Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

9. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, Maryland, December 22, 1984, 10:40–11:10 a.m. and 11:20 a.m.–1:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary Shultz
• Robert C. McFarlane
• Ambassador Price
• Assistant Secretary Burt
• Peter R. Sommer, NSC
• Mrs. Thatcher
• Ambassador Wright
• Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher
• Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher

PRIVATE MEETING: THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. THATCHER, PLUS NOTE-TAKERS:

After exchanging pleasantries, Mrs. Thatcher praised the President’s reelection, calling it a fantastic victory. She asked him how it felt to win by such an overwhelming margin. The President said it was an honor to win by such a margin and joked that someone had said there is only one thing he could ask for from Santa Claus—it was Minnesota, the only state he had lost. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher emphasized that the President’s victory was even more impressive given that he had so significantly changed U.S. policies. Such a wide victory was an endorsement of the President’s policies and a clear call for a continuation of these policies. She was pleased the President was keeping his same foreign policy, noting it made no sense to break-up a good team. The President agreed and observed that many serve at considerable personal and financial sacrifice. (U)

[Omitted here is Thatcher’s account of Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev’s visit to the United Kingdom on December 16.]

Turning to the Geneva talks,² the President said since the Soviets had fared so poorly in recent months in the propaganda battles associated with disarmament talks, he feared that they were looking at Geneva as mainly a propaganda forum. This is one of the reasons they launched such an attack against what has become commonly known as “Star Wars.” He emphasized that Star Wars was not his term and was clearly not what he had in mind. He continued that there has never been a weapon for which another weapon against it had not been developed. Therefore, in view of all the advances in technology, he asked for a study of new defensive systems. Its aim would strictly be to strengthen deterrence. So far, initial research has been promising and, as he had stated many times, if it proves successful he would be willing to put this new technology into international hands. The President said we are not violating the ABM treaty and have no intention of doing so. The new Strategic Defense Initiative also had a moral context. We must search for ways to build a more stable peace. Our goal is to reduce, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Chernenko now claims that this is also a Soviet goal. We have told them if they are really serious about reductions, we are ready. Gromyko had told him, said the President, that we cannot continue to sit on two mountains of weapons. The President said he replied, “let us then begin to lower and eventually eliminate these mountains.” (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that Gorbachev had implied returning to Geneva was not an easy decision for the Soviets. He also indicated the Soviets would come to Geneva with serious proposals. The President replied, “we hope so.” She continued that she had emphasized to Gorbachev that Britain supports the U.S. SDI program and told him it was not linked to a first strike strategy. (C)

The President continued that he was simply amazed how closely Mrs. Thatcher’s remarks to Gorbachev had accorded with what he told Gromyko. He had made similar points, said the President, on immigration restrictions, underscoring that these restrictions make it especially difficult for the U.S.—with its many political groups with ties to the old country—to improve relations with the Soviets. He had made it clear to Gromyko that he could better deal with the Soviets with the support of the American people. The President then returned to his concern that the Soviets will use the Geneva talks primarily as a propaganda forum. He hoped, however, that the Soviets would treat these talks seriously; as he had told Gromyko the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a joint responsibility to see that war does not happen. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that she had a special interest in learning more details about the U.S. SDI program. Gorbachev had told her “tell your friend President Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons.” He suggested if you develop SDI the Russians would either develop their own, or more probably, develop new offensive systems superior to SDI. General Keegan (former head of USAF Intelligence), whom she had seen several times, had informed her about Soviet advances and she was interested in learning more about SDI. The President noted it was time to join the others at Laurel Lodge. (C)

The private meeting ended at 11:10 a.m.

Expanded Session in Laurel Lodge

In opening the expanded session, the President said he thought it would be appropriate to quote a remark the Queen had made to him during the course of the campaign. When the Queen was in Canada and he was in Michigan, the Queen had called to say she was sure there will never be a wider divide between the U.S. and Great Britain “than the river that currently divides us.” Smiling, the President and Mrs. Thatcher both agreed with the Queen’s remark. (U)

Noting that it was her first visit to Camp David, Mrs. Thatcher said it was marvelous to be here and a privilege as well. She said she and the President had discussed at some length her impressions of Gorbachev. It is clear that basic Soviet policy has not changed, but Gorbachev was both willing and able to openly discuss and debate issues. He did not cry or complain when she discussed the human rights situation within the Soviet Union. She had emphasized to Gorbachev that it would be a futile effort to try to divide Great Britain from the U.S. We have a common heritage and are part of the same Western Alliance system. (C)

The Prime Minister continued that Gorbachev had spent an in-ordinate amount of time on SDI. He had asked me to tell the President to stop the militarization of outer space. She had replied that Britain supports the U.S. SDI research effort and it was the Soviets who had been the first to develop an antisatellite capability. The West was also trying to keep up with Soviet research into laser weapons. She had told Gorbachev that there must be balance in research and the U.S. SDI research program must go ahead. (C)

