Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

224. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 10, 1987

SUBJECT

• March 11 NSPG Meeting—Proposed Congressional Deal on SDI

NSPG Objectives. As we have discussed, there is a dialogue in progress between a number of members of the Administration and Congress on the possibility of a “deal” involving SDI funding and the conduct of the SDI program. We have scheduled an NSPG for tomorrow to discuss this. The objectives we should seek from tomorrow’s NSPG are the following:

1. To freeze all “free-lancing” by members of the Administration on an SDI deal.

2. To get firm control over this situation so that if further action is taken, the White House calls the timing and the terms.

3. To do the above while avoiding any stories of “disarray” within the Administration.

Tactics. The tactics we have chosen to accomplish these objectives are the following:

1. Develop a paper to identify and establish where various elements in the Executive Branch agree/disagree, and to highlight that while some elements of a “deal” may sound acceptable in certain quarters of the Administration, they are opposed in others. This paper should make it clear to all concerned that “free-lancing” on this issue involves unacceptable risks.

2. Use tomorrow’s NSPG to make it clear that any action in this area will require your specific approval.

3. Use the NSPG to freeze the situation (pending your further guidance), thus bringing the ball firmly back into the White House court.

NSPG Discussion Paper. At Tab A is the interagency paper which forms the basis of discussion for tomorrow’s NSPG meeting.

As the paper reflects (see the footnotes to the paper), there is considerable interagency disagreement over the terms of any such deal with the Hill, as well as concern over whether the Senators with whom Max Kampelman discussed this in Geneva could deliver on their end of the deal. All agree, therefore, that any agreement would have to be in writing and include the Majority Leaders of both houses. Since the proposed deal is not likely to get any better for us over time and to preempt any leaks, all agree as well on the urgency of this NSPG discussion.

Differences. With regard to the discussion paper, the key interagency differences are:

— DOD does not believe we should have a “going-in” position, but only the bottom line indicated in the front of the attached paper.

— DOD, ACDA and Ambassador Rowny believe the proposed bottom line we should accept for the duration of the deal, through March 31, 1988, is too long. They want it to last at most through December 31, 1987.

— For very different reasons, DOD, Rowny and Ambassador Kampelman oppose the idea of an interagency study on whether we should negotiate with the Soviets over what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty.

On this third issue, Cap feels that any such study can only lead to further restrictions being put on SDI. Rowny agrees, and feels that Max Kampelman has already gone far enough on this subject in Max’s discussions with Vorontsov.

Max Kampelman’s comments on this portion of the paper are a bit more troubling. We have provided them at Tab B so you can read them for yourself. At best, Max seems to be arguing that we should never imply to the Congress that he is inhibited from negotiating on this subject and attempting to reach agreement (on our terms). Therefore, Max would rather have any study of this subject be characterized as a study as to whether we should change our current negotiating position. On the other hand, Max’s comments may also indicate his frustration at not being authorized in his instructions to engage in a real negotiation on this point. If so, it would be useful to reinforce our position that moving beyond our current position of simply asserting (and defending) our interpretation is viewed as a very significant step which would require your explicit authorization. (This issue is included in the proposed talking points which I sent to you with the Meeting Memo.)²

As you know, based on discussions with George, Cap and yourself, I have asked the Arms Control Support Group to conduct a very close-hold study of this subject. This work is proceeding in a special compartment and should be completed in 3 to 4 weeks.

NSPG Meeting Outcome. The outcome we seek from tomorrow’s NSPG meeting is to freeze the situation and regain control in the White House. To do this, the meeting should end on the note that you will consider your options and, pending further guidance:

1. Members of the Administration should not initiate contacts with the Hill on the subject of such a deal until you have studied the various views heard, thought through the issue, and explicitly authorized any such action.

2. If approached by members of Congress, members of the Administration should not engage in speculation about such a deal, especially substantive discussion which could foreclose your options, both:

(a) as to whether you will or will not authorize such a deal at the appropriate time; and

(b) as to the substance of such a deal.

Recommendations

OK NO

____ ____ That you review the attached materials prior to the NSPG.³

____ ____ That you listen to the views of your advisors, but not make any remarks that could be interpreted as authorization for any agency to pursue this “deal” with the Congress at this time.⁴

Tab A

NSPG Discussion Paper⁵

Washington, March 10, 1987

SDI CONGRESSIONAL COMPROMISE ALTERNATIVES

Introduction. Over the last week, the idea of a “compromise” on SDI with the Congress has received a lot of discussion. Before we can evaluate whether attempting to reach such a compromise is in the US interest, we require a firm grasp of what the Administration would require in such a deal. This paper is designed to see if we can reach consensus on the elements of both a potential “going in” position and affirm “bottom line” position on a Congressional compromise on SDI.⁶

An initial version of this paper was circulated for comment on Saturday, March 7. The footnotes in this version of the paper reflect the comments received.

