.

Bartholomew: We do not accept the concept of an agreed, legally-binding limit. We do accept the concept of a politically-binding limit, but only on nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Akhromeyev: My job tonight is to go through the list, and identify a list of differences. I want to find out on which points we differ. Then we will summarize.

Burt: Why does the Soviet side think it necessary to limit conventional SLCMs? Akhromeyev: I want to go through the list first, but I will answer the question. If we reach agreement with you on range, set the range at 600 km, then we are prepared to limit only nuclear SLCMs. Then you would have the right to deploy freely conventional SLCMs.

Akhromeyev (moving to paragraph 6 in the Soviet paper): I assume you would like to disagree on point 6, that the maximum number of nuclear-armed long-range SLCMs would not exceed 600 units. Bartholomew: You understand correctly.

Akhromeyev: On point 7, future nuclear-armed long-range SLCMs would be made distinguishable from non-nuclear SLCMs on the basis of external and functionally-defined differences. I understand you disagree. Bartholomew: Your understanding is correct.

Akhromeyev: The question still stands. How do we distinguish nuclear SLCMs from non-nuclear SLCMs? This is different from ALCMs, where we have distinguishability rules, on-site inspection, etc. How do we distinguish SLCMs?

Bartholomew: You can put us down as disagreeing on 7, 8, 9, and 10. The verification problem is fundamental from the outset. We cannot devise verification means to reach levels of confidence required to develop legally-binding limits and bring them to Congress. (Holding up the Moscow bracketed draft declaration) I do not believe we have yet succeeded in explaining how serious this declaration is and how it serves your needs because of our political system. Burt will explain why it meets many of the points you have been raising about limits and levels.

Akhromeyev: You disregard the political atmosphere today in the Soviet Union. Probably you are disregarding our situation in taking this document to the Supreme Soviet without verification. It would not be ratified.

Burt: You do not appreciate what a politically sophisticated document the draft SLCM declaration is. We need to find an approach that meets both the political realities here and in the Soviet Union. I will speak candidly, recognizing the informality of this meeting. We recognize your desire to have some form of limits on SLCMs. But we face a difficult problem. We cannot produce on the verification regime that would meet the demanding tests required by Congress to get an agreement ratified. So what is the solution—you want limits, we don’t think they can be verified in a legally-binding agreement. In our view, the solution is in the form of a politically-binding understanding, which would be inevitably enforced in our political system. Akhromeyev: I understand.

Burt: Given our system, if we were to declare that we were to deploy some number for these five years, that would be the maximum we would be permitted to deploy. Akhromeyev: I understand.

Burt: We need to get out of this dilemma, and have real limits without facing the problems of explaining how they will be verified. Bartholomew: Which would open to attack the entire START agreement.

Akhromeyev: So you are ruling out the possibility of reaching agreement on a ceiling on nuclear SLCMs on both sides? Burt: What we are suggesting is that both sides issue parallel statements.

Akhromeyev: Answer my question about both sides. You are against an agreed limit on SLCMs for both sides. Burt: What do you really mean?

Akhromeyev: I mean the US and the USSR would agree to limit SLCMs by a certain number for both sides. Are you ruling out this possibility? Burt: In a politically-binding agreement?

Akhromeyev: In order to proceed I must know. Do you rule out the possibility of US and Soviet agreement on establishing a certain number of SLCMs for the US and the Soviet Union and this level will not be exceeded? Burt: Could that number be the number the US plans to deploy for the next five years?

Akhromeyev: The limit would be proposed and accepted, and would have to be formally recorded. Under your approach the number would be recorded unilaterally by the US. The Soviet Union would not have the power of influencing these numbers.

Bartholomew: (Holding up the Moscow bracketed draft declaration) In the second year that we present this declaration, we would have a politically-binding limit not to exceed the numbers we presented this year, this year, this year, and this year (pointing to the declarations for years 2, 3, 4, and 5). This would be a politically-binding limit on us, just as your declaration would have that effect on you. And this document would be public. There would be no way we could have a number that would exceed that number. If anyone tried to exceed it, someone would say we have a political understanding with the Soviet Union.

Bartholomew: In the character of these informal talks, let me say we discussed the idea of a politically-binding limit for a long time before we proposed a draft in Moscow. The reason it was so difficult is because it was regarded as being a real undertaking.

Akhromeyev: We fail to understand each other. My problem is not with your text. The Soviet Union holds the position that all these limits should be bilateral. Neither side has the right to go beyond these limits. In the case of your proposal, we have unilateral declarations. We cannot agree to this. In this case, the limit would not be the responsibility of both sides. I am coming to the conclusion we can’t work it out successfully. I don’t see how to solve this. I don’t think our government could agree to your option. I will report positively on ALCMs, and will report we cannot achieve common ground on SLCMs.

