220. Letter From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to President Reagan1
Pursuant to your direction in NSDD 261,2 Richard Perle and I began that consultation. We first consulted with Mrs. Thatcher and her Foreign and Defense Ministers. We went on to consult with heads of government and Foreign and Defense Ministers in Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, Paris, and Rome. While in Brussels, we also consulted with the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters. Over the weekend, we were able to visit with your negotiators in Geneva, Max Kampelman, Mike Glitman, and Ron Lehman. Coincidentally, we were also fortunate to have the Senate Observer Group in Geneva at the time we were there; we had constructive discussions with that group.
Below is a summary of the initial consultations; we have reported each discussion in detail from respective capitals we visited.
The consultations with our NATO Allies were made somewhat more difficult by press stories that an early deployment decision had been recommended to you, that you had already decided in favor of authorizing a shift in the guidelines for the SDI test program to the broader interpretation, and that formulation of such a decision could be expected shortly after March 2nd. Some took those press stories seriously and, as a result, presumed that our discussions would be more for appearance than to seek their views.
We therefore stressed the seriousness with which you regard the process of consultation. We said that you desire a full and considered expression of their views before you decide whether or not to change the guidelines for the SDI test program. We assured them that they could expect further consultation before such a decision was made.
There were differences of viewpoint among the NATO countries and also among ministers in the same country. In general, however, they agreed on the following points:
- A.
- They were appreciative of the consultations and most relieved to learn that this visit initiated a consultative process in advance of whatever decisions you make in the future. They were especially pleased to learn that press stories alleging you had already made your decision to restructure the SDI program were not true; they look forward to further [Page 804] consultations. A number of them thought that before your final decision is made, there should be a special ministerial meeting on this subject, or at least that it should be put on the agenda of the regular spring NAC Ministerial. Foreign Minister Andreotti proposed a delay until the fall by which time it should be clear whether or not the Geneva negotiations had a serious prospect of success; if by then it was clear they did not, he thought Italy would back a change.
- B.
- They take the view that the interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the responsibility of
the parties to the Treaty. They believe, however, that a decision in
the short-term redefining the SDI
research program to permit testing under the broad interpretation is
a political one which would have grave consequences in the following
areas:
- 1.
- First, they believe such a decision would adversely affect NST negotiations in Geneva. Namely, it would preclude the 50 percent reductions in strategic forces and seriously erode the ABM Treaty unless we cooperatively arrived at a “joint interpretation” with the Soviets. Related to this point was Mrs. Thatcher’s view, the most positive of those with whom we consulted. She believed that it was imperative for the U.S. to test, under whatever interpretation, to the extent necessary to prove the feasibility of SDI defenses. In so doing, however, we must engage in a dialogue with the Soviets in order to establish “predictability” between the sides. She emphasized in this regard that we need to give Gorbachev a “face saving” way to follow through with his agreement on 50% reductions. She suggested that, after the Defense Department had completed its study on testing under the broad interpretation, it should be presented in terms of a proposal to the Soviets at Geneva. It was imperative, she said, that Gorbachev be given a face-saver on the one hand and that we ensure our testing on the other. Otherwise, distrust and lack of mutual confidence could upset on-going negotiations or lead to even worse consequences.
- 2.
- Our NATO Allies are concerned that a move soon to the broad interpretation would further erode public confidence within their respective countries, and within NATO Europe generally, in U.S. leadership. Related to this point was the view of FRG Defense Minister Woerner. He asked: “Why now?” Rightly or wrongly, he said that the Soviets are winning over the publics with the perceived view that they are putting forth many innovative ideas while the U.S. is plagued with “passivity.”
- 3.
- Because of points 1 and 2 above, the Allies are concerned that a decision soon would cause disunity among members of NATO resulting in a serious fracture in Alliance solidarity which the Soviets would attempt to exploit.
- 4.
- A number of them argued that they had justified participation in the SDI research program by assuring their legislative bodies that it was [Page 805] our intention to stay within the narrow interpretation; a change now without persuasive justification could jeopardize that participation.
- C.
- While in Geneva Vorontsov told me of Gorbachev’s general acceptance of our INF position. I stressed the importance of concurrently reaching agreement on START and Space Defense.
- D.
- Also, in Geneva we had a long discussion among Max, ourselves and Stevens, Pell and five other U.S. Senators. Progress was made on a possible consensus behind higher than anticipated SDI appropriation to give support to your negotiating position with the Soviets during a delay in your moving to a decision to implement the broader interpretation.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March–April 1987. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- See Document 218.↩