Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

225. Memorandum From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, March 10, 1987

SUBJECT

• Talking Points: NSPG, March 11, 1987

Attached at Tab A are your draft talking points for tomorrow’s NSPG.

The talking points requested for Senator Baker’s use are provided at Tab B.

Paul Stevens called to relay that the Attorney General’s staff were asking about tomorrow’s meeting. We did not include Mr. Meese (or Mr. Baker) on the attendance list for the NSPG. If you want either added at this late time, we will take steps to get them the paper as quickly as possible in the morning.²

Recommendations³

That you use the points at Tab A to conduct tomorrow’s NSPG.

That you approve the points at Tab B for Senator Baker’s use and provide Tab B to him prior to the meeting.

That you provide guidance on whether to invite Mr. Meese (and Mr. Baker).

That you remind the President in the morning of the objectives of the NSPG, the outcomes we seek, and that he should not make any remarks at the meeting which could be interpreted as giving authorization for further “free lancing” on this issue.

Tab A

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Talking Points for Mr. Carlucci

[Introduction]

— Today’s session is intended to be a discussion of the possibility of a compromise with the Congress on SDI which initially surfaced during a meeting between Max Kampelman, Richard Perle and Paul Nitze and members of the Congressional arms control observer group while that group was on a visit to Geneva.

— We felt this was a timely subject because knowledge of that meeting has spread and the idea has begun to take on a life of its own on the Hill.

— Before we begin, Mr. President, would you like to say a few words?

[After the President’s remarks]

— The policy issues that we face today focus on three main questions:

1. Given the discussion that has already taken place with some members of Congress, is there a version of the general “deal” that has been discussed which we could all recommend to the President?

— If so, can we all agree on the details of the “going in” and “bottom line” positions that would comprise such a deal?

2. Assuming that we can agree on the substance of such a deal, would it be in our interest to pursue such a deal now or in the future?

3. If in our interest, what would be the correct way to approach Congress? And when?

— I would recommend, Mr. President, that we turn our attention to the first of these questions, the substance of such a “deal”, before we move any further.

— We would put the SDI program in great risk if we started down this path without a clear understanding of what we could accept and what we could not.

— If you agree, Mr. President, we will try to use roughly the first half of our meeting to hear views on this first question.

— Following that, I think it would be useful to have Will Ball give us his assessment of the situation with respect to the SDI program on the Hill.

— The remaining time can then be spent on the second and third questions, that is:

(1) is it in our interest to pursue such a deal; and

(2) if so, how and when should this be done.

[The Substance of the Deal]

— To focus our discussion on the first question, the substance of a potential deal, we have had senior staff, including those who were involved in the initial discussions with the Congress on this, develop a paper which you all should have seen which addresses this question.⁵

— The paper attempts to identify both a “bottom line” and “going in” position and to indicate, by way of footnotes, agency views on each of the points as they were reported to my staff on Monday.⁶

[The “Bottom Line” Position]

— The paper lays out a bottom line position which has the following elements.

1. An agreement be concluded in writing that involved the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), plus a sufficient portion of the ranking majority and minority members of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of both the Senate and the House to ensure that the Congressional parties to such an agreement could deliver on the commitments made by them.

— Ed Rowny notes that it is essential that key conservatives (e.g., Quayle, Wilson, Wallop, Kemp and Courter) be made full partners in such a deal.

2. The Congressional parties to the agreement would commit:

a. To assist blocking for roughly one year from the time the agreement was reached, but no longer than March 31, 1988, any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

— However, the Congressional parties to the agreement would reserve the right to take such action after the agreed period.

— Defense, ACDA and Ed Rowny all have expressed the view that this date should be changed from March 31, 1988, to December 31, 1987. This point needs discussion.

— Ken Adelman also feels that there is no reason for the Administration to acknowledge this point to the Congress. This is also worth some discussion, but we should internally have no confusion about whether we can live with this or not as an outcome before we enter into any negotiations with the Congress.

b. (The Congressional parties would also commit) to support the establishment of a special Congressional group or other appropriate mechanism to study the issue of the Treaty’s interpretation with the results not to be released until the end of the agreed period.

— The original idea of this element was to try to use this to control both the timing and the nature of Congressional activity on the interpretation issue.

— Ken (Adelman) suggests that this point should be changed to read “any study of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty would be done by a special Congressional group with the results not released until the end of the agreed period.”

(With respect to SDI funding, the Congressional parties would commit:)

c. To support prompt and favorable action on the $500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request).

d. To support a minimum of $4.5B in DoD funds for SDI in the FY88 budget (and a minimum of $6B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity).

e. To support the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.

— Defense would add a deadline of May 15, 1987, for positive Congressional action on the SDI FY87 supplemental.

3. (In return for the above,) the Administration would commit:

a. Not to restructure the SDI program for roughly one year from the time the agreement was reached, but no longer than March 31, 1988.

— During this period, the Administration would be permitted by Congress to take actions necessary to keep options open which would allow the Administration to move promptly to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty after that date. These actions could include committing funds to be used for necessary planning and preliminary fabrication of test devices. However, no tests which would require the broad interpretation would be conducted during this period.