Issue 1. Elements of the Deal—The Bottom Line Position:

1. An agreement be concluded in writing that involved the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), plus a sufficient portion of the ranking majority and minority members of the Arms Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of both the Senate and the House to ensure that the Congressional parties to such an agreement could deliver on the commitments made by them.⁷

2. The Congressional parties to the agreement would commit:

a. To assist blocking for roughly one year from the time the agreement was reached, but no longer than March 31, 1988, any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.⁸

— However, the Congressional parties to the agreement would reserve the right to take such action after the agreed period.⁹

b. To support the establishment of a special Congressional group or other appropriate mechanism to study the issue of the Treaty’s interpretation with the results not to be released until the end of the agreed period.¹⁰

c. To support prompt and favorable action on the $500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request).¹¹

d. To support a minimum of $4.5B in DoD funds for SDI in the FY88 budget (and a minimum of $6B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity).

e. To support the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.

3. The Administration would commit:

a. Not to restructure the SDI program for roughly one year from the time the agreement was reached, but no longer than March 31, 1988.¹²

— During this period, the Administration would be permitted by Congress to take actions necessary to keep options open which would allow the Administration to move promptly to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty after that date. These actions could include committing funds to be used for necessary planning and preliminary fabrication of test devices. However, no tests which would require the broad interpretation would be conducted during this period.

b. To study, within the Executive Branch, the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities with the Soviet Union, but not to proceed with any such negotiations unless such study clearly shows this to be in the US interest.¹³,¹⁴

c. To drop the requirement for “dual ratification” of the TTBT/PNET treaties provided that additional verification criteria for implementing ratification could be agreed, and added to the existing language proposed by Senator Pell.¹⁵

4. The Administration would not agree to any action involving SALT or ASAT as a part of this agreement.

Issue 2. Elements of the Deal—The Going in Position:¹⁶

1. An agreement be concluded in writing that involved the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), ranking majority/minority members of the Arms Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of both the Senate and the House.¹⁷

2. The Congressional parties to the agreement would commit:

a. To assist blocking any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty for the remainder of calendar year 1987.¹⁸

b. Assuming the Administration meets its associated commitments, to assist in blocking any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty after the agreed period.

c. To support the establishment of a special group or other appropriate mechanism to study the issue of the Treaty’s interpretation with the results of that study not to be released until the end of the agreed period.¹⁹

d. To assist in blocking additional hearings on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty until the study is complete.²⁰

e. To refrain from personally engaging in criticism of the broad interpretation of the Treaty until the results of such a study are completed.²¹

f. To support prompt and favorable action on the $500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request).²²

g. To support the full $5.2B in DoD funds requested for SDI in the FY88 budget (and $6.2B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity).

h. To support the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.

i. To support the Administration’s detailed study of the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities with the Soviet Union with the results of this study to be completed by the end of the agreed period.²³,²⁴,²⁵

j. To assist in blocking efforts to try to legislate the negotiation of such permitted/prohibited activities until that study is completed.²⁶

3. The Administration would commit:

a. Not to restructure the SDI program before the end of calendar year 1987.²⁷

— During this period, the Administration would be permitted by Congress to take actions necessary to keep options open which would allow the Administration to move promptly to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty after that date. These actions could include committing funds to be used for necessary planning and preliminary fabrication of test devices. However, no tests which would require the broad interpretation would be conducted during this period.

b. To study, within the Executive Branch, the feasibility of negotiating permitted/prohibited activities with the Soviet Union.²⁸,²⁹

c. To drop the requirement for “dual ratification” of the TTBT/PNET treaties provided that an appropriate reservation containing additional verification criteria for implementing ratification could be crafted and agreed to by the Administration.³⁰

4. The Administration would not agree to any action involving SALT or ASAT as a part of this agreement.

Tab B

Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (Kampelman) to Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff³¹

Washington, March 9, 1987

SUBJECT

• Your Paper of March 7

Your paper is a good compilation of the essence of our Friday³² discussion but I have one serious problem with an element of it. I refer to paragraph 3b of your Issue 1 discussion found on the top of page 2. The same point is applicable to 3b of Issue 2 found on page 3.

Our critics are taking the position that I have not been permitted to negotiate the issue of what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty. You are aware that is not so. I have, indeed, been participating in such a negotiation since 1985, particularly since October 1985. The dictionary in my home defines “negotiate” as “to confer with another party with the aim of reaching an agreement.” I have conferred with the Soviets on all issues dealing with our subject matter and have never said or felt that I could not do so. This has involved extensive probing and discussion. I also believe that my objective and the objective of our government has, indeed, been to reach an agreement. We have advanced the U.S. position with respect to what is permitted and prohibited under the broad definition. We must not, in any way, play into the hands of our critics by now saying that we are prepared to look into the feasibility of whether we should negotiate. That is what we have been doing in Geneva.

I think what we are really talking about and what Senator Gore was addressing in Geneva with his request is “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities” and whether to “proceed with any such reexamination . . .”

