Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

96. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Whitehead)¹

Washington, December 30, 1985

SUBJECT

• Responses to Soviet Non-Compliance

You have both the OSD paper² (called “RSVP” for Response to Soviet Violations Paper) and the EUR/PM commentary on it.³

Weinberger recommends four actions:

— Not dismantle two Poseidon submarines next spring as the eighth Trident submarine goes on sea trials, but refuel them for some future mission.

— Replace 50 single warhead Minuteman II’s with MIRVed Minuteman III’s.

— Encrypt US missile tests the same way the Soviets encrypt theirs.

— Intensify research on countermeasures to Soviet chemical and biological warfare.

The proposal with respect to CBW deserves our support. In my view, the encryption proposal also deserves our support. We have little to lose by encrypting, since the Soviets already encrypt most telemetry on their new missiles. A US encryption program could lead to a more realistic look on both sides at the question of what test data is necessary for verification of constraints on warhead numbers, throw weight, etc., and how it should be provided. This view is at variance with the EUR/PM memo, and I have conveyed it to Allen Holmes, who will raise it with his people.

The other two proposals (keeping two Poseidon subs and adding 50 MM–III) cause problems:

— Both would violate the 1200 ceiling on MIRVed missiles, one of the central limits of the agreement and one which the Soviets are respecting.

— The OSD paper does not assess the consequences of lifting the constraint on the number of Soviet MIRVed missiles, including the SS–17’s, 18’s and 19’s and submarine launched MIRV missiles.

— The Poseidon refueling would be expensive (over $300 million) add only small, inaccurate, soft target weapons which are not in short supply, and the boats will reach their 30-year hull life in the early 1990’s anyway. The JCS, for this reason, is cool to this idea.

— The MM-III conversion is relatively cheap, but would add a net of only 100 warheads. Its primary purpose would be to break the treaty rather than add significantly to our strength.

A better idea would be to respond to Krasnoyarsk with an intensified program to develop penetration aids (decoys, maneuvering RVs etc.) to hedge against the possibility that Krasnoyarsk may be the beginning of a nationwide Soviet defense. And as the President mentioned last June, our response to the SS–25 as a second new-type ICBM is Midgetman, which could be accelerated.

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1984. Secret. Whitehead wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “JPT, I agree with your analysis. How should we let these views be known? Should you write a memo to S thru me? JW”
2. See Attachment, Document 93.
3. See Document 95.