Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

337. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, Maryland, December 22, 1984, 10:40–11:10 a.m. and 11:20 a.m.–1:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary Shultz
• Robert C. McFarlane
• Ambassador Price
• Assistant Secretary Burt
• Peter R. Sommer, NSC
• Mrs. Thatcher
• Ambassador Wright
• Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher
• Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher

PRIVATE MEETING: THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. THATCHER, PLUS NOTETAKERS:

After exchanging pleasantries, Mrs. Thatcher praised the President’s reelection, calling it a fantastic victory. She asked him how it felt to win by such an overwhelming margin. The President said it was an honor to win by such a margin and joked that someone had said there is only one thing he could ask for from Santa Claus—it was Minnesota, the only state he had lost. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher emphasized that the President’s victory was even more impressive given that he had so significantly changed U.S. policies. Such a wide victory was an endorsement of the President’s policies and a clear call for a continuation of these policies. She was pleased the President was keeping his same foreign policy, noting it made no sense to break-up a good team. The President agreed and observed that many serve at considerable personal and financial sacrifice. (U)

Turning to Gorbachev’s visit to the UK,² Mrs. Thatcher said he was an unusual Russian in that he was much less constrained, more charming, open to discussion and debate, and did not stick to prepared notes. His wife was equally charming.³ The Prime Minister noted that she often says to herself the more charming the adversary, the more dangerous. Over the private lunch at Chequers, she had raised a number of pointed questions. She asked Gorbachev why the Soviet Union denies its people the right to emigrate. She had underlined that the West simply cannot understand or accept the Soviet policy of refusing people the right to leave. She contrasted the Soviet policy with the situation in the West, where many countries have had to stop people from coming in. Gorbachev replied that 89 percent of those who applied for permits to leave receive them. Noting that she had no way to cross-check Gorbachev’s statistics, she told the President that Gorbachev’s claim clearly conflicted with information she receives from British Jewish groups. She commented that she had further suggested to Gorbachev that it was a sign of weakness to feel the need to keep one’s people in. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher contrasted Gorbachev with Gromyko, whom she observed would have sharply replied that emigration was an internal matter and not open for discussion. Gorbachev was not willing to debate the point, but he did allow her to discuss it without cutting her off. He also avoided the usual Soviet reaction of citing lengthy positions of principle. The Prime Minister said she also questioned Gorbachev about the Soviets providing financial assistance to Britain’s striking miners. Gorbachev replied “this has nothing to do with us.” Mrs. Thatcher, however, observed that in a centrally controlled system like the Soviet Union there is no way funds could pass to British trade unions without government knowledge. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then expanded on what she called the government’s total control of the Soviet economy. She had the impression that Gorbachev, like Andropov, was an advocate of economic reform and was willing to slacken government control over the Soviet economy. Gorbachev was clearly worried, said the Prime Minister, about the Soviet Union’s poor economic performance. She had made a point to contrast Soviet control over its economy with the free societies in the West, where a number of governments have recently been elected because of their promise to restrict government interference in domestic economic affairs. Despite Gorbachev’s professions about lessening government control, in reply to her question about how does a Russian factory decide how much to produce, he said, “we tell them.” (C)

Indicating she wished to reiterate what she had told the Vice President over breakfast, Mrs. Thatcher underlined that she told Gorbachev there is no point in trying to divide Britain from the United States. This ploy will never succeed.

Britain is part of the Western Alliance of free nations and the Soviets should drop any illusions about severing Europe or Great Britain from the United States. She also told Gorbachev that she and the President have known each other since long before they assumed their current positions and dividing Europe from America is simply “not on.” (C)

Gorbachev had made a special effort, said the Prime Minister, to cite Chernenko’s name as a source of authority for his remarks. She then turned to what she had told Gorbachev about the Geneva talks. She emphasized that the Soviet Union and the West had entirely different ways of life and government. You don’t like ours, we don’t like yours. But it is in our common interest—indeed it is our duty—to avoid a conflict. We in the West, including the United States, accept that there can only be real security through military balance. She had underscored to Gorbachev that the Soviets must rid themselves of the belief that the U.S. is not sincere about disarmament. Gorbachev had replied that even public documents now show that the U.S. had targeted the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in the 1950’s. Mrs. Thatcher said she had replied, “of course the U.S. had targeted the Soviet Union—who was preaching a political credo of world communism—what else did they expect?” And she asked Gorbachev rhetorically if it wasn’t true that the Soviets targeted the U.S. during that same period and continued to do so now. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then contrasted the Soviet Union with the U.S. which had not used its great nuclear monopoly in the immediate post-war years to seek expansion. The U.S. is a former colony and knows what it is to be dominated by others. There is no other example in history of a great power using its military strength so sparingly to advance political goals. She had also emphasized to Gorbachev that the President is an honorable man who sincerely wants to improve relations with the Soviet Union. She was struck that when she mentioned that the President had sent a personal handwritten letter to Brezhnev shortly after assuming office, Gorbachev did not appear familiar with it. She made a point of telling Gorbachev that the President had put his heart and soul into his letter and after months of silence received only a pro forma typed reply. Again, Gorbachev did not react. (C)

