4. Memorandum for the Record1
MEMO RE SDI
I asked T.K. Jones, who is in charge of strategic systems in the Office of Research and Development at the Pentagon, to brief me (Dec. 12, 1984) on his estimates of the cost effectiveness of SDI systems.
He said the SDI concept depended upon having a defense at a series of levels. The cost effectiveness of each level by itself could be estimated, but the true payoff was in the mutually supportive interaction of defense at a number of levels.
Looked at as a single level, the least cost–effective level was the boost phase interceptor level. I said that I had been led to believe that that is the level with the greatest payoff because, if successful, one could kill the missile before it had had a chance to dispense its large number of RVs. T.K. said that that multiplier was offset by the consideration that the geography of the situation meant that only approximately one-tenth [Page 9] of the array of satellite kill mechanisms would be in the right position to launch within the time limit available for a kill. Each satellite and its kill mechanisms would necessarily be quite expensive. His computations indicated a cost per RV kill of $30 million to $35 million per RV. He said that the estimated cost of the MX program divided by the number of RVs it would make available is approximately $25 million per RV. He estimated the cost of the Midgetman program at $70 million per RV. Thus, taking the boost phase interceptor level by itself is not cost effective. However, if one had a reasonable capability at the other levels, a boost phase capability would significantly increase the effectiveness of defenses at those other levels.
I asked T.K. which, in his opinion, was the most cost effective level. He said it was the high endo-atmospheric level, i.e., the level at the edge of the sensible atmosphere where chaff and balloons and other such light pen aids begin to be washed out by atmospheric resistance and where the altitude was such that a significant area of sky could be covered from a single interceptor location on the ground. His estimates indicated a cost of around $10 million per RV kill at that level. He said the next most cost effective level was the terminal defense level, which he estimated at $12 million per kill. He estimated mid-course intercept to be somewhat more costly than terminal defense per kill, but not as costly as boost phase intercept. He emphasized that the Soviets are much advantaged by the fact that they have already developed the base level of defense, civil defense, i.e., several thousand of hardened and dispersed facilities for communication and leadership personnel.
He said that in the Pentagon’s SDI R&D efforts, he was emphasizing development of smaller and less costly non-nuclear interceptors, easily transportable airborne sensors, and mobile radars. He was trying to get the weight of the miniature vehicle, the MV, down from 30 pounds to 10 pounds.
Subsequently (Dec. 13, 1984) General Chain and I had lunch with General Lamberson who heads the Air Force program office on SDI. Lamberson said that his office deals only with boost phase and mid-course intercept systems; the Army deals with terminal and high endo-atmospheric systems. He said that the only boost phased intercept system for which the technology is currently pretty well in hand is the kinetic energy system. This is a device with a large number of small thrusters controlled by a guidance device which can maintain its accuracy of position, can give it or sub munitions acceleration sufficiently high that they can, with their high velocity, kill a missile or its post-boost stage through the force of its impact. Because space offers no resistance, the sub munitions maintain their high velocity and their accuracy over relatively long distances. The techniques involved are different from, but related to, the techniques in the MV vehicle. Lamberson said that he would need four more tests of the MV vehicle to prove out those parts [Page 10] of the technology which require tests in space for such proof. He would need approximately a year to do the four tests. His current testing program is for 12 tests. He believes most of the remaining work could be done in laboratory facilities or on the ground.
With respect to the more exotic technologies such as space-based lasers, ground-based directed energy systems using mirrors in space, and neutral particle accelerators, there were important technological problems which had not yet been resolved even in concept. He did not believe that any of these systems would be ready for engineering development testing until the mid-90s, and would not be available for deployment in useful numbers until some time in the mid-21st century.
He emphasized the theoretical attractiveness of neutral particle beams because of the fact they could penetrate several inches of dense material and thus destroy heavily shielded nuclear weapons; lasers, on the other hand, merely caused intense heat at the surface of the object which they hit.
I also talked (Dec. 12, 1984) with Ron Lehman and his associate, Colonel Linhard, who is an extremely competent military planner. They emphasized the domestic political parameters within which we must consider our SDI problems. They foresee the Soviets interconnecting their phased array radars and deploying large numbers, perhaps two or three thousand, of SA–12 anti-aircraft systems with ABM capabilities, or a follow-on system they think the Soviets may be developing, which they call the SA–15. They say that in the current political climate it will be impossible for us to respond to such a proliferation of terminal defenses. We would be buried in the environmental impact statements required. They foresee a possible play on the part of the Soviets to try to have the Krasnoyarsk radar2 grandfathered, and to permit us a comparable radar in the center of the United States. We would never be able to get authority to build such a radar or to exploit it in the same way and time frame as the Soviets can. They offered some useful suggestions on my suggested talking points on the offense-defense relationship, which I have incorporated therein.3
- Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, November–December 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Nitze.↩
- Reference is to the longstanding point of contention over whether the Soviet phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.↩
- Not found.↩