Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

95. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Hawes) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 29, 1985

SUBJECT

• Proposed Responses to Soviet Noncompliance

SUMMARY

RSVP, Part II, was personally delivered to the President by Secretary Weinberger December 19² and was forwarded to you for comment December 24. The NSC staff has asked for your views by January 10. We have analyzed the OSD proposal and have attached a precis and some preliminary ideas of our own at Tab 1.³ We are preparing separately a Platt/Poindexter Memorandum for your approval. The latter also will address the question of presentation of the President’s decision to foreign governments and publics.

Weinberger recommends that the President decide, now, that the U.S. will violate SALT limits in three areas, as a response to Soviet violations. To codify this policy, he proposes that the President request congressional approval of supplemental appropriations to fund the specific steps involved. We believe that:

— There is no need for the U.S. to take any decisions at this point on programmatic steps which might breach SALT limits; the next decision point in this regard will not be met until May when the next Trident SSBN goes on sea trials;

— It is both possible and desirable, on military and political grounds, to design proportionate responses to Soviet violations which do not cause the U.S. to breach SALT limits; some of these are suggested in the attachment;

— It would be politically damaging to supplemental funding to take steps specifically in violation of arms control agreements. In addition to almost certain defeat in the Congress—on both arms control and fiscal grounds—we would hand the Soviets a ready-made propaganda victory; and

— Any decision which seemed to place us unnecessarily outside SALT limits would erode significantly the current high degree of allied support for our arms control policy. At the NAC Ministerial two weeks ago, your colleagues made clear their interests in continued U.S. treaty compliance.

RSVP Part II

Weinberger recommends that the President adopt a policy which would openly violate SALT numerical limitations and in effect, ask Congress to approve such violations. The vehicle would be a supplemental defense appropriation, called the “Arms Control Compliance Act of 1986”, funding four initiatives. These would:

— Preserve two Poseidon Submarines tentatively scheduled for dismantlement in 1986 to abide by SALT;

— Replace 50 Single-Warhead Minuteman II ICBMS with the MIRVed Minuteman III;

— Implement telemetry encryption of future tests of strategic systems to deny the USSR the information they deny the U.S.; and

— Intensify our research for countermeasures to the Soviet biological and chemical warfare effort.

The total cost of these initiatives—less the cost of encryption which is left undetermined in the OSD proposal—ranges between $480–500 million.

Weinberger candidly recognizes in his covering letter that the first three recommended measures would not be compliant with SALT. In fact, our analysis indicates the programmatic recommendations were deliberately designed to go beyond the bounds of SALT, and that proposals within treaty limits were discarded. Such a demonstrated willingness to break with SALT restrictions in view of Soviet violations is, in Weinberger’s words, “fundamental to protecting the integrity of arms control.”

Our view is that the President need make no decisions now with respect to interim restraint. Our policy of last June continues until the President determines otherwise. Further, it is not in our interest to scuttle the limits that SALT places on Soviet forces, especially when our own defense budget is coming under increasing pressure. Finally, the legislative course Weinberger proposes would likely prove to be a politically costly battle with Congress—one which the administration probably would lose. Support in Congress for continued interim restraint remains strong, and willingness to increase defense spending in the context of Gramm-Rudman will be limited even for less controversial programs. The joint chiefs will likely agree with our view.

White House Deputy Press Secretary Speakes’ December 23 statement denying the need for an end-of-year Presidential decision on our interim restraint policy should have removed any expectation that the approach of December 31—when SALT II would have expired—would elicit a change in our interim restraint policy now. However, while the U.S. will not have to make another dismantling decision before late Spring 1986, OSD will continue to argue, as Weinberger suggests in his memo, for an early decision on both interim restraint policy and appropriate and proportionate responses.

We agree that appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet violations are necessary. However, because no decision is necessary now, we believe more careful consideration can and should be given to other programmatic options. When a decision is made on specific measures, it should:

— Not require the President to abandon his overall interim restraint policy, nor weaken our NST negotiating position;

— Be related to the specific military impact of Soviet violations and comprise the steps we need to take to offset that impact; and

— Reflect our willingness to “go the extra mile” so as not to breach treaty obligations. (We do not want to compromise our positions on key issues of Soviet non-compliance, nor diminish the prospect that the Soviets will become compliant in areas of reversible violations, e.g., Krasnoyarsk.)

Criteria for evaluating “appropriate and proportionate” responses are attached at Tab 2.⁴

Preliminary State Ideas

We generally agree with OSD that two specific strategic nuclear issues need to be addressed in our proportionate response—territorial defense and SS–25. However, we have other ideas on how this can be done which are summarized below and addressed in more detail in Tab 1.

Higher profile for anti-ABM programs, Current programs (about $150 million annually) to develop sophisticated penetration aids, decoys and maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs) as a hedge against future Soviet ABM deployments are appropriate in view of current Soviet ABM efforts; however, their disparate nature makes them vulnerable to the budget process. Increased priority and additional funding, if needed, for these current development programs is an appropriate response to current Soviet ABM development efforts. We should also continue to cite SDI as a necessary response to Soviet ABM development. Another possible response would be to redirect some SDI efforts toward nearer-term ABM deployments to protect our ICBM fields.

Increased profile for counters to the SS–25, The military significance of the SS–25 lies far more in its mobility and its enhancement of the overall Soviet strategic posture than in its status as a prohibited second new type of ICBM. Our response to the SS–25 (one already indicated on June 10 as part of our interim restraint decision) should be to continue the development of the Midgetman and other improvements to ICBM survivability. The programs are in place, but they could be drawn together publicly and given higher priority by the President. Calling public attention to the development of the Midgetman would add an element of activism and shield us from accusations that our approach was a “do-nothing” one. Another direct military response to the SS–25 would be to develop the sensors, command and control elements and forces, possibly including additional B–1Bs, to attack mobile or relocatable targets. Such an effort is under study and DOD recommendations in this regard are due to the NSC in April 1986.

Other additions to our strategic offensive forces are possible (e.g., accelerating Trident, converting Poseidon to SLCM carriers, accelerating ALCMs) but the options are expensive and difficult to relate militarily to the SS–25. Self-serving additions to existing programs, especially programs that have already been cut by Congress, would be more difficult to sell on the Hill, e.g., re-selling MX deployments in existing silos. Many of these approaches also have negative implications for our NST proposal. Potential arms control considerations could make service support and Congressional funding problematical.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Dec. 20 Mtg w the PRES. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Richard Davis and Debra Stogdale in PM/SNP; cleared by Ralph Hallenbeck (PM), James Holmes (PM/SNP), Burton, Thomas, and in substance by Michael Stafford (S/ARN) and Timbie.
2. See Document 93.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Attached but not printed.