Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

226. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, March 11, 1987, 1–2 p.m.

National Security Planning Group Meeting

SUBJECT

• Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary of State Shultz
  • Counselor Max Kampelman

• Treasury

  • Secretary of Treasury Baker

• Defense

  • Secretary of Defense Weinberger
  • Dr. Fred Ikle
  • General James Abrahamson

• Justice

  • Attorney General Meese

• OMB

  • Mr. James Miller
  • Mr. Wayne Arney

• ACDA

  • Director Kenneth Adelman

• CIA

  • Deputy Director Robert Gates

• JCS

  • General Herres
  • General Moellering

• White House

  • Chief of Staff Baker
  • Craig Fuller
  • Frank C. Carlucci
  • Colin L. Powell
  • Will Ball

• NSC

  • Robert Linhard

• OSTP

  • William Graham

• Special Advisors to the President

  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny

Minutes

The President: Opened the meeting by reading his points (Tab A).²

Mr. Carlucci: Read his opening remarks as annotated (Tab B).³ [Following Carlucci’s remarks, the discussion began.]

Secretary Weinberger: We have made great progress on SDI and, therefore, I favor the date of December 31, 1987 so that we cut our time commitments to a minimum. At the end of that period, we need to be free to do what we want to do. I think this is part of the package we’re discussing.

— We should avoid any discussion of determining what may be permitted and prohibited during the period. The Soviets will offer a range of things that they already know would restrict us. We should do nothing to restrict the SDI program. It’s unwise even to commit study of the feasibility of this type of thing. The study itself will lead us into restrictions. We should leave any clause with reference to this out. If not asked for by Congress, we should leave it out.

— Some have suggested that we should consider dropping all limits on sensors. Again, I don’t want to have any part of this, mainly because the Soviets will use this to achieve their goal blocking the SDI.

— We should not have any opening position in arguing with Congress. We should give them our bottom line as outlined and as modified by this discussion, and then if Congress agrees, okay.

— Once again, I don’t want any part of any discussion of what may be permitted and prohibited. This would just undercut our interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and move us towards restrictions. Mr. President, I have a briefing that I’m prepared to give you on at least one experiment that we can’t do under the narrow interpretation. I would be glad to give you that briefing at this time; if there’s no time now, I’ll be prepared to give to you at a later date.

Mr. Carlucci: Cap, we need to hear the others first. Let’s reschedule your briefing.

Secretary Shultz: Working on a compromise like this is a good thing to do. We really must ask ourselves what the alternatives are to fighting with the Congress. We run the risk of getting our ears pinned back. On the other hand, we really could get a good deal, especially Point D (which deals with funding). With respect to permitted and prohibited, the position in our current instructions to our delegation is satisfactory; no changes needed. Max can state our position in Geneva and probe. There’s no need to change this. We need to find a way to know what we’re talking about. Perhaps, we should do this in a smaller group once we’ve gotten our homework done.

Mr. Carlucci: I agree that we need to get our homework done. We are doing so, and we’re discussing this in a very small group.

Secretary Shultz: I agree; we should be able to handle this.

Chief of Staff Baker: Part of our problem is we don’t have one person that we’re dealing with; we have a herd of people. We need to find the group to deal with. It’s very early for something like this. We don’t need to be in a hurry; we can take our time on what we want. Let’s keep our powder dry, and let them come to us. Al Gore is already wetting his pants to try to get a deal. Once again, take it slow and let them come to us.

— The only way to screw this up is if we speak with multiple voices. We should say nothing at all, or everyone should say the exact same thing, both with the Soviets and with the Congress. I think we ought to proceed with this exercise, figure out who should do the negotiations, take it slow, and wait for them to come us. And, finally, we need to sing with one voice.

Will Ball: The Speaker is thinking about taking their trip to Moscow. Your trip in April (Secretary Shultz) allows us to block this activity and block an amendment until after your trip. This buys us time.

Chief of Staff Baker: I told Congressman Wright that we would talk to him.

Max Kampelman: We’re working on the assumption that all here want to preserve and strengthen the SDI program. All we differ on is tactics.

