Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

221. Memorandum From Robert Linhard and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, March 5, 1987

SUBJECT

• Weinberger Memo on D&S Developments

At Tab A is a memo to you from Cap Weinberger, expressing his concern about hints from Max Kampelman that the U.S. might be willing to accept a period of additional negotiations on permitted and prohibited ABM activities. There is some basis for Cap’s concern. A case can be made that Max has pushed his instructions to the limit—or (some feel) perhaps beyond. These actions include:

○ Tabling in December a side-by-side paper comparing U.S. and Soviet views of permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty.

○ Proposing working groups in January and accepting the Soviet position that one of two working groups should be on permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty.

○ Suggesting to Vorontsov in January a seven year period of non-deployment, to be followed by an unspecified period of negotiations. [This is not one of two authorized U.S. proposals.]

○ To our surprise, briefing the Soviets on the details of the ongoing consultations under NSDD 261.² In this context he told the Soviets on February 24th that “None of this [i.e. the contemplation in Washington of restructuring the SDI program to take advantage of the LCI] should interfere with our negotiations since what the sides negotiate, with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, would become the supreme law of the United States.” This may have led the Soviets to believe that the negotiations in Geneva could somehow supersede the President’s decision on this issue, despite NSDD 261’s caution that, “it is essential that we avoid giving the Soviet Union the mistaken impression that we are willing to accept additional restrictions on the conduct of the SDI program . . .”

○ With Paul Nitze, proposing to visiting Senate Arms Control Observers a plan whereby the Executive Branch would not move to take advantage of the LCI for a specified period of time, in return for a commitment by those senators to support an SDI funding level of $4 billion. [The President’s FY 88 budget request for SDI is $5. 2 billion.]

While Max can explain his rationale and his view of his authority to do each of the above, we need to remember that his standing instructions since September state that, “It is not in the U.S. interest to accept any changes in the understanding of key terms and definitions associated with the ABM Treaty which alter that which has already been negotiated and agreed. The negotiating group should counter and reject Soviet attempts indirectly to amend the ABM Treaty and to narrow that which is permitted by the Treaty.” These instructions were reinforced in NSDD 261.

The issue of negotiations with the Soviets about permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty reaches back to the start of the negotiations, with Max resisting instructions that would limit his flexibility. Thus, instructions, private conversations (including one here), backchannel messages (including ones from Cap and you), and now an NSDD have not really prevented Max from discussing with the Soviets and senators how the President’s authority to implement the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty might be circumscribed.

Only intervention from the highest levels will dampen Max’s activity and help us to keep peace in the interagency community. You may wish to discuss these issues with the President, and if he concurs, take Max aside and stress to him privately the nature and level of concern about these issues. If you wish, we will provide talking points for such a conversation.

Recommendation

That you raise these issues with Max at an appropriate moment.³

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)⁴

Washington, February 27, 1987

SUBJECT

• DST Joint Working Paper Paragraph on “Right to Deploy” (U)

(S) I am concerned about the direction discussions within the DST Delegation may take regarding the deployment of strategic defenses. The Soviets recently suggested it might be possible to move their proposal for 3–5 years of subsequent negotiations on the entire issue of ABM defenses within the 10-year period of non-withdrawal. As currently drafted, paragraph 5 of the joint working paper contains Soviet language proposing the sides “begin negotiations on subject of advanced strategic defenses,” juxtaposed with U.S. language that the sides “shall be free to deploy.”

(S) Although the U.S. language contains the phrase “unless the sides agree otherwise,” the focus of the U.S. position must remain on the right to deploy strategic defenses at the end of whatever delay interval is suggested. As you know, I think a 10-year delay is much too long. I recommend no more than a 5-year period, as I have before. But our Delegation should not imply to the Soviets that the U.S. side is willing to accept additional restrictions on the SDI program. Indeed, placing restrictions on SDI has been the long term objective of the Soviets in these talks. I believe, therefore, that any further effort by the U.S. side to accept the Soviet notion of negotiations within any interval must not forsake that right to deploy and must be carefully coordinated with Washington.

1. Source: Reagan Library, William Tobey Files, Subject File, Arms Control Proposals. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original. A stamped notation indicates Powell saw the memorandum.
2. See Document 218.
3. Neither Powell nor Carlucci approved or disapproved the recommendation.
4. Secret. Weinberger wrote “Frank” above the recipient line.