Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense11
SALT II and
Interim Restraint
(S) Even prior to the discovery of a
brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
the SALT II Treaty was largely
discredited within the U.S. Senate.
While many would have voted for SALT
II simply on the basis of party identification, a rather typical
reaction was that of Senator Cohen: “Unhappily, I conclude that the
treaty, while paying homage to the arms control process, not only fails
to achieve any substantial reductions in arms, but also permits and
codifies serious inequalities in our respective strategic capabilities.”
The accuracy of 1979 criticism of SALT
II has been proven by history and affirmed by this Administration.
“Since the SALT I talks started in
1969,” Assistant to the President for National Security Robert McFarlane stated in 1984, “the
Soviets have added over 7,000 nuclear weapons to their arsenal; since
SALT II was signed, over
3,800.”
(U) A fundamental characteristic of the SALT II Treaty is that it permits a very large expansion in
strategic forces by both sides, but is particularly suited to Soviet
force expansion. President Reagan noted this fact in 1984: “Today, the Soviet
nuclear arsenal can grow to over 15,000 nuclear weapons and still stay
within all past arms control agreements, including SALT I and SALT II guidelines.”
(S/NF) SALT II contains many
fundamental inequalities in the Soviet favor—a monopoly on “heavy”
missiles and the exclusion of Backfire bombers from the limitations, for
example. The MIRV ceilings of SALT II are equal on their face but
dramatically unequal in effect. They treat large and powerful Soviet
ICBMs on the same basis as small U.S.
ICBMs. The U.S. Minuteman III with three
warheads and about 2,300 pounds of throw-weight is counted as equal to a
Soviet SS–18 with 10 warheads and 17,500 lbs. of throw-weight. The
combination of the unequal limits on numbers of warheads on existing
ICBMs and the MIRV ceiling assured
that the Soviets would have at least a two-to-one advantage in ICBM warheads for the period of the
SALT II Treaty. For the period after 1986 the MIRV ceilings will result in much larger U.S. dismantling requirements than
those expected for the Soviet Union despite the fact that the
Soviets will have a much more capable strategic force. U.S.
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dismantling between 1986 and
1991, for example, will involve two to four times as many warheads as
required of the Soviet Union. Thus the unequal nature of the SALT II constraints will tend to increase
the strategic disparity that currently favors the Soviet Union.
(U) The SALT II Treaty, even if fully
complied with, cannot place any significant constraint upon Soviet
strategic capabilities. It has not prevented the Soviet Union from
obtaining strategic counterforce disarming capabilities against the
U.S.
ICBM force. It places no limits on the
improvement of Soviet air defenses, civil defenses or ASW capabilities. The Soviets can deploy
up to 18,000 strategic warheads, plus refire missiles in unlimited
numbers, under SALT II.
(S) The fundamental issue concerning the
extension of SALT II beyond its
expiration date is not the merits or demerits of the agreement, however,
but the fact of multiple Soviet violations of the Treaty. Extending an
unratified and “fatally flawed” agreement beyond its expiration date in
the wake of multiple Soviet violations of that agreement would be a
virtually unprecedented act.
(S) President Reagan has determined the existence of four violations
and several probable violations or actions inconsistent with the SALT II Treaty by the Soviet Union. In
NSDD 12112 the President stated
that: “The expanding pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms
control agreements raises serious questions for U.S. national security, our Alliances, arms control, and
U.S.-Soviet relations.” This judgement was recently reaffirmed in NSDD 161.13
(S) The USG now faces a major decision concerning the future of our
interim restraint policy. The SALT II
Treaty has been violated by the Soviet Union and we have indications of
future violations. The Soviet Union has refused to take corrective
action when requested by the United States. Soviet activities in the
ABM arena threaten a breakout from
the ABM Treaty as well. Continued
compliance with the SALT II Treaty
entails near-term military consequences which were not present when the
initial decision to “not undercut” SALT II was made in 1982. Soviet violations of SALT II represent a fundamental change in
circumstances. The United States therefore must formulate a policy to
deal with these new and unpleasant realities.
(S) United States interim restraint policy
was always based upon the condition that the Soviet Union would
“exercise equal restraint.” The Soviet Union clearly has not. Multiple
violations of SALT II, continued over
a number of years, with no corrective action by the Soviet Union,
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must fundamentally determine
the nature of the interim restraint decision now facing the United
States. Paul Nitze recently
observed that the argument “. . . that SALT II was better than no agreement . . . was a defeatist
criterion . . .” If advocating a “bad agreement” is “defeatist,” how
much more defeatist is it to comply with one that is being violated by
the other side? Paul Nitze
continued by observing that advocacy of a bad agreement as better than
nothing, “. . . suggested loss of confidence in our ability to maintain
an adequate deterrent posture without arms control and implied that we
must, therefore, accept more or less what the Soviets had agreed to.” If
this is true, then what can be said of a policy of unilaterally
complying with SALT II in the face of
significant Soviet violations of the agreement? Would the Soviet Union
regard as a serious competitor a nation that accepted Soviet violations
of major arms control agreements and even extended a “fatally flawed”
agreement beyond its expiration date?