Burt: We have a problem with the question of mutual agreement. You did not touch on verification. I would like to know if the question of a mutual limit is your cardinal point, and if so are you prepared to move back from the verification language in your paper. Akhromeyev: Yes. If we had a limit binding for both sides (perhaps recorded in other ways, say in the negotiating record) then we could get to dropping the verification measures.

Burt: Under the US approach the US would declare its number, and the Soviet Union would have the right to declare a similar number. Akhromeyev: Our proposal is 600 for you and for us. Give us your figure. The idea is we would agree on the binding number of SLCMs, and in return we would drop insistence on verification for SLCMs.

Akhromeyev: Let us put away SLCMs, nothing has worked out. It is decisive to us to have a binding limit for both sides on SLCMs.

Bartholomew: I have two points. First, the approach agreed to in Moscow gives you and us a politically binding limit. Second, it is the US view that that is a real limit and the only limit we can accept. We don’t have a difference over a limit but over it’s form. This is in substance and form very far in your direction.

Akhromeyev: It is not in our direction. There is one cardinal difference between us. We should establish a binding, obligatory common limit. Otherwise we don’t have realistic limits with unilateral declarations. I will report to our political leadership, and they may arrive at another decision. Our leaders understand this particular problem. Our President and Prime Minister and the others are personally familiar with it. The way they view this problem rules out your option. How they react when I report this I cannot say. Whether they would unilaterally decide or write a letter to the US President I cannot say. I am giving the maximum concessions. On this point I cannot give you a concession. I will report it to my leaders and let them decide.

Bartholomew: I will be faithful in reporting your views. Please in describing mine, make clear how the politically-binding limits would be real.

Akhromeyev: The good part of our discussions is that we clearly understand each other’s positions, and realize the maximum concessions we are prepared to make. Now it is for the Soviet leaders to undertake a new decision. An exchange at the top level will be required.

At this point Gen. Peresypkin arrived, and Akhromeyev suggested that we return to the question of ALCMs, and asked Peresypkin to begin with comments on the distinguishability rules in the Moscow elements of common ground. Peresypkin: I have a number of questions on the ALCM paper. On the external differences, each side is free to interpret those differences the way it wants to. This might lead to an impasse. So what we might have as a result is we have one set in mind and you have another set. Can you be more specific? Then we might agree on the differences between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs.

Bartholomew: Notice there are two standards, and that will limit any possible misunderstanding—differences must be observable to national technical means and visible to on-site inspection. What we have thought of and talked of in Moscow are size, length, diameter, more than just color. So the external differences meet a standard—observable by NTM. Other differences are visible to on-site inspection. Note the on-site inspection. You can come and look and we can go and look.

Burt: In Geneva we discussed functionally-related observable differences, and I asked Soviet experts to give me examples of functionally-related observable differences. I never heard one example. We then worked to narrow differences. Your side was not satisfied with national technical means, and in Moscow we made a big concession in allowing experts to observe with on-site inspection.

Bartholomew: Please look at the next point. To get at the question of these differences we exchange information and exhibit the missiles to confirm the information and confirm the distinguishing features. Burt: We have an Air Force General on our delegation, we would be happy to set up a meeting to discuss this further tomorrow morning.

Bartholomew: What we have constructed in our proposal is a whole system of openness—NTM, information exchange, on-site inspection—to give each side confidence in distinguishing between nuclear and conventional ALCMs. One last point, after the missiles are identified you get to go to a non-ALCM heavy bomber base or to a converted heavy bomber base and go to the weapons storage area and say you want the 7th, 11th, and 19th missiles pulled and you will be able to see that they are not nuclear-armed missiles.

Peresypkin: You took the time to try to convince me this was enough to distinguish nuclear from conventional ALCMs. You have confirmed my fears. This is not an idle question. We are concerned by the fact that bombers have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons unless we agree on distinguishing features. The points for mounting of missiles, the mounting units themselves, are different for nuclear than for conventional ALCMs. The base is 1.5 meters for nuclear ALCMs, 2 meters for conventional ALCMs. (Using a styrofoam cup, he made clear that he was talking about a portion of the top of the missile where it is attached to the aircraft.) Nuclear and conventional ALCMs should be distinguished by this feature.

Burt: That would be one example of differences visible to OSI. Peresypkin: The warhead attachment and interface is also different. Bartholomew: This is also an example of a difference visible to on-site inspection. This seems to fit the concept. Burt: I suggest you talk to our general.

