36. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
SUBJECT
- (U) Upcoming Decisions on Congressional Strategy on the Peacekeeper Missile.
(S) At your request, I am writing to convey to you my view on the appropriate strategy to pursue in the course of upcoming Congressional deliberations on the FY1986 request for Peacekeeper missile funding. The decisions the President will make on this strategy are of enormous [Page 107] importance insofar as three areas of vital concern to me will be directly and, perhaps, critically affected. The approach we adopt toward the MX must be considered in light of its implications for: the strategic balance with the USSR, the prospects for sound and equitable arms control, and the risks to the national security which might result from perceived erosion of the President’s political leadership.
Implications for the Strategic Balance:
(S) As you know, I regard the Peacekeeper missile program of 100 missiles deployed in Minuteman silos as the centerpiece of the President’s Strategic Modernization Program (SMP). The SMP is, in turn, the single most important determinant in calculating our future ability to deter the Soviet Union and preserve the security of the United States.
(S) Put in other words, without the full MX program—a program, it should be remembered, designed to respond to Soviet strategic developments of the 1970’s—serious and possibly irreparable harm will be done to the Nation’s deterrent posture. Even if one were to assume that an interruption or cessation of Peacekeeper deployments will not have untoward repercussions on other elements of the SMP, our inability to respond even in small measure to the Soviet build-up of prompt, hard-target kill capability would make permanent the existing imbalance in this vital measure of strategic power. You can readily appreciate the profound and adverse consequences such a development would have both for stability and for our influence as a world power.
Implications for Arms Control:
(S) You are well acquainted with my thinking on the indispensability of the full strategic modernization program to our negotiating strength at Geneva and to the prospects for a satisfactory outcome in the Nuclear and Space Talks. It is worth noting in this context, however, one other way in which the SMP, in general, and the Peacekeeper, in particular, contribute critically to our negotiating posture.
(S) Every one of the outcomes we seek at Geneva is assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its ability to satisfy our national security requirements. The positions we have tabled to date have all been found to be acceptable in this respect in the expectation that U.S. strategic capabilities would include under each regime the forces planned under the SMP. Consequently, if we are unable to secure Congressional approval for the full MX program and/or other SMP elements, the adequacy of our negotiating positions will have to be reappraised.
(S) It goes without saying that such a reappraisal could be time-consuming, difficult and, ultimately, might produce recommendations at odds with current Administration negotiating goals. For example, in the absence of vital strategic modernization, we may be unable to feel [Page 108] confident that we could satisfy our strategic requirements at radically reduced levels of forces.
(S) In short, both our ability to induce the Soviets to join with us in achieving meaningful arms reductions and our ability to strive for such a laudable and desirable goal depend directly upon realization of the complete Peacekeeper and strategic modernization programs.
Implications for Presidential Leadership:
(S) The next Congressional votes on the MX program come at a critical time in our nation’s history. It is a time of testing for President Reagan—testing by our principal adversary, by our Allies and by the Congress.
(S) General Secretary Gorbachev, still a relative newcomer to national leadership, is clearly preoccupied with consolidating his authority and preeminence. If he can do so without serious risk, he may well seek to use the assertion of Soviet power as a means of enhancing his personal standing with the military. Gorbachev’s assessment of such risk may depend to a considerable extent upon his perceptions of the President’s political strength domestically and internationally.
(S) Allied leaders are facing important political challenges of their own. Several are reading the tea-leaves of recent electoral defeats as part of the process of deciding how best to position themselves for their own turn at the polls. As ever, their willingness to be identified with American policies will be a function in some measure, at least, of their perception of the U.S. President’s political health.
(S) Finally, as you well know, notwithstanding President Reagan’s sweeping mandate of last November, many in Congress are anxious to reduce him at the outset of his second term to the status of a feckless “lame-duck.” Nowhere are the stakes likely to be higher and the effort of his opponents more concerted than in the challenges to his leadership on national security matters.
(S) The uncontested rejection by the Congress of the President’s Peacekeeper missile program would be regarded by these three parties as encouragement for each of them to move in directions contrary to our interests. It is impossible to know at this point in what way each might react or with what effect; it is sufficient to say we should try to avoid finding out.
Conclusion and Recommendation:
(S) In my judgment, for the reasons outlined above, the MX program must be fully funded by the Congress. While I could support, extremely reluctantly and only if deemed absolutely necessary, a tactical decision to agree to the reduced procurement rate for FY 1986 recommended [Page 109] by both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees (i.e., 21 missiles), that should be the only compromise contemplated by the Administration. Under no circumstances should serious consideration be given to a “pause” in Peacekeeper procurement, a cap on deployment of MX, or—it should go without saying—to the termination of this vital program.
(S) While there will doubtless be intense pressure to find such a “face-saving” compromise, I feel strongly that the national security would be seriously and adversely affected were the President to agree to do so. The strategic balance would shift markedly and probably permanently against us; our prospects—and even our positions—at the arms control talks would be undermined; and the President’s critical leadership on national security matters would be dangerously degraded with unknown consequences for U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Allied and executive-legislative branch relations.
(S) In particular, with respect to the last of these considerations, I believe the record of the past few months argues persuasively for firm, unflinching Presidential leadership. We simply can no longer afford, in the face of reverses on Nicaragua and the defense budget, to treat with the most implacable of our Congressional adversaries on an equal—if not preferential—footing to that afforded our friends.
(S) Now, as never before, is the moment to “hang tough.” The President should make it clear to the Congressional leadership that he will veto without hesitation any bill providing funds for the Department of Defense (DoD authorization, appropriation or continuing resolution measures) if it fails to provide the requisite funds for the Peacekeeper program leading to the scheduled Full Operational Capability of this system. The President knows that there is no point in sending his negotiators to Geneva if the program is not funded as requested (or with SASC/HASC amendments); he should give serious consideration to announcing he will not do so if his MX program is not approved.
(S) This approach will, of course, generate controversy and criticism. It is not only the principled and right course of action, however; it is also the sole strategy with a realistic chance of supporting our manifold national security objectives and requirements.
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 828, Subject File, 1985 President—memoranda to #149–197 (4). Secret.↩