— How did all this arise? We had our observers visit the delegation in Geneva. At lunch, we heard from members of both parties. Both Republicans and Democrats from the Senate said they have the votes and the intentions to signal reduce SDI funding and to place restrictions on the Appropriations Bill to block the use of these funds for testing beyond the narrow interpretation of the Treaty. The House people were not there. We took seriously what was said, because it could hurt us and cause the Soviets to get something that they haven’t paid for at the negotiating table. Also, we’ll know by the end of the year whether a Defense and Space agreement is in the works or not. We tried to figure out in Geneva a way to avoid debate until we’re finished with the negotiations with the Soviets.

— We have to ask ourselves what do we want. First, we need respectable funding. Secondly, we need to stop legislative action that could hurt the negotiations.

— Then we have to ask what they want. What the Senate wants, apparently, is a period of time with no change in the SDI program. Richard Perle was there. There was nothing binding on the Administration that was said. Since then, members of Congress have met with others and have talked further about this. I met with both Dole and Byrd, and with some others. I think the piece of paper that was produced by the Arms Control Support Group summarized the deal well. If we have no deal, SDI funding will slow down, and I don’t know how that can be helped.

— With respect to negotiations on prohibited and permitted behavior, the Soviets have tried to have negotiations on this issue both through the internal activities in Geneva and through external public contacts. My instructions have allowed me to say publicly that I am authorized to negotiate. I can’t maintain the US position while not being able to say so publicly and to the Congress. Now I have talked about permitted and prohibited behavior with the Soviets, but I haven’t given them an inch. And, hell no, I won’t. And I certainly won’t unless I am explicitly authorized.

— You have nothing to fear if you trust your negotiators.

Secretary Weinberger: Mr. President, you did not want us to discuss and define what is permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty. I’m all for an agreement if the money is right for the SDI program; but maybe it’s too early for us to look at that. I do believe that we may face a cut in the SDI funding if there’s no agreement along the lines that’s suggested. But on the issue of what’s permitted and prohibited, maybe the word that’s bothering me is negotiation. We should be clear that we can talk about this issue, but there can be no movement on our part. Is that agreed?

Max Kampelman: I agree.

Secretary Weinberger: My problem is negotiations mean that you want to make an agreement on a list of what’s permitted and prohibited, but you can’t do that if you don’t know enough about it to make such a list and, instead, we press forward for agreement sake. I strongly oppose any agreement on permitted and prohibited. I strongly support a try for an agreement with the Congress however. Timing remains an issue. Who we talk to is also an issue. What is not an issue, though, is any discussion about what may be permitted and prohibited.

Mr. Carlucci: We have our instructions, and all agree. Let’s stick with them.

Secretary Weinberger: I didn’t know we needed any additional interpretation for our instructions.

Mr. Carlucci: If we need so, we’ll work it out.

The President: All right, what period of time should we be looking towards? Do we want to have this still extend through March 31, 1988? Or December 31, 1987? Do we accept either of those?

Secretary Weinberger: If we accept either, it will have an impact now. But I’m willing to accept a restriction running through December 31, 1987.

Mr. Carlucci: This would let you execute your plans. But would you be ready to test anything in January of 1988?

Secretary Weinberger: If I were free of the narrow interpretation, we could test this fall, and certainly by December.

Mr. Carlucci: If the Congress says no to December, do we walk away?

Secretary Weinberger: No, I’d say we would shift to January 15.

Secretary Baker: You are working a “going in” position.

Secretary Weinberger: No, I’m not.

General Abrahamson: We’re working to develop a restructured program by 30 April. There are two types of tests that we are considering—one on near-term adjustments; the second are far-term (tests in 1990) that could be exercised if we make adjustments now, and in the process save us both time and money. There’s a real benefit to be able to plan for our testing now.

Mr. Adelman: Okay, I agree with that. However, I agree on the premise that we can move to the broad interpretation now. It would be a worse situation if we were to plan for the broad interpretation and then the Congress legislate the narrow interpretation. We’d be worse off than even now.

— We need to do a lot better in explaining the legal interpretation of the Treaty. We also need a clear understanding and explanation of why we need to go to the broad interpretation.