Now for an additional brief comment:

I do not believe it is realistic in paragraphs 2d and 2e to block hearings or to stop the Members of Congress from stating their personal views on the treaty interpretation. This certainly is not attainable without the Executive Branch providing an assurance that no government official will state their position in favor of the broad definition. What we should rather seek is moderation.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0148. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush. Powell initialed the memorandum on Carlucci’s behalf. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.
2. See Tab C, Document 223.
3. Reagan initialed his approval.
4. Reagan initialed his approval.
5. Secret; Sensitive.
6. Defense feels that we should only consider our bottom line position. [Footnote is in the original.]
7. Rowny notes that it is essential that key conservatives (e.g., Quayle, Wilson, Wallop, Kemp and Courter) be made full partners in such a deal. [Footnote is in the original.]
8. Defense, ACDA, and Rowny feel that this date should be changed to 31 December 1987. [Footnote is in the original.]
9. ACDA notes that there is no reason for the Administration to acknowledge this point to the Congress. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. ACDA feels that this point should be changed to read “any study of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty would be done by a special Congressional group with the results not released until the end of the agreed period.” [Footnote is in the original.]
11. Defense would add a deadline of May 15, 1987, for positive Congressional action on the SDI FY87 supplemental. [Footnote is in the original.]
12. Defense, ACDA and Rowny feel the end date should be December 31, 1987. [Footnote is in the original.]
13. Defense, and Rowny recommend deleting this element. Defense and Rowny feel that such a study is not needed and will only lead to additional restrictions on SDI. [Footnote is in the original.]
14. Kampelman objects to the characterization that we are not negotiating permitted/prohibited now in that we have advanced in Geneva the US position on what is permitted and prohibited under the broad interpretation of the Treaty. He would characterize this as a commitment to study “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities”, but not to “proceed with any such reexamination” unless study clearly shows this to be in the US interest. [Footnote is in the original.]
15. ACDA feels that this additional verification detail cannot go as far as the language previously floated by Senator Dole, which would codify our current negotiating position of seeking CORRTEX measurements for all tests about 75kt. ACDA believes we will ultimately wish to agree to monitor some lesser number and should not accept having our hands legislatively bound. [Footnote is in the original.]
16. Defense feels that we should only consider our bottom line position. [Footnote is in the original.]
17. Rowny notes that it is essential that key conservatives (e.g., Quayle, Wilson, Wallop, Kemp and Courter) be made full partners in such a deal. [Footnote is in the original.]
18. Rowny believes that the Administration’s going in position should be that we will commit to not restructuring the SDI program through FY 87 (October 1, 1987). Therefore, this date would change to October 1, 1987. [Footnote is in the original.]
19. ACDA feels that this point should be changed to read “any study of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty would be done by a special Congressional group with the results not released until the end of the agreed period.” [Footnote is in the original.]
20. Kampelman believes that such a request of Congress should be dropped since it is unrealistic to ask for such a commitment. [Footnote is in the original.]
21. Footnote in the original directs to the same text as footnote 20, above.
22. Defense does not support a separate going in position. However, to track its position on the bottom line position, it would add a deadline of May 15, 1987, for positive Congressional action on the SDI FY87 supplemental. [Footnote is in the original.]
23. Defense, and Rowny recommend deleting this element. Defense does not support a separate going in position. However, to track its position on the bottom line position, Defense would delete this element arguing that such a study is not needed and will only lead to additional restrictions on SDI. Rowny agrees. [Footnote is in the original.]
24. Kampelman objects to the characterization that we are not negotiating permitted/prohibited now in that we have advanced in Geneva the US position on what is permitted
25. and prohibited under the broad interpretation of the Treaty. He would characterize this as a commitment to study “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities.” [Footnote is in the original.]
26. Kampelman would also object to the wording of this element on the same grounds as footnote 18 [24]. He would prefer an alternative wording along the following lines: “To assist in blocking efforts to try to legislate a change in our negotiating position with respect to permitted/prohibited activities until that study is completed.” [Footnote is in the original. Bracket is in the original footnote.] For the original footnote 18, see footnote 24, above.
27. Rowny believes that the Administration’s going in position should be that we will commit to not restructuring the SDI program through FY 87 (October 1, 1987). [Footnote is in the original.]
28. Defense, and Rowny recommend deleting this element. Defense does not support a separate going in position. However, to track its position on the bottom line position, Defense would delete this element arguing that such a study is not needed and will only lead to additional restrictions on SDI. Rowny agrees. [Footnote is in the original.]
29. Kampelman objects to the characterization that we are not negotiating permitted/prohibited now in that we have advanced in Geneva the US position on what is permitted and prohibited under the broad interpretation of the Treaty. He would characterize this as a commitment to study “the feasibility of reexamining our negotiating position on permitted/prohibited activities.” [Footnote is in the original.]
30. ACDA feels that this additional verification detail cannot go as far as the language previously floated by Senator Dole, which would codify our current negotiating position of seeking CORRTEX measures for all tests above 75kt. ACDA believes we will ultimately wish to agree to monitor some lesser number and should not accept having our hands legislatively bound. [Footnote is in the original.]
31. Secret.
32. March 6. No minutes were found.