Saying he wished to extend Mrs. Thatcher a special Christmas welcome to Camp David, the President said he was pleased with Mrs. Thatcher’s support for the oft misunderstood SDI program. He noted that currently envisioned strategic defense weapons are not nuclear systems; many people have the mistaken impression that they are. General Eisenhower had spoken about how every advance in weapons of war is offset by another technological development. We owe it to future generations to see if we cannot develop a strategic defense that would move us away from this horrible threat of destroying the world. As he had told the Prime Minister in the private meeting, the initial research is promising, but we do not have any final answers. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher again underlined that Britain backed the U.S. research program. She said she understood that we will not know for some time if a strategic defense system is truly feasible. If we reached a stage where production looked possible we would have some serious and difficult decisions to make. There are the ABM and outer space treaties. Future technological developments and possible countering strategies must also be considered. She recalled, for example, that with the advent of heat seeking missiles the general view had been that there was no defense against them, but this proved erroneous. Avoidance devices were developed. It was her impression from her talks with Gorbachev that the Soviets were following the same line of reasoning. They clearly fear U.S. technological prowess. However, Gorbachev suggested that the Soviets would either develop their own strategic defense system or add additional offensive systems. (S)

We do not want our objective of increased security, opined the Prime Minister, to result in increased Soviet nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have served not only to prevent a nuclear war, but they have also given us forty years of unprecedented peace in Europe. It would be unwise, she continued, to abandon a deterrence system that has prevented both nuclear and conventional war. Moreover, if we ever reach the stage of abolishing all nuclear weapons, this would make conventional, biological, or chemical war more likely. Hitler won the race for the rocket; the U.S. won the race for the nuclear bomb. The technological struggle goes on, she observed. There are all sorts of decoys, jamming systems and technological developments such as making the missile boost phase even shorter. All these advances make crisis management more and more difficult. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher said these comments reflect concerns. We have some real worries, especially about SDI’s impact on deterrence. The wretched press has tried to make out that we have major differences. This is simply not true, but we do feel it is unwise to conclude where we will go on SDI before the research program is completed. At the same time we need a sound research program if we are to maintain a balanced relationship with the Soviets. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that the President said earlier that initial indications are that a SDI program is feasible. Mrs. Thatcher said she must admit that personally she had some doubts. In the past, scientific genius has always developed a counter system. Even if an SDI system proved 95 percent successful—a significant success rate—over 60 million people would still die from those weapons that got through. She again emphasized her concern with any implication of dropping our successful nuclear deterrent strategy and stressed that it was important that we work out privately what we will say publicly about SDI. She said several points appear pertinent. We must emphasize that SDI is only a research program; and that our objective is both to maintain a military balance and to enhance, not weaken deterrence. (S)

The President said we need to address the points Mrs. Thatcher had raised and to reach agreement on SDI, a program he called worth pursuing. He noted that experts continue to tell him that research is promising and SDI may be feasible. We have obviously not made a decision on production or deployment and these questions would have to be addressed at the appropriate time. We cannot and should not, however, continued the President, have to go on living under the threat of nuclear destruction. We must eliminate the threat posed by strategic nuclear weapons. My ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviets are now beginning to echo this same view. He said he told Gromyko that the U.S. is not seeking superiority, but we will not let the Soviets achieve superiority. He recognized that the Soviets have great respect for our technology. They also must be concerned about our economic strength. It will be especially difficult for them to keep spending such vast sums on defense. Such spending is in neither of our interests. (C)

The President continued that he also recognized the great losses the Soviets suffered in World War II—20 million or more—and accepted their obsession with security. But it doesn’t make sense, as my predecessor did, to propose unilateral reductions, such as cancelling the B–1 bomber. Common sense tells us that one needs negotiating tools when bargaining with the Soviets, or anyone else for that matter. We in the West have great strength—Europe alone has four times the GNP of the Soviet Union. We must deal with the Soviets from a position of strength. But we also know that in a nuclear war there would be no winners. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher interjected that this is why she had emphasized and praised the deterrence system that has worked so well for so many years. Strength is our best deterrence. (C)

The President agreed and said he is trying to convince the Soviets that we mean them no harm. He often thought that the basic system in Russia has not changed fundamentally, i.e., that their current communist system is another form of the aristocratic system that ruled Russia under the Czar. Gandhi had once said the Soviets believe more in survival than in communism. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher replied that it is correct to emphasize military balance, not superiority. Balance gives us security. Making a specific reference to SDI, she said research contributes towards maintaining a military balance. We need to explain to our publics that SDI is only a research program, that it does not contravene any existing treaties and if we get to the development stage, many alternative factors will have to be considered at that time. For example, the ABM treaty may have to be re-negotiated. (S)

