Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

33. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, May 6, 1985

SUBJECT

• Strategic Modernization (Update to NSDD–91)

The memo at Tab III from Secretary Weinberger contains his comments on the draft NSDD which we sent to State and DOD for formal review on March 28, 1985.

Secretary Shultz did not respond in writing, but indicated verbally via General Chain that he concurred with the draft NSDD as written.

The only major issue which surfaced in the final review was the size of the bomber force. I concur with Secretary Weinberger’s proposed approach of calling for a new bomber study rather than setting limits at this time. This approach would be consistent with Congressional requests for a new bomber study contained in the SASC mark-up. The final NSDD has been changed to reflect this approach (see Tab A).²

In the final version of the NSDD I have incorporated all of Secretary Weinberger’s proposed changes except for the addition of two paragraphs regarding non-strategic programs and cost overruns which I feel are inappropriate at this time (see highlighted material at Tab II).³ These paragraphs (they are similar to wording contained in NSDD–12,⁴ the original Strategic Modernization NSDD) were recommended by the JCS who opposed the new NSDD on the general grounds that the timing was poor (in their view) and that it would require more resources.

I would recommend against the incorporation of the two paragraphs. We are now drafting a conventional modernization NSDD which will hopefully be well received by the JCS which should cover part of the Services concerns. The paragraph on financial resources appears to be more appropriate to an internal DOD document, but was placed in NSDD–12 in the fall of 1981 to point out that NSDD–12 was part of the original Administration’s five year plan—not an addition to it. Mike Donley and Al Keel see no utility in adding such a paragraph at this time.

On our staff, Bill Wright still does not concur with the need to reissue an expanded strategic force modernization NSDD at this time. He believes that the President’s five point Strategic Modernization Program (TRIAD plus strategic defense and survivable command/communications) has gained a long-term credibility and a sustained degree of success in addressing a decade of inattention to the health of our strategic force posture. To add new priority emphases (and implicitly fenced funding) on warning, mobile targeting, ABM penetration and air defense capabilities will unduly burden the basic program with expanded priority elements, dilute its effectiveness and draw funds from non-strategic force modernization in a period of more difficult budgets.

Please return the entire package to me after the NSDD and Annex One are signed by the President; I will arrange for the NSDD to be distributed through normal channels and the Codeword Annex through Codeword channels.

Bob Linhard, John Grimes, Mike Donley, Ken deGraffenreid, Don Mahley and Sven Kraemer concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I⁵ forwarding the NSDD to the President for signature.⁶

Tab III

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)⁷

Washington, May 2, 1985

SUBJECT

• Update of NSDD–91, Strategic Forces Modernization (U)

(U) We have reviewed carefully the subject draft NSDD, and my line-in, line-out comments are attached for your use in preparing a final version for signature by the President.⁸

(TS) I do not consider my recommended changes significant enough to warrant a special NSC meeting; however, I would like to point out my rationale for one of the recommended changes. In the paragraph on bomber forces, I strongly urge you to delete the last two sentences that direct us to maintain a force of at least 350 heavy bombers as the ATB is deployed. That guidance would require either the procurement of more than 100 B-1Bs or a further delay in the retirement of aging B-52Gs. I do not believe we should pursue either of these options. We would, however, be willing to study the bomber force structure issue and report the results later this year.

Cap

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–090, NSDD 178. Top Secret; Special Access. Sent for action.
2. Attached but not printed are the draft NSDD and Annex One.
3. Not attached.
4. NSDD–12, “Strategic Forces Modernization Program,” is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.
5. Not attached.
6. McFarlane neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.
7. Top Secret; Special Access. Weinberger wrote “Bud” above the recipient line.
8. Not found.