37. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Kelley) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger1
SUBJECT
- Interim Restraint Policy (U)
1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have analyzed the military implications of the options available to the United States with regard to interim restraint policy. In conducting the analysis, we examined each option against the requirement of the four military objectives for deterrence: (a) continuation of the Strategic Modernization Program; (b) support for strong conventional forces; (c) protection of the Strategic Defense Initiative; and (d) maintaining strong alliances including continued support for INF deployments.
2. (S) The review of each interim restraint option has led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that two options offer the best possibility for maintaining the necessary support and backing. The first option would be to continue the present interim restraint as we have over the past several years. This would be linked to continued use of the Standing Consultative Commission and public fora to highlight Soviet noncompliance. For the next 2 to 3 years, it would have little effect on our ability to carry out our Strategic Modernization Program under the restraints. The second option would be to declare that the United States no longer will be bound by unverifiable treaties which have had only selective Soviet compliance and which have not limited Soviet nuclear weapons, but that the United States will pursue independent and prudent restraints of its own nuclear weapons. Such independent US restraints could be along the following lines:
The United States would announce a commitment independently to restrain proliferation of nuclear weapons in lieu of being bound by past commitments to observe SALT I and II limits. The United States would instead determine the size of its strategic forces based on Western security needs. The United States would cease using SALT dismantlement procedures and when strategic systems are withdrawn, the Executive Branch would certify their inactivation to Congress and the public. The Soviets would be invited to inspect inactivated systems in addition to use of Soviet NTM. Under this option, the United States would begin the new policy on 1 January 1986.
3. (U) With respect to these two remaining options, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the selection should be made only after consultation with congressional leaders and US allies, and that whichever option is selected must be supported with a carefully developed public diplomacy plan.
4. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request you forward these views to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
General, USMC
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 837, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R. #64–73 (6). Secret.↩