The President said he was pleased that, without exchanging a word in advance, Mrs. Thatcher had taken the same line with Gorbachev as he had followed in his September meeting with Gromyko.⁴ He had spoken about the communist desire to dominate the world. In reply, Gromyko suggested that the Soviets had acted with constraint since they could have, but did not send a mass of men into Western Europe after World War II. The President noted that in reply he had referred to Stalin’s remarks that there would have been no victory without the U.S. The President also referred Gromyko to quotations from Lenin and Stalin about world domination by communism. This time, Gromyko did not reply but quickly changed the subject. (C)

Turning to the Geneva talks, the President said since the Soviets had fared so poorly in recent months in the propaganda battles associated with disarmament talks, he feared that they were looking at Geneva as mainly a propaganda forum. This is one of the reasons they launched such an attack against what has become commonly known as “Star Wars.” He emphasized that Star Wars was not his term and was clearly not what he had in mind. He continued that there has never been a weapon for which another weapon against it had not been developed. Therefore, in view of all the advances in technology, he asked for a study of new defensive systems. Its aim would strictly be to strengthen deterrence. So far, initial research has been promising and, as he had stated many times, if it proves successful he would be willing to put this new technology into international hands. The President said we are not violating the ABM treaty and have no intention of doing so. The new Strategic Defense Initiative also had a moral context. We must search for ways to build a more stable peace. Our goal is to reduce, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Chernenko now claims that this is also a Soviet goal. We have told them if they are really serious about reductions, we are ready. Gromyko had told him, said the President, that we cannot continue to sit on two mountains of weapons. The President said he replied, “let us then begin to lower and eventually eliminate these mountains.” (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that Gorbachev had implied returning to Geneva was not an easy decision for the Soviets. He also indicated the Soviets would come to Geneva with serious proposals. The President replied, “we hope so.” She continued that she had emphasized to Gorbachev that Britain supports the U.S. SDI program and told him it was not linked to a first strike strategy. (C)

The President continued that he was simply amazed how closely Mrs. Thatcher’s remarks to Gorbachev had accorded with what he told Gromyko. He had made similar points, said the President, on immigration restrictions, underscoring that these restrictions make it especially difficult for the U.S.—with its many political groups with ties to the old country—to improve relations with the Soviets. He had made it clear to Gromyko that he could better deal with the Soviets with the support of the American people. The President then returned to his concern that the Soviets will use the Geneva talks primarily as a propaganda forum. He hoped, however, that the Soviets would treat these talks seriously; as he had told Gromyko the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a joint responsibility to see that war does not happen. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that she had a special interest in learning more details about the U.S. SDI program. Gorbachev had told her “tell your friend President Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons.” He suggested if you develop SDI the Russians would either develop their own, or more probably, develop new offensive systems superior to SDI. General Keegan (former head of USAF Intelligence), whom she had seen several times, had informed her about Soviet advances and she was interested in learning more about SDI. The President noted it was time to join the others at Laurel Lodge. (C)

The private meeting ended at 11:10 a.m.

Expanded Session in Laurel Lodge

In opening the expanded session, the President said he thought it would be appropriate to quote a remark the Queen had made to him during the course of the campaign. When the Queen was in Canada and he was in Michigan, the Queen had called to say she was sure there will never be a a wider divide between the U.S. and Great Britain “than the river that currently divides us.” Smiling, the President and Mrs. Thatcher both agreed with the Queen’s remark. (U)

Noting that it was her first visit to Camp David, Mrs. Thatcher said it was marvelous to be here and a privilege as well. She said she and the President had discussed at some length her impressions of Gorbachev. It is clear that basic Soviet policy has not changed, but Gorbachev was both willing and able to openly discuss and debate issues. He did not cry or complain when she discussed the human rights situation within the Soviet Union. She had emphasized to Gorbachev that it would be a futile effort to try to divide Great Britain from the U.S. We have a common heritage and are part of the same Western Alliance system. (C)

The Prime Minister continued that Gorbachev had spent an inordinate amount of time on SDI. He had asked me to tell the President to stop the militarization of outer space. She had replied that Britain supports the U.S. SDI research effort and it was the Soviets who had been the first to develop an anti-satellite capability. The West was also trying to keep up with Soviet research into laser weapons. She had told Gorbachev that there must be balance in research and the U.S. SDI research program must go ahead. (C)

Saying he wished to extend Mrs. Thatcher a special Christmas welcome to Camp David, the President said he was pleased with Mrs. Thatcher’s support for the oft misunderstood SDI program.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Thatcher, 1984. The morning private meeting took place in the Aspen Lodge. The expanded meeting and working lunch took place in the Laurel Lodge. Reagan wrote in his diary entries for December 22–23: “Sat. dawned clear & bright which was fine because P.M. Margaret Thatcher was coming in for a visit. I met her in a golf cart & took her to Aspen where she & I had a brief visit in which I got a report on her visit with Gorbachev of Soviet U. In an amazing coincidence I learned she had said virtually the same things to him I had said to Gromyko. In addition, she made it clear there was no way the Soviet U. could split Eng. away from the US. Then we joined the others—Ambassadors, Shultz, McFarlane, Bush, et al at Laurel for a plenary meeting & working lunch. Main topic was our Strategic Defense Research (‘Starwars’) I believe [we] eased some concerns she had.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 411)
2. Gorbachev met with Thatcher at Chequers on December 16. See footnote 3, Document 334 and Document 341.
3. Raisa Gorbacheva.
4. See Documents 286 and 287.