— Defense, ACDA and Ed Rowny feel the end date should be changed from March 31, 1988, to December 31, 1987.

b. (In addition, the Administration would commit) to study, within the Executive Branch, the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities with the Soviet Union, but not to proceed with any such negotiations unless such study clearly shows this to be in the US interest.

— Defense, and Ed Rowny recommend deleting this element arguing that such a study is not needed and will only lead to additional restrictions on SDI.

— As I understand it, Max Kampelman objects to the characterization that we are not negotiating permitted and prohibited now in that we have advanced in Geneva the US position on what is permitted and prohibited under the broad interpretation of the Treaty. He would characterize this as a commitment to study “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities”, but not to “proceed with any such reexamination” unless study clearly shows this to be in the US interest.

c. (The Administration would also commit) to drop the requirement for “dual ratification” of the TTBT/PNET treaties provided that additional verification criteria for implementing ratification could be agreed and added to the existing language proposed by Senator Pell.

4. (Finally) the Administration would not agree to any action involving SALT or ASAT as a part of this agreement.

— This completes the paper’s treatment of the “bottom line” position.

[The “Going in” Position]

— The paper also addresses the subject of a “going in” position.

— The main differences in the “going in” position is that the Administration’s position would harden by adding the following requirements.

1. It would firm up the list of necessary Congressional parties to such an agreement to insist that the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), ranking majority/minority members of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of both the Senate and the House, all be included signatures to the written agreement.

2. It would shorten the agreed period covered by the deal from until March 31, 1988, to through December 31, 1987.

3. It would ask the Congressional parties to commit to assist in blocking any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty after the agreed period.

4. It would also ask Congressional parties to refrain from personally engaging in criticism of the broad interpretation of the Treaty, or supporting hearing on this subject, until the results of such a study are completed.

5. With respect to funding, it would ask the Congressional parties to support full funding for SDI during the period:

— the $500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request);

— the full $5.2B in DoD funds requested for SDI in the FY88 budget (and $6.2B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity); and

— the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.

6. Finally, associated with the Administration’s commitment to study the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities, it would ask the Congressional parties to such an agreement to assist in blocking efforts to try to legislate the negotiation of such permitted/prohibited activities until that study is completed.

— As you can see, the “going in” position does differ from the “bottom line” in certain significant ways; especially the request that the Congressional parties agree in advance to support any attempt to block the restructuring of the SDI program after the end of the agreed period.

— However, it is most essential that we see if we can agree on the “bottom line” position.⁷

— In fact, I understand that Cap feels that this is the only position that we should consider.

— Perhaps we could start our discussion on this point and ask Cap for his views.⁸

— Cap, as we agreed earlier, could we confine our remarks for now to the substance of a potential agreement. We will turn shortly to the question of whether any agreement along these lines is in our interest.

[Discussion: Solicit views of the various players on substance. Try to leave at least 20 minutes for the other issues.]

[After discussion of paper]

— Let’s break off our discussion of the paper and turn to the remaining two questions.

— Will (Ball), to set the stage for the question of whether any deal is in our interest, could you give us your assessment of the situation with respect to SDI on the Hill?

[After Will Ball’s remarks]

— Could we turn to a discussion of the two remaining questions, that is

(1) is it in our interest to pursue such a deal; and

(2) if so, how and when should this be done.

— George (Shultz), would you like to lead us off?

[Discussion. Leave 5 minutes for Howard Baker’s remarks on everyone staying on the same sheet of music and your summary.]

[After discussion]

— Well, this discussion has been useful. I think that we have quite a bit to think about.

— Howard (Baker), do have anything to add to this.

[Closing, after Baker’s remarks]

— Mr. President, I think that today’s discussion gives us quite a bit to consider.

— If you agree, Mr. President, I think that we should all be guided by the following rules while you considering your options. Pending further guidance:

1. Members of the Administration should not initiate contacts with the Hill on the subject of such a deal until the President has studied the various views heard, thought through the issue, and explicitly authorizes any such action.

2. If approached by members of Congress, members of the Administration should not engage in speculation about such a deal, especially substantive discussion which could foreclose the President’s options: both

(a) as to whether he will or will not authorize such a deal at the appropriate time; and

(b) as to the substance of such a deal.

Tab B

Talking Points Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Talking Points for Senator Baker

— I would like [to] make just one point.

— Since the Tower Commission Report and the beginning of the most recent flurry of activity involving the possibility of an agreement in the INF area, there hasn’t been a single story about disarray in the Administration over arms control.

— We have been very successful in all singing from the same sheet of music.

— It is essential, both for the President, and for our ability to achieve our objectives, that this continue—especially in SDI related areas.

— Let’s make sure we coordinate before we act, and all continue to pull in the same direction as a team.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0148. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum.
2. Linhard wrote in the right-hand margin beside this paragraph: “3/11 Meese and Baker were invited. We will send paper. Bob”
3. Carlucci did not indicate approval or disapproval of the recommendations on the document.
4. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for March 11 from 1 p.m. until 2 p.m.
5. See Tab A, Document 224.
6. March 9.
7. Carlucci drew two short vertical lines in the left-hand margin beside this point.
8. Carlucci drew two short vertical lines in the left-hand margin beside this point.
9. No classification marking. The document indicates that the meeting was scheduled for March 11 from 1 p.m. until 2 p.m.