Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

271. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 4, 1988

SUBJECT

• ABM Treaty Review—Proposed NSDD

Issue

Whether to sign the National Security Decision Directive providing guidance for the third five-year review of the ABM Treaty and tasking assessments of the responses available to the U.S. Government should the Soviet Union not agree at the Treaty Review to correct its violations of the ABM Treaty.

Background

The U.S. and USSR are required to begin a five-year review of the ABM Treaty by October 2, 1988. Since the last review, the U.S. has identified the Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk as a serious violation of the ABM Treaty.² During the July 6th NSPG meeting, your key advisors expressed their views on whether we should take the opportunity of the upcoming five-year review to declare the illegal Soviet radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty.

Discussion

Your advisors were divided on whether to declare the Krasnoyarsk a material breach of the Treaty. Some (among them Secretary Carlucci, Secretary Baker, Attorney General Meese, ACDA Director Burns, Ambassador Rowny, and Defense & Space Negotiator Cooper) believe that that there is no question that this radar constitutes a breach of the Treaty and that you should charge the Soviets with a material breach of the Treaty. Your Science Advisor is also of this view and he has provided the memorandum at Tab B offering to you his recommendation. As you know, we have heard from some key Senators who also support this position. Their letter, which you had seen before the July 6 NSPG, is attached at Tab C.³

Others (notably Secretary Shultz, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador Nitze, and SCC Commissioner Ellis) advise against declaring a material breach. At the NSPG, General Herres stated that the JCS believe this radar alone does not constitute a militarily significant violation nor does it meet the definition of material breach at this time. Secretary Shultz, who is traveling, has sent you the message at Tab D on this issue.

If you were to declare a material breach, two questions immediately arise: what triggered such a decision and what will be the U.S. response. A construction moratorium announced by the Soviets last October continues, and we have not identified any appropriate proportionate responses to this violation to date. In short, it would be very difficult to make a persuasive case for declaring a material breach at this time, and even if such a declaration were made, you would have no proportional response options readily available to execute.

At this point, the only decisions that you must make and announce to the Executive Branch are whether the U.S. should declare the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a material breach of the ABM Treaty before or during the five-year Review Conference, and how the Krasnoyarsk violation should be handled during the Review.

If approved, the attached NSDD⁴ indicates that you have decided not to declare a material breach before or during the ABM Treaty Review. While it does indicate that you would consider such an action in the future, it explicitly does not signal any decision now on whether you would declare a material breach after the Treaty Review. It does call for putting the Soviets on notice during the Treaty Review that should the Soviets continue to refuse to correct the Krasnoyarsk radar violation, the U.S. would reserve its rights to take the appropriate proportionate response in the future, including a declaration of material breach. The NSDD also tasks the Department of Defense, in consultation with Congress, to develop response options for your consideration later this year.

In accordance with NSDD 266,⁵ Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser to the NSC, has coordinated the attached NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK NO

____ ____ That you sign the NSDD at Tab A.⁶

Attachments

Tab B

Memorandum From the President’s Science Advisor (Graham) to President Reagan⁷

Washington, July 8, 1988

SUBJECT

• ABM TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE

I strongly recommend that the Krasnoyarsk Radar be declared a material breach of the ABM Treaty at the upcoming Treaty Review Conference. I base this recommendation on the unequivocal challenge this facility poses to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

The Krasnoyarsk Radar is strategically significant because of its relationship to the vast network of “legal” Large Phased Array Radars (LPARs) on the periphery of Soviet territory. Individually and collectively, these LPARs represent significant components of a base for territorial defense against ballistic missiles. We formally challenged the Soviets on the purpose of these radars four times before we ever even raised the Krasnoyarsk issue with them, and we have now raised Krasnoyarsk at each of the last eight meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission.

This is an extremely serious violation of the Treaty. Large phased array radars are the most visible and verifiable component constrained by the ABM Treaty, and the only reliable source of long lead warning of a Soviet breakout capability. The fact that the Soviets have completed over five years of construction reduces our warning time substantially. No number of on-site inspections could alter that fact. That is why we have insisted the radar be dismantled.

One of the principal arguments against identifying Krasnoyarsk as a “material breach” over the past few years has been our hope that the Soviets would dismantle it before the 1987 ABM Treaty Review Conference. We have now delayed the Conference for nearly a year so that Summits and Ministerials could provide further opportunities to encourage its dismantlement. Despite all of our patience and diplomacy toward that end, the radar still stands.

Some would argue against publicly declaring the Soviets in material breach of the Treaty on the grounds that such a declaration would call into question our continuing adherence to the Treaty. This argument needs to be seen in the context of national strategy.

From a technological perspective the objectives of the ABM Treaty and your Strategic Defense Initiative are fundamentally inconsistent. In order to advance SDI, we will have to chart a transition out of the ABM Treaty. I have heard the arguments about Soviet advantages in ground-based ABM deployment preparation, space launch capability, and operational experience in strategic defense. These are not irrelevant; but they should not blind us to our own strengths. Our technological capacity remains far beyond that of the Soviet Union (as evidenced by our tremendous progress in SDI) and, given full national support, can more than offset these short-term Soviet advantages.

The forthrightness of your policy on Soviet treaty violations will be counted among this Administration’s proudest and most enduring legacies. We have seen the Soviets return to the bargaining table because of your overall defense buildup and specifically because of your Strategic Defense Initiative. Similarly, they will be persuaded to comply with their arms control commitments only if they see the U.S. is prepared to act from strength.

Tab D

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan⁸

Bangkok, July 7, 1988

SUBJECT

• ABM Treaty: The Material Breach Issue

I have been told about the discussion at the NSPG today and want to stress again that to declare a material breach is bad policy and bad politics.

There is only one possible interpretation of such a decision by us regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar—that we are getting ourselves positioned to leave the ABM Treaty. The Chiefs do not want this because it would be bad for the national security of the United States. I fully agree with them. The Soviets are in a better position to exploit defenses in the near term than we are. So we want the Soviets to comply with the treaty. Our approach is working. The Soviets have stopped construction. We should continue stating that Krasnoyarsk is a serious violation and that we will not sign a START Treaty until it ends. The Soviets are getting the message; they have hinted to you and me that they are considering tearing down the radar in the context of a START agreement.

This is not the time to take a decision that implies we are laying the groundwork for suspension of the ABM Treaty. Such a move would alarm far more senators and congressmen than it would please, and undercut support for defense modernization and SDI. It could undercut the legacy of your arms control accomplishments which are achieving real reductions in Soviet forces.

So I strongly recommend you take no decision now to declare a material breach; we should conduct the treaty review under current policy. This fall, after the review, we can again look at options for responding to Krasnoyarsk. There is nothing to be gained and much to risk in changing our position now. End text.

Shultz

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–097, NSDD 312. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Heiser. Copies were sent to Bush and Duberstein. A stamped notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it on August 5.
2. See Document 266.
3. Attached but not printed. See Tab 1, Document 265.
4. Printed as Document 272.
5. NSDD–266, “Implementation of the Recommendations of the President’s Special Review Board,” March 31, 1987, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy.
6. Reagan approved the recommendation.
7. Secret.
8. Secret. Shultz was in Thailand from July 6 until July 9 for the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. From there, he traveled to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Japan, and the Marshall Islands before returning to the United States on July 20.