Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

32. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 26, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

At yesterday’s luncheon meeting² you put your finger on the major European fear about SDI. Our allies worry that if we succeed in missile defense we would be able to reduce our own offensive missile force and this would leave them open to Soviet conventional attack. Everybody has forgotten that you provided the answer to this concern in your March 1983 speech launching SDI.

The label “Star Wars” and the attention given to missile defense have obscured the fact that you were not merely proposing a gadget but you were pointing the way to a new Western defense strategy based on a recognition that technology has brought us to an era in which a unit of defense will cost less than a corresponding unit of offense.

In that speech, in addition to missile defense, you called for a massive effort to develop and deploy high-tech conventional weapons, and by doing so to further raise the nuclear threshold. You said, “America does possess now the technologies to accomplish very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional non-nuclear forces.”

We have technology which would enable the Europeans to modernize their conventional forces to a higher level, and at less cost, than they are doing now. (Example: a Hell-fire anti-tank rocket costs about $500,000, versus $60,000 for one of those Boeing RPVs that can find and hit a Soviet tank.) Today we are selling the Europeans weapons and technologies that in our own country are now obsolete. At some point they will discover and be upset about this.

Reminding Europe of this conventional aspect of your 1983 proposal would both reduce opposition and give new impetus to SDI by shifting the discussion to technology which can be demonstrated in the near future. The financial strain of force modernization would be eased. And the large technology gap between Europe and the US—which we are all coming to recognize as a looming threat to the alliance—would be swiftly and sharply narrowed. And as Europe’s conventional power grows, concerns over the strategic aspect of SDI should lessen.

The attached London Times editorial³ shows that a perception is just beginning to take hold that there is more to SDI than merely an anti-missile gadget, and that the conventional aspect holds much promise for Europe. You got the conventional/strategic combination exactly right. Now it’s time to remind people of what you said and bring forward some of what we have to back up the conventional aspect of your 1983 initiative.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Casey⁴

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R, Box 17, Folder: DCI Memo Chrono (1–3 Apr ‘85). Secret. Casey sent the letter to Weinberger under cover of an April 26 note: “Dear Cap, I had a talk with the President today in which I gave him this letter. I think you will be interested in the London Times editorial which is also attached.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Casey, Regan, and McFarlane in the Oval Office from 9:52–10:12 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found.
2. On April 25, Reagan participated in a lunchtime briefing for the May 2–4 Bonn G–7 Summit in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, 12:16–1:45 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
3. Attached but not printed is “Geneva Intermission,” The Times, April 23, 1985, p. 13.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Casey signed the original.