Akhromeyev (referring to the five tics on distinguishability and inspection in the Moscow elements of common ground): These are the points that are acceptable on the whole, in general.

Bartholomew: May I try to reformulate that, and see if you agree. Can I say that you agree with the points on distinguishability and inspection that we talked about, but of course there are elements that will need to be developed, to be fleshed out? Akrhomeyev: We have agreement on the first five points. As for the other five points, we accept them in general but they are still to be fleshed out. That is right.

Akhromeyev: We say 100, you say 115. Burt: We say continuing right. Peresypkin: That continuing right applies to older bombers. In Moscow the US position was different, it referred to the B–1 and B–2. Burt: We say that looking into the future, bombers that today are new will then be older, and B–1s or B–2s could be converted to a conventional role. For now B–52s will be converted. This is what we mean by a continuing right. Bombers other than the B–52 could be converted in the future.

Akhromeyev: What we have in mind is determining at each point how to determine older types. Burt: If you accept the concept of a continuing right, we could talk about criteria for bombers that could be put in this category.

Akhromeyev: This can be done. For example, a bomber that has been in service over 15 years. We will specify that definition. Burt: That kind of criterion can be considered.

Bartholomew: Let us look at the number 115 versus 100. Burt: I think we can resolve this. You have another position. You want extra bombers for jamming, tanking, and reconnaissance. Peresypkin: We do not want an additional number for these purposes. Burt: Why not put together a category of converted conventional bombers, jammers, tankers, and reconnaissance aircraft, all under a 115 limit.

Peresypkin: You did not understand correctly. We do not want to throw these other aircraft into the category of conventional bombers. Burt: Why not, and limit them all to 115? Akhromeyev: The other aircraft you mentioned are no longer bombers, and should not be counted.

Burt: How many of these aircraft will you need? Peresypkin: It is difficult to say. Akhromeyev: Let us keep this difference. Bartholomew: Think about it overnight.

Bartholomew (returning to the Moscow ALCM elements of common ground): Before we leave this page, do you want to keep the ban on ALCMs with multiple nuclear warheads? Akhromeyev: We are agreed on that.

Bartholomew (referring to the ban on conversion of aircraft other than bombers into ALCM heavy bombers): I am prepared to drop the first of the last three points. Akhromeyev: I accept all three of the last three points.

Bartholomew: Let us take stock.

Akhromeyev: I would like to return to the question of equipping future types of heavy bombers with nuclear ALCMs, now that I can consult with my colleague. Peresypkin: Marshall Akhromeyev agreed that future Soviet types of heavy bombers would be attributed 10 ALCMs and could be equipped with 20, the same as the US. For the American side this is tantamount to a realistic circumvention of the treaty. For the Soviet side this is a formal right. We have no plans or intentions to do this. So our proposal, and we want this right recorded, is that future Soviet ALCM heavy bombers, not just the TU–95 and TU–160, still enjoy the right to 40% more.

Burt: I don’t see the basis for doing that, since future Soviet ALCM heavy bombers are subject to the same 10 and 20 numbers as US ALCM heavy bombers. Peresypkin: If the Soviet Union does not use this right, they would enjoy the 40% formula.

Bartholomew: You say you don’t have any such plans now, but the time scale here is 15 years. There are other formal rights that we have—for example heavy missiles. We have the formal right, a right we cannot exercise.

Bartholomew: I ask if you could give us your agreement to this provision a third time. Peresypkin: I presented my idea clearly. Nothing actually changes, it represents a continuation into the future of the situation today.

Bartholomew: We agreed to the 40% rule in Moscow to reflect concerns related to today’s aircraft. I cannot agree with the general. Peresypkin: Let us have your experts talk to our experts.

Bartholomew: Let us try again to take stock. The agreed Moscow elements of common ground are now the agreed Washington elements of common ground except for the 40% rule and the 115 number. With these two exceptions, the agreed Moscow elements are now the agreed Washington elements. There are three additional issues on which we differ—range, subceiling on ALCM heavy bombers, and tactical aircraft carrying conventional ALCMs.

Burt: There is also the question whether converted heavy bombers can carry conventional ALCMs without counting in START limits. Akhromeyev: We agreed. The 100 converted bombers are outside the 1600.

Burt: The counting rules do not pertain to an aircraft that carries non-nuclear ALCMs and cannot otherwise be classified as a heavy bomber. For example, an F–16 carrying a non-nuclear ALCM does not count as a heavy bomber. Akhromeyev: It will count as a heavy bomber.

