97. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting Re SLBM Conversion

I had a meeting today with Rear Admiral R. F. Bacon (Navy Staff), Rear Admiral T. E. Lewin (Navy Staff), Colonel R. G. Toye (JCS), and Major R. C. Bogstie (JCS) regarding SLBM conversion. Admiral Lewin first reviewed the history of the SLBM program. 41 ballistic missile submarines were originally deployed. Of those, 9 were deactivated according to SALT rules, including one which last year was deactivated and is being converted into a training ship; [number not declassified] others have been converted for use as [less than 1 line not declassified] attack submarines and have not been relieved from SALT counting. [2 lines not declassified].

[number not declassified] Trident submarines have been built, of which 5 are in active service [1½ lines not declassified] are to be equipped [less than 1 line not declassified]. The [less than 1 line not declassified] Trident SSBN will go on sea trials in May; this is the event driving the SALT constraint issue. The [less than 1 line not declassified] Trident will be the first which will carry [less than 1 line not declassified]. The beginning of the [less than 1 line not declassified] run is in 1987, with [number not declassified] test flights from Cape Canaveral scheduled for 1987–1988. The [less than 1 line not declassified] has an IOC of December 1989.

Poseidon submarines were originally scheduled for a [1½ lines not declassified] years nominally—nominally means +/- [1½ lines not declassified]. The Navy has scheduled [less than 1 line not declassified] for overhaul [less than 1 line not declassified] of these will take place this year and [number not declassified] later. The cost of overhaul [less than 1 line not declassified] is approximately [less than 1 line not declassified] per boat. The average lifetime [less than 1 line not declassified] is estimated to be [less than 1 line not declassified]. The actual remaining hull life may be more/less than that [less than 1 line not declassified] the actual figure can be determined only after the ship has been opened up for [less than 1 line not declassified] overhaul.

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The Navy has stopped producing [less than 1 line not declassified]. To deploy [less than 1 line not declassified] in the overhauled boats beyond those already programmed would require restarting production line at a cost of $2 billion. By 1992, however, [less than 1 line not declassified] from those Trident submarines originally fitted [less than 1 line not declassified] which by then would begin [less than 1 line not declassified].

The options and time schedule for preserving for future use the two Poseidon SSBNs now earmarked for dismantling is outlined on the attached chart.2

In the discussion of that chart, the following point came up. The [less than 1 line not declassified] service life noted at the end of the lines might possibly be extended or contracted by [less than 1 line not declassified] depending upon what is learned in the process of [less than 1 line not declassified] overhaul.

The Navy will not certify for continuing safe operation any submarine that had been in an “inactivated” status for more than one year.

With respect to the conversion option, the Navy is not interested in conversion of those submarines for use by the Navy for training purposes. The Navy does not need more training submarines; for cruise missiles, they would prefer to refit [number not declassified] 688 Class attack submarines (SSNs) [less than 1 line not declassified], rather than converting one SSBN [less than 1 line not declassified]—the cost would be about the same [less than 1 line not declassified] and [less than 1 line not declassified] or more remaining hull life could be expected for each SSN against [less than 1 line not declassified] for the SSBN (illustrative only—Navy has no plans for any submarines to be converted for cruise missiles). They would be prepared to convert the SSBNs to such use as the SDI program might have for them.

We also asked Colonel Toye about the option of deploying an additional 50 Minuteman III in Minuteman II silos. [3 lines not declassified]. Estimated target damage expectancy against hardened targets from the MARK 12 is some [less than 1 line not declassified].

  1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986, Arms Control Mtg. Secret; Sensitive. McKinley initialed the memorandum and wrote: “13 Jan.”
  2. Attached but not printed is an undated chart, “Preserving Poseidon Boats for Future Use.”