Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State2
Washington, February 2, 1987
LIKELY REACTIONS OF NATO
ALLIES TO OFFICIAL US ADOPTION OF THE
BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM
TREATY
The reactions of our NATO allies to a
US move in the coming months to
adopt officially the broad interpretation of the ABM treaty would be uniformly negative and
some, including our principal allies, would strongly oppose it. Given
the recent public debate over acceleration of SDI deployment, our allies would view a decision to move to
the broad interpretation of the treaty as tantamount to an early
deployment decision. They would regard such a move as a radical switch
in policy and premature in light of the commitments we have made to them
to date. It would, moreover, feed their accumulating fears about the
administration’s grip on foreign policy.
Conditions for Present Allied Support for SDI
Most of our allies have endorsed the SDI
research program as an appropriate response to Soviet strategic defense
activities. Prime Ministers Thatcher and Chirac and Chancellor Kohl have all been supportive of the
legitimacy of SDI research. Kohl and others credited SDI research with providing a strong
inducement to the Soviets to return to the negotiating table and bargain
seriously. London, Bonn, and Rome have lent moral support to the program
by signing formal agreements to participate in SDI research, although their primary motive has been the
desire not to be left behind in the SDI
technology revolution.
While endorsing SDI research the allies
have reserved on the merits of deployment. Their support has been given
on conditions implicit in Prime Minister Thatcher’s Camp David statement (see annex).3
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One of these conditions has been that research will be conducted in
conformity with the ABM treaty. When
the question of treaty interpretation arose last fall, our allies made
clear their unhappiness with our initiative to adopt a more permissive
reading which would permit full-scale development and testing of
space-based defense components. London and Bonn were relieved by the
President’s decision to confine SDI
activities to the restrictive interpretation as a matter of policy.
Kohl has publicly endorsed the
restrictive interpretation of the treaty. Although Thatcher has reportedly said she does
not wish to be drawn into interpreting the treaty, Geoffrey Howe, presumably speaking last week
with her blessing, urged adherence to the restrictive
interpretation.
The allies have taken us at our word that we will consult with them
before taking any decision to develop and deploy strategic defenses.
Because they will see an official move to the broad interpretation of
the treaty as presaging deployment, they will insist that consultations
are in order. On a number of occasions, they have sought to engage us in
discussion of the pros and cons of strategic defenses but have found
US answers to their questions
unsatisfying. They have acquiesced in postponing such a dialogue,
believing there would be an opportunity for it later. We have repeatedly
said decisions on development and deployment would be made by a future
president, at the earliest in the early 1990s.
Foreign Minister Genscher last
week complained to Ambassador Burt that the Germans had been told nothing of US consideration of SDI deployment and that they would want to
express their views on so important a matter. Lord Carrington reportedly
is considering calling for US-NATO consultations on SDI deployment options. Belgian and
Canadian permreps at NATO have called
for a NATO study of the implications
of SDI for alliance strategy. In
consultations, our allies will expect a detailed, rigorous analysis of
the political and military implications of SDI and a thorough exchange of views.
The allies have been temporarily reassured in the past by our enunciation
of objective criteria for judging the efficacy of SDI—cost effectiveness, survivability, and
stability. Before we take a decision to develop a specific system, they
will expect us to show how these criteria are met.
Strategic Concerns
Although debate on the strategic implications of SDI has been overshadowed in the past year by attention to
other aspects of the SDI issue, such as
participation in the research and the Reykjavik negotiations, there is
no indication that the concerns voiced earlier have eased.
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These would be brought to the
fore by decisions on the ABM treaty
interpretation. These concerns include:
- —
- Alliance strategy. Protection of the
US and the USSR by defensive systems would
diminish or end the extended deterrent of US strategic forces, leaving Europe
exposed to a relatively greater threat from superior Soviet
conventional forces.
- —
- UK-French deterrents. A Soviet
strategic defense in the long run could easily neutralize the
much smaller deterrents of Britain and France. Both France and
the UK fear difficulties in
sustaining political support for their nuclear programs, a
challenge which would be accelerated by an early deployment
decision.
- —
- Instability. Our allies fear
destabilizing effects of SDI on
the strategic relationship. They will have special doubts about
the survivability and cost-effectiveness of a first-generation
strategic defense against an unconstrained Soviet threat.
Arms Control Implications
The allies probably believe that US
adoption of the broader interpretation of the ABM treaty would seal the doom of the Nuclear and Space
Talks because of either a Soviet walkout or a hopeless stalemate. Soviet
assertions that the US had killed the
talks would find a receptive audience among those Europeans who are
already suspicious of or hostile to SDI.
Our allies believe that a departure in practice from the restrictive
interpretation should be a matter for negotiation with the Soviets.
Geoffrey Howe has recently suggested to you that we offer to stick with
the broad interpretation in exchange for 50-percent reductions. The
disruption of the Geneva talks would come at time when London and Bonn
believe Gorbachev is interested
in reaching a deal and that the Soviet internal situation may offer
unique opportunities for reducing tensions.
Allied Domestic Concerns
With an election on the horizon, Thatcher would find US
decisions on the treaty unwelcome at this time. Although the Kohl government has just won
reelection, US decisions that led to a
rupture of the Geneva talks would likely bring mass protests from
Germany’s peace movement. Moreover, Foreign Minister Genscher, who is personally most
suspicious of SDI, has been
strengthened in the coalition by the strong showing of the FDP.
Chirac’s enthusiasm for SDI has been
motivated in part by a desire to distinguish his policy from Mitterrand’s. Differences between the
two over SDI are likely to be muted in
the face of a US decision leading to
accelerated development, since Gaullists and Socialists alike must deal
with the strategic implications of SDI
for the French deterrent.
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Impact on the Alliance
Events of the last year—including the bombing of Libya, our decision on
SALT II, and the proposal to
eliminate ballistic missiles—have already conveyed the impression that
we will act alone when it suits us, with insufficient regard for allied
views and interests. Official adoption of the broad interpretation,
particularly without adequate consultations, would likely be viewed as a
last-ditch act to assure implementation of a policy now because we
doubted that political support could be mobilized later.
These perceptions would likely diminish US ability to lead the alliance on other tough issues such
as coordinating a common approach in the CSCE and improving NATO’s conventional posture. The
tendencies of our European partners to use the EC and WEU to prepare a
common front for dealing with the US on
security issues would doubtlessly be given momentum. One cannot rule out
the possibility that, as a group or individually, our allies might
embark on unilateralist paths of their own in dealing with Moscow.