Burt: Even if it carries a non-nuclear ALCM that is distinguishable from a nuclear ALCM? Akhromeyev: This is the third time we have addressed this subject. I know why you keep bringing it up. Any aircraft carrying an ALCM with range equal or in excess of 600 km will be considered a heavy bomber.

Bartholomew: It is hard for us to believe an F–16 with a non-nuclear ALCM becomes a heavy bomber, and then all other F–16s do as well. This is not a separate issue outside the ALCM question. This is an ALCM fired into the package we are discussing. This is a major difference between us, and I will so report to my Secretary.

Akhromeyev: Your observation is correct, but these papers fix the limits of our discussions. This is a central and important question, but it is not the subject for tonight. Burt wants to solve this question here. I understand why you keep asking this question. I will report we reached agreement on ALCM issues on an informal level, and still have two questions outstanding—the 600 km range limit and the maximum limit on ALCM heavy bombers.

Bartholomew: How is it that an issue that Secretary Baker raised with your minister is not part of our agenda. This morning the Secretary referred directly to this position of yours when he said “the Soviet side put forward proposals to the effect that . . . any aircraft with conventional ALCMs are considered heavy bombers and count against the START limits.”

Kanter: Let me explain a puzzle I have. An F–16 is not counted in START. A future kind of non-nuclear ALCM that is distinguishable does not count in START. But if this non-nuclear ALCM that does not count in START is matched up with an aircraft that does not count in START, the result counts in START. This makes no sense.

Akhromeyev: I could engage in detail on tactical aircraft with long-range missiles. That is a big subject. I am prepared to address it tomorrow in the CFE context. In addition I will report to you tomorrow morning on our position on the 40%—whether we wish future Soviet ALCM heavy bombers to have the 10 and 20 numbers, or the 8 and 12 numbers and the right to 40% more.

Bartholomew: Let me sum up. We are agreed that the Moscow ALCM elements are the agreed Washington elements except for:

— application of the 40% rule to future Soviet ALCM heavy bombers.

— 100–115.

In addition there are two issues:

— range.

— subceiling on ALCM heavy bombers.

The US believes there is a third major question:

— the Soviet proposal that any aircraft that carries a conventional ALCM above the agreed range would count as a heavy bomber in START.

Akhromyev: This is correct. I want to say that the last issue you are adding is a mine that might explode the entire package on ALCMs. With your approach the 600 km range would become useless and pointless. Why insist on this number if the US Air Force can have longer range ALCMs on tactical aircraft? This puts the START treaty in question.

Burt: We don’t disagree that a nuclear ALCM on an aircraft makes it a heavy bomber. But a conventional ALCM should not be regulated by this treaty.

Bartholomew: Turning to SLCMs, as I see it we have one issue. Akhromeyev: We have not reached agreement on anything on SLCMs.

Bartholomew: We have one major issue. The Soviet side stated it is essential to have an agreed common binding limit that is real. Akhromeyev: That is the main issue.

Bartholomew: The US position is that we cannot agree to this and believe the parallel politically-binding limits in the Moscow joint statement are real and politically binding and do the job. The Soviet side stated that its position reflected the views of the President, the Prime Minister, and others and it would be for the Soviet leaders themselves to take a new decision after they received a report of this exchange. This is the heart of the SLCM question summarized into those three points.

Akhromeyev: Da. If we start listing points of difference on the SLCM issue:

— First, the level for SLCMs. We believe it should be a common limit, binding for both sides, reached as a result of an agreement. The US believes it should be unilateral in a declaration.

— Second, we propose verification measures—on-site inspection—while the US is against.

There are other differences that are not as big.

Bartholomew: Should we understand that you are prepared to include only nuclear SLCMs in the context of 600 km range? Akhromeyev: Yes, we are prepared to propose such a swap.

Bartholomew: Do I understand also that you offered a trade in which the US would accept an agreed level in return for which the Soviet side is prepared to drop verification. Akhromeyev: This is a strange picture. On the one hand you say you disagree with agreed limits because of verification grounds, then you oppose all verification.

Bartholomew: This is not from our side. I am trying to understand and faithfully report your position. Akhromeyev: You understand me correctly. If we reach agreement on a SLCM limit, we would drop the verification part.

Bartholomew: It is necessary not to mislead you. Questions we ask for clarification should not be taken to indicate interest. I just want to make sure I understood your position correctly.

Akhromeyev: I understand that you just wanted to clarify. I want to clarify something myself, and say once again these talks tonight are completely informal in character. We will present our conclusions as informal conclusions. It is up to the ministers to decide whether to punish us or execute us or give mercy.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, START Meetings (Bartholomew) April 1990. Secret. Drafted on April 9. The meeting took place in the T Conference Room.