Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

205. Electronic Message From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, February 3, 1987, 10:29 a.m.

Good Morning, Boss.

SUBJECT

• Consultations and Today’s NSPG.

Both me and my normal back-up, Don Mahley, got trapped on the Shirley Highway this morning, causing us to miss the 7:30 meeting. I understand that consultation on SDI did come up as an issue (Fritz came down and gave me a detailed debrief after the meeting).

I would offer the following thoughts on the consultation process (both allied and congressional).

1. Before we initiate a consultative process, we need to get the President to the point where he has fully thought through the issue, the arguments, and the consequences of the views he will hear (when asked) from both Congress and allies. This helps the President by preparing him with a context within which he can quickly understand what he hears, evaluate it, and respond as needed. In my view, we are not quite there yet. I would argue for one more NSPG, after today’s, which focuses on the arms control options in the defense and space area. We could be ready for this meeting as early as this Friday²—but the likely best time would be next Tuesday, 10 February. Following that meeting, the President should have about as much information as we will be able to provide. He could use the remainder of that week to come to some tentative decisions and then (by Friday, February 13th) issue instructions on how his views should be presented to allies and the Congress. In the past, we have issued an NSDD on “consultations” which provides these instructions and thus structures the substance of the consultation process.

2. The “how” to consult issue can only be resolved after the President has made up his mind about his tentative decision. Let’s consider the allied problem first. Should the President decide that he is not going to restructure the SDI program now, then, since we know this will not be a problem for allies and we don’t want to make this an event so that they can lay markers down in an attempt to lock us in for all time, we would want a very low key process. In this case, we may be able to handle this via message thru normal diplomatic channels. We really don’t need senior representatives “explaining” this decision, since this will give our valiant allies the chance to lay down marker after marker. In short, we want to avoid the allied higher political levels in the consultation since they are the level that can lay down markers, and deal with this as a routine matter. On the other hand, should the President decide to authorize restructuring, then we will want to do just the opposite and avoid the normal diplomatic channels and contacts below the political level who will likely oppose the action (i.e., in the UK, the Foreign Office—Geoffrey Howe) and take our case directly to the top (i.e., to Mrs. Thatcher). To do this, we would likely have to send Nitze to Europe with either Fritz or I as thought police and co-briefers to consult at the highest available levels in the SDI participating countries (UK, FRG, Italy) and in France—and with a stop at the NAC (NATO) to officially touch base with all the rest. We would also need to send someone (maybe with Fritz going to Europe, I could handle Asia), to Japan and Korea, possibly Australia, and returning via Israel (another SDI participant). Ed Rowny would likely expect to be asked to “lead” an Asian trip. The two teams would be preceded by a closely held head-of-state letter so that allies could prepare for discussions when the team arrives. The official line would be that the President has completed his assessment, has tentative views on how to proceed that he wishes these teams to share with his allies so that he can solicit their views before he makes any final decisions. Congress is more difficult to handle. No matter what the decision, we will have a problem with one part of Congress or another. Contact with Congress on the President’s tentative views must start at the same time as the initiation of allied consultations. Both your congressional advisors and your advisors on alliance management will argue that their clients need to be notified first or we risk that the other group will leak and their clients will read about the issue in the paper before we get to them. In the past, the best solution is to run both processes at the same time. We will have to sit down with Alison and Will Ball/Ron Sable and lay out a game plan for Congress. We should start this planning as soon as today’s NSPG is behind us. Tentative plan:

— At today’s NSPG, simply note if necessary that NSC staff Linhard/Ermarth will be in with contact State and others to discuss the planning for allied consultation, but that process should not begin until the President has indicated that he is prepared and made up his mind on how to present the US view in such consultation.

— Also today you authorize us to plan for a second, final NSPG which focuses on the related arms control aspects of this and the situation in Geneva.

— Tomorrow we will work up a 1st cut at a congressional plan for internal NSC review and begin contacts with State on an allied plan.

— By Friday, we will complete the “Grip 02” paper in the Arms Control Support Group which focuses on the arms control options.

— Tuesday, 10 Feb (at the latest), we hold the second NSPG on arms control related issues.

— By Thursday, 12 Feb, the President indicates the general direction of his decision and (if he is inclined to authorize the SDI restructuring) we inform allies a team will be coming to talk arriving at their first stop on Monday, 16 Feb, with consultations ended by Friday/Saturday 20/21 Feb, and congressional consultations proceed at the same time in parallel.

— The President makes his final decision during the week of 23 Feb. If, at any time in this process, the President should reach the clear decision not to restructure the SDI program, then we should move quickly to telescope the consultations, focus on handling the “right” on the Hill, and put the decision behind us so that we limit the exposure for markers to be placed and minimize the significance for the future of the decision not to move now. I would note that we should expect allies to attempt to “give us their views” on the issue now. We can’t stop that—but we should try to minimize it to the extent possible since: (1) the President isn’t yet ready to process this input; (2) at most, allies can comment in general and without the benefit of an explanation of the US rationale—we should be trying to keep their minds open until we can give them our thoughts; and (3) in most instances, we will be getting the view of the allied bureaucracies—not the leaders. Also, this dialogue with allied “bureaucracies” may limit the flexibility of allied leaders later. When approached, we should simply listen at this point—but not attempt to present US views.

In sum, I would not make this a major issue at tomorrow’s NSPG. If needed, I would simply note that:

1. We are not ready to begin consultations—but we will consult when the appropriate time comes.

2. We should expect to get unsolicited advice from allies/Congress. We should simply take the advice but not speculate on the way the President sees the issues or the current US thinking. We should simply tell those who ask that the issue is under study, the President will consult before making up his mind, but he needs a bit more time to frame the issue in his own mind.

3. NSC staff Linhard/Ermarth will start this week to discuss with appropriate staffs in agencies how best to consult with Congress and allies when the time comes. I have discussed the broad outlines of the above note with Fritz and Peter Sommer—but not all the details. They will, I am sure, help improve both the planning and handling of allies. I have yet to discuss the above with Alison Fortier or (thru her) Ron Sable. I will do this shortly.

P.S. Sorry for the length of this one. Tuff subject, and first time we came up on this.

1. Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 61930. Secret. Copies were sent to Ermarth, Alison Fortier, Kraemer, Brooks, Sestanovich, Tobey, Mahley, Sommer, and Linhard. Sent through Green and Pearson.
2. February 6.