35. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- US Policy on Interim Restraint
A decision on whether to continue interim restraint should be taken in light of its impact on the military balance, the overall US-Soviet relationship, the Geneva negotiations, Soviet noncompliance, Congressional support for US military programs and SDI, and public and Allied reactions.
On balance, it is in our interest to continue the basic regime. We should adopt a modified policy of restraint, under which we would: (1) no longer be bound by the one new ICBM type rule (and so free to pursue Midgetman), and (2) remove Poseidon SSBNs from the active force to caretaker or mothball status in order to stay under the SALT ceilings, but not dismantle them pending changes in Soviet compliance practices.
[Page 103]Military Factors
Impact on US. Were we to cease observing interim restraint, between 1986 and 1995 we would exceed the SALT I ceiling on SLBM launchers, and the SALT II subceilings on MIRVed ballistic missiles and MIRVed ballistic missiles plus ALCM-carrying bombers; after 1995 US strategic nuclear forces will be below all SALT limits. To stay within those limits, what is required is mainly an acceleration of the dismantlement of Poseidon SSBNs. The Poseidons have a planned hull life of thirty years; accelerated dismantlement would mean dismantling them in the late 1980s vice the first half of the 1990s.
Were we to dismantle Poseidon SSBNs to stay within SALT, we should still be able to meet our targeting needs. While the Poseidon carries a considerable number of RVs, we would maintain about the same number of total warheads as at present—and they would be far more effective—as we deploy Trident C–4, and later D–5 and MX.
Were we to abandon interim-restraint, it is unlikely we could accelerate new strategic programs to any significant degree, given the long lead times and the difficulty of obtaining additional funds from Congress, particularly in view of budget-cutting pressures. The primary military gain from abandoning interim restraint would thus be retention of Poseidon SSBNs armed with C–3 missiles and their small and relatively inaccurate warheads. They are ineffective against hard targets, and we may now have more than we could rationally employ.
Impact on Soviets. The Soviets will be able to increase the number of their missile RVs over the next ten years, even within the principal SALT ceilings and subceilings. However, absent any restraints, they could increase their RVs to much higher levels. This could result from several factors:
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- retention of older ICBMs and SLBMs as new missiles such as the SS–X–24 and SS–X–23 are deployed;
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- increasing the number of RVs on SS–18s and the SS–18 follow-on; and
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- acceleration of production of new systems (something the Soviets probably can do more easily than we).
Rick Burt sent you a paper2 showing how the Soviet Force 3 projection—which assumes SALT constraints are abandoned and the Soviets engage in a “higher level of effort”—could mean 7000 more Soviet RVs in 1995 than if the Soviets abided by the SALT limits. Even the Soviet Force 2 projection—which assumes SALT constraints are abandoned but no “higher level of effort”—would mean an increase of some 3000 RVs over the case in which the Soviets abide by SALT.
[Page 104]In sum, while continuing interim restraint would mean that we would have to dismantle launchers for more RVs in the near term than would the Soviets, these would be Poseidon RVs on our side. The gain would be holding Soviet forces down to a level considerably below that to which they could otherwise build.
US-Soviet Relations
Our interim restraint policy has been an element of stability in what has been a sometimes turbulent period in US-Soviet relations, and has been seen as such by Congress, the public and our Allies. We will want to think carefully about ending it, an action which could be seen as signaling a reversal of the President’s goal of building a more constructive relationship with Moscow.
Geneva Negotiations
The US in 1982 declared a policy of interim restraint to foster a good atmosphere for the new START talks. Abandoning interim restraint altogether now would be seen as inconsistent with—and would complicate achievement of—our objective of radical reductions in nuclear arms in Geneva. If there are no constraints on strategic forces and the Soviets expand their current warhead advantage (beyond what they can do within SALT), it would be even more difficult to achieve the kinds of reductions we are seeking.