Secretary Shultz stressed our concern is that the current situation is not balanced. The Soviets have many more offensive nuclear systems than foreseen under Salt I. The defensive side is covered under the ABM Treaty, but we have essentially dropped the notion of deploying a defensive system around cities and bases. The Soviets, however, have deployed an ABM system around Moscow—this is permitted under the treaty—and now they are also devoting considerable resources toward the development of other defensive systems. For example, they have a large phased array radar under construction, which we believe is a treaty violation.³ The Soviets have positioned themselves to break out from the conditions imposed the treaties. Their emphasis on defensive systems puts us in an unequal position. Our view is that there is an imbalance; our SDI research is designed to contribute to enhancing deterrence. (S)

Saying she didn’t wish to debate strategic theory, Mrs. Thatcher noted that some claim SDI would be an incentive for the Soviets to produce more offensive systems and could encourage the Soviets to launch a preemptive first strike. From our point of view, said Mrs. Thatcher, deterrence remains our fundamental objective. And like you, we are fearful of the Soviets finding an excuse to walk out of the Geneva talks. (S)

Secretary Shultz interjected that we cannot just sit back and let the Soviets build up a significant advantage in defensive systems. Mrs. Thatcher said if she was a Soviet, she would take steps to improve my already significant civil defense program. (S)

At the President’s request, National Security Advisor McFarlane expanded on the U.S. SDI program. Calling Mrs. Thatcher’s questions and criticisms thoughtful and well-reasoned, McFarlane underscored that her remarks are based on the assumption that offensive deterrence in its present form can and will endure. This may not be true. In recent years the character of Soviet offensive systems have changed dramatically; they are more mobile and carry increased warheads, making verification a near impossible task. The future suggests that the Soviets will rely far more on mobile systems, as well as cruise missiles. (S)

McFarlane continued that our dilemma has been what to do to restore the strategic balance. The President has underway a significant strategic modernization program but this has encountered both moral and political difficulties, as evidenced by the M–X debate in Congress. The preferred course would be to reduce offensive systems. As the President has stated, this is our goal and the President ultimately hopes to eliminate nuclear weapons. McFarlane observed that our current dilemma—one over which the President expressed concern several years ago—is our inability to match the Soviet offensive build up. This is why the President asked us to examine other alternatives. Emerging technologies suggest that a new defensive system may be feasible. This is a searching question: can you have an absolute defense against incoming missiles, whether they be nuclear, chemical, or biological? (C)

Mrs. Thatcher wondered if a truly impervious system was possible. She asked, “is there any such thing as a perfect defense?” Could the Soviets simply not just overwhelm any defensive system with increased numbers of offensive systems? (S)

Calling the Prime Minister’s questions good ones, McFarlane replied that we are concerned about nuclear deterrence becoming unstable and our goal is to strengthen deterrence. Given technological advances—there have been some remarkable technology developments—it is prudent and responsible for the President to undertake the SDI research effort. (S)

Saying SDI as she understood it seemed to suggest inherent U.S. superiority, Mrs. Thatcher added she was not convinced of the need to deploy such a system, particularly if it could eventually be knocked out by other technological advances. (S)

McFarlane commented that we need to better inform the British government on the extensive Soviet strategic defense effort. They have made great strides with their SA–10 and SAX–12 systems; the potential for what is called break-out is high. The President’s SDI program is designed to maintain the strategic balance and thereby enhance deterrence. Shultz stated that we may be moving from a situation where we have mutually assured destruction to mutually assured defense. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher again stressed the need to work out the arguments in support of SDI and to develop a better coordinated public affairs line. (C)

McFarlane agreed and noted that there still remain several points where there is a difference of nuance. We believe that there is a strategic imbalance and the President’s SDI program can contribute to strengthening deterrence. Deterrence as we know it today may no longer meet our future needs. We are willing to negotiate and discuss strategic systems with the Soviets, but neither of us can be expected to completely restructure our nuclear forces. He reemphasized that the President’s goal is to enhance deterrence by maintaining a military balance. (C)

Noting we can say in public that we support the SDI research program and the need for military balance to maintain an effective deterrence, Mrs. Thatcher said it would be useful if someone could come to London to give her a top-level U.S. technical briefing on the U.S. and Soviet strategic defense programs. The President nodded agreement and said it was time to break for lunch. (S)

[Omitted here are discussion not related to SDI.]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, [Thatcher, 1984]. Secret. Drafted on December 28. Portions of the memorandum of conversation are also printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 337. The morning private meeting took place in the Aspen Lodge. The expanded meeting and working lunch took place in the Laurel Lodge. Gorbachev met with Thatcher at Chequers on December 16.
2. Reference is to the January 7–8, 1985, meetings between Shultz and Gromyko; the memoranda of conversation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–1985, Documents 355, 357, 360, 362, and 363. The U.S.-Soviet joint statement, which was released on January 8, noted that “the sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.” The text is in the Department of State Bulletin, March 1985, p. 30.
3. See footnote 2, Document 4.