Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

270. Memorandum From William Heiser, William Tobey, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, August 4, 1988

SUBJECT

• ABM Treaty Review—Proposed NSDD

Purpose. After both SACG and NSPG discussions of whether the U.S. should declare the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty, this package provides a memorandum for the President and accompanying NSDD for your consideration.

The proposed memorandum to the President (Tab I)² briefly reviews the issue of declaring or not declaring the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty. It then presents a path through the maze of competing considerations which the President could follow. It forwards for the President’s approval an NSDD (Tab A)³ which implements the first step on that path. Finally, it also forwards, for the record, a recently received memorandum from Bill Graham addressed to the President (Tab B),⁴ relevant Congressional correspondence (Tab C),⁵ and a message from Secretary Shultz (Tab D).⁶

Discussion. We have summarized the views of all the major players in previous memoranda to the President. Additionally, both you and the President heard the various arguments presented by the President’s most senior advisors at the NSPG on July 6. We acknowledge that there are a number of very good arguments for declaring the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty at or immediately after the ABM Treaty Review. We will not attempt to restate all the pros and cons again for you in this package. Rather we assume that, based on our previous discussions, you are very familiar with these arguments. Therefore, the following simply provides the NSC Staff recommendation on how to proceed and our rationale for making such a recommendation.

NSC Staff View. Our recommendation is the product of applying two bottom-line criteria to the question of declaring a material breach:

(1) if the President were to decide to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty at this time, could the President’s decision be reasonably explained and justified in light of the circumstances we now confront; and

(2) would the effects of such a decision taken now promote or undermine the integrity of the President’s compliance policy.

At this particular point, the only decision that the President must make and announce to the Executive Branch is whether we should declare the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a material breach before or during the ABM Treaty Review Conference. Based on this decision, he also must approve the U.S. approach to this subject at the Review.

If the President were to decide at this time to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty—a decision favored by many—this would rapidly become a matter of public record and the administration would be asked what had triggered the decision and what the United States intended to do about it. In point of fact, intelligence information indicates that nothing about the status of the radar has changed. The slow-down in construction activity proclaimed as a moratorium by the Soviets last October continues. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, when asked by Senators and Congressmen for his view, may be put in the awkward position of having to admit that the Chiefs did not recommend this step be taken, and perhaps he may even be forced to go further to state that the Chiefs do not consider the Krasnoyarsk radar, in its current configuration, to be a militarily significant violation of the ABM Treaty.

Moreover, when the Administration is asked what it proposes to do about the breach, all recognize that we currently have no response. When pressed on whether we want to suspend in whole or in part or terminate the Treaty, few of the President’s advisers propose that we do either. On the contrary, most would say that we have no plans either to suspend or terminate the Treaty. We could easily find ourselves detailing all the actions we would not undertake when asked the obvious question of what responses we have in mind, thereby undercutting the credibility of the declaration itself.

Based upon these considerations, we would recommend that the President not decide to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach of the ABM Treaty at this time.

However, with regard to the treatment of this issue at the ABM Treaty Review, a good case can be made for putting the Soviets on notice at the Review that if they refuse to correct their Treaty violations, the U.S. reserves, consistent with international law, all rights to take the appropriate proportionate response at a later time, and that the U.S. will be forced to consider charging the Soviets with a material breach of the Treaty. We would recommend this be the approach authorized for the Treaty Review.

Further, we would recommend that the Department of Defense immediately be tasked to develop options, in consultation with other appropriate agencies and the Congress, that the President could consider should the Soviets either once again begin work on the radar or continue to fail to correct their violation to our satisfaction. By taking this action, we would signal seriousness in our resolve and keep pressure on the Soviets to correct the Krasnoyarsk radar violation.

These are the only steps that the President need announce to the Executive Branch now. He can then wait to see the results of the ABM Treaty Review before moving further. The NSDD provided at Tab A reflects only these steps.

Given cards that we currently have to play, and assuming that the Soviets do not satisfy us concerning Krasnoyarsk at the Review, we think that the following will likely be the best course for the President to follow. After the review, the President should issue a statement making the following points.