Ceasing to observe interim restraint would also open us to charges of “poisoning” the atmosphere for the NST talks. The Soviets would take this propaganda gift and be that much more inclined to engage in public, posturing—exploiting the latest US “blow” against arms control—rather than real give and take at the bargaining table.
Soviet Noncompliance
Soviet noncompliance is a serious factor to which we must respond, but we should bear two points in mind. First, the SALT II provisions the Soviets have abided by are considerably more significant than those which they have violated. Second, pulling out of the interim restraint regime means giving up any hope of bringing the Soviets into compliance and also means giving up part of the basis for beating them up on compliance.
Congressional Factors
While there is a conservative group on the Hill strongly favoring abandonment of the SALT limits, my guess is that that group is outnumbered by those who favor continued observance of interim restraint as providing a measure of control over the arms competition. If we abandon interim restraint, we would provoke concern over the Administration’s intentions regarding arms control. In particular, [Page 105] it may be seen as a step towards abandoning the ABM Treaty, which would increase Congressional resistance to SDI.
Congressional concern—combined with budget-cutting pressures—would be such that we would be unable to exploit the absence of constraints to accelerate our strategic modernization program. Indeed, it may be more difficult to maintain support for Trident, the MX and B–1, and we may encounter Congressionally mandated limits restricting US forces to within SALT limits.
Public and Allied Reactions
The public would share many of the concerns of Congress. Skeptics of Administration arms control policy would seize upon a move away from interim restraint as another example of our “lack of seriousness” about arms control.
We could expect problems with the Allies, who generally support interim restraint as a positive element for stability in the US-Soviet relationship and are skeptical about our charges of Soviet noncompliance. This is not the sort of problem we need now, when we are trying to maintain Allied support for our approach in Geneva and SDI.
We could also expect Soviet efforts to exploit our abandonment of interim restraint to drive wedges between the USG and both domestic opinion and the Allies.
Recommendation
The interim restraint regime provides important limits on future Soviet force developments at a price—in terms of the forces that we would have to give up—that is marginal. Moreover, abandoning that regime would entail severe political costs with Congress, the public and our Allies and would raise even greater obstacles to the achievement of our objectives in Geneva. Thus, we should seek to maintain the basic regime.
At the same time, we should not let Soviet noncompliance go unchallenged. I therefore recommend we modify our policy of interim restraint along the following lines:
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- As the Soviets are proceeding with both the SS–X–24 and SS–25, the US should no longer consider itself bound by SALT Il’s limitation of one new ICBM type and therefore be free to proceed with Midgetman. (This might have the bonus of giving an impetus to the Midgetman program.)
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- Given the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, the US would not dismantle Poseidon SSBNs in excess of SALT limitations, but would instead remove their missiles and place the boats in port in caretaker or mothball status. The missile tube hatches would be left open so that the Soviets could verify the missiles had been removed (we could also offer on-site inspection). We would state that we would reconsider ultimate disposition of the SSBNs in view of changes in Soviet compliance [Page 106] practices. (This means we would be observing the SALT limits in principle but would also have a breakout capability if needed in view of Soviet actions and as a hedge against Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. This also provides a “carrot” for the Soviets to change their ways.)
With the above modifications, we should extend our policy of observing interim restraint until the end of 1986, at which time we would again review that policy in view of the overall US-Soviet relationship, developments in Geneva, and Soviet compliance practices. I see several advantages to a limited duration extension of our interim restraint policy. A time-limited extension maintains some pressure on the Soviets to negotiate in Geneva for a replacement regime. Moreover, the first three Poseidon SSBNs that would have to be placed in caretaker status need reactor refueling and other work (at a cost of at least $200 million each, funds for which have not been programmed); after 1986, continuing interim restraint could mean retiring SSBNs that may not be in need of such work.
While we should inform the Soviets in advance of our decision, I see little utility in trying to negotiate a new regime with them. It would only divert attention from our effort to negotiate reductions, and the likely Soviet response would be to refuse to agree to any modification of interim restraint, leaving us in the position of demandeur with little to offer for their agreement.