Secretary Weinberger: Well, one explanation is still simple. If I’m under the broad interpretation and I run a test of our interceptor, I have to plan to miss. If I can work under the broad interpretation, I can try to hit the target I’m shooting for. Right now, we’re not trying to hit anything.

Secretary Shultz: What happens if we plan for a miss and we hit it?

The President: Yeah, what do we say? Do we say we intended to miss but whoops?

Secretary Weinberger: It takes us time to plan for events, and we can use the time to plan to exercise the broad interpretation. We can’t have a miss step. For example, think about ASAT. We’ve got an $80 million target up there right now, and we can’t shoot at it. After the period in question, we need to be able to shoot at things. Then we can develop other capabilities needed.

The President: Haven’t the Soviets tested against an anti-satellite weapon?

Secretary Shultz: They’ve had 20 or so shots with their anti-satellite system, but not in the last five years.

The President: Why the hell are we so restricted?

Mr. Carlucci: This is not an ABM Treaty issue.

The President: Let’s move to nine months vice the three additional months. Why don’t we take the attitude that after 31 January 1988, we can move to the broad interpretation.

Ambassador Rowny: I think you mean 1 January 1988, Mr. President.

The President: Yes, that’s right.

Attorney General Meese: I think a lot of this is implicit in our position. We should not make that a negotiating issue. Our chances of their not passing a restrictive legislation on the SDI program after the nine-month period are better. So let’s follow what the President had in mind.

Chief of Staff Baker: We’ve got to be careful; we can’t insist on what we want, and we can’t bind the Congress. We just need to be silent on what we’re going to do. We have the Supplemental coming up, and we’re going to need to fight this fight several times. Be silent on any idea of what we’re going to do later until we need to.

The President: Okay, let’s do it. We can limit ourselves until 31 January 1988 (once again, he was referring to 1 January 1988).

Attorney General Meese: It’s going to be very hard to override a veto after this.

The President: I agree, but let’s do it anyway. The people are on our side.

Ambassador Rowny: You can’t deal with Gore, Pell, Stevens, Wright, etc.

Ambassador Nitze: Our greatest asset is that the country is ready for such a deal. I get the feeling that the Congress want to get behind the position that Max is offering and, more important than the specifics of the deal, is the fact that we would get general support for our program.

Secretary Shultz: It seems like we have an agreement on approach with issues of timing and who would do the work. The Supplemental is almost upon us already. TTBT is also a very prominent issue. Some parts of Congress may drive us sooner looking for concessions on TTBT, if we’re going to get funding in our Supplemental. We can’t wait too long.

Max Kampelman: We have to work with many groups. Howard Baker is the central figure. We’ll get a better feel if Senator Baker is key in this process.

Mr. Carlucci: There is sentiment, therefore, for an agreement, but we have to be careful; this could fly apart at anytime.

The President: I don’t want anyone free-lancing on this.

Mr. Carlucci: On substance, we will work it all out with Howard Baker, and I defer to Howard Baker on the appropriate use of tactics.

The President: Okay, we got to have someone deal with the Congress.

Secretary Baker: (Pointing at Chief of Staff Baker) He’s the one.

Chief of Staff Baker; Well, I’m not dead yet. This is Frank’s game, and I will support him.

The Vice President: Are the Soviets close to deploying SDI? We need a Community study on exactly how far the Soviets are.

Mr. Gates: There is such a study. They’re roughly comparable to our own program. There will be no space-based Soviet systems until well into the 1990’s.

Secretary Weinberger: However, they have a very good heavy lift capability and a good laser capability. And, we can’t forget, with no restrictions, they can go as fast as they wish.

Mr. Gates: That’s true; they can plow forward.

Mr. Adelman: They also have a Moscow ABM and are working on ground-based lasers.

Mr. President: Maybe we can cooperate. Instead of shooting ours, maybe we can move theirs to Minnesota. I didn’t carry that state anyway.

The meeting ended at 1:53 p.m.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–111, NSPG 0148. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes.
2. Attached but not printed. See Tab C, Document 223.
3. Attached but not printed. See Tab A, Document 225.