— The long-standing Krasnoyarsk violation has not been satisfactorily resolved by the Soviet Union at the ABM Treaty Review; therefore, I am forced to consider declaring this serious violation a material breach of the ABM Treaty.

— The United States is now actively studying responses that would be appropriate and proportionate to the violation.

— As this proceeds over the next few months, the Administration will be working with the Congress and consulting with our Allies on this serious problem.

— We encourage the Soviet Union to promptly dismantle this illegal radar.

— We have already made it clear to the Soviet Union that neither a START or Defense & Space agreement can be concluded until the issue of the illegal radar at Krasnoyarsk is resolved.

Following such a statement, the next milestones that we would face are:

(1) the end of the declared 1-year moratorium on work on the Krasnoyarsk radar (October 24, 1988);

(2) the completion of the options study (November 1, 1988); and

(3) the submission of this Administration’s final Congressionally mandated compliance report (December 1, 1988).

The President should understand that by signing this NSDD he will forego declaring a material breach at the Review Conference. This will not be well received by many of his advisors within the Administration and by many of his strongest supporters in the Congress. In addition, depending on Soviet behavior during this interim period, and particularly Soviet actions after the construction moratorium at Krasnoyarsk ends in October, the President could face the decision on material breach once again later this year. At that time, the President may have specific response options available for his use; but we should not base our actions on this. NSC staff do have some ideas (e.g., how about retaining POSEIDON SSBNs that the Congress encouraged us to retire for “fiscal” reasons to hedge against a breakout). However, past efforts in the Interagency to agree on responses to Soviet violations (i.e., the RSVP drill) have generally not been successful. On the other hand, at a minimum, the President would certainly be in position to state that he had given the Soviets every opportunity to correct the Krasnoyarsk violation and since they refused to do so, proportionate responses on the part of the U.S. are warranted.

Some NSC Staff feel that prospects could improve for declaring a material breach (if needed) and taking an appropriate response at that time. However, other NSC Staff who fully agree with the recommendation not to declare a material breach now, strongly believe that the chances of the President making such a declaration under favorable circumstances will decline as time passes. Thus, we should recognize that the President’s option for doing so will be foreclosed by this recommendation.

All the above being said, NSC Staff recommend the President:

1. approve the NSDD provided at Tab A;

2. announce no further decisions at this time and wait for the results of the ABM Treaty Review; and

3. should the Review not resolve the Krasnoyarsk issue and other circumstances not change, follow the course outlined above.

We believe that this is a sound way to proceed, albeit a controversial one, and that it offers the President the best prospect of resolving the Krasnoyarsk violation and preserving the integrity of his compliance policy. The one element of this very difficult issue that most troubles us is that much of the rationale for our recommendation is based on our judgment of the political realities we face, and, based on the NSPG discussion, it appears that a number of the President’s most experienced and senior advisors hold a different view.

Our draft memorandum for the President (Tab I) does not go into all of the above rationale. We felt that, on this issue, if you agree with our approach, you may wish [to] discuss these sensitive considerations with the President in person.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at TAB I forwarding the NSDD which moves the U.S. along the path described above in dealing with the Krasnoyarsk violation.⁷

2. That you sign the NSDD distribution memorandum at TAB II.⁸

Concurrence: Brooks, Fortier (in draft), Rostow⁹

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–097, NSDD 312. Secret. Sent for action. Powell crossed out the memorandum date, “July 9” and wrote “Aug 4 CP” above it.
2. Printed as Document 271.
3. Printed as Document 272.
4. Printed as Tab B, Document 271.
5. Attached but not printed. See Tab 1, Document 265.
6. Printed as Tab D, Document 271.
7. Powell did not indicate a preference.
8. Powell did not indicate a preference.
9. Linhard drew an asterisk next to Rostow’s name and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum on July 9: “General, *Nick has not yet shown the draft NSDD to A.B. [A.B. Culvahouse]. He is scheduled to see him Monday. He can try to get to him Sunday if you desire. V/R Bob”