Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

20. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 6, 1985

SUBJECT

• SDI: Building Allied Understanding

We have known all along that SDI would stimulate European apprehensions and that Moscow would do its best to aggravate them. With arms control negotiations only five weeks away, I believe we now need to bolster our strategy for building allied understanding and consensus on SDI.

In one sense, SDI should be more peripheral to European interests than INF, since SDI is a non-nuclear research project destined for space while INF involved nuclear missiles set for imminent deployment on European soil. Moreover, the Soviet threat to abandon arms control over SDI appears somewhat less credible given their humble-pie return to Geneva following INF deployments.

This view is too sanguine, however:

— Allied angst about SDI is just below the surface and is shared by London, Paris, and others, as well as perennially-nervous Bonn.

— There is genuine fear of the unknown among the Europeans, who are shaken by high unemployment and inflation, low self-confidence and bad nerves about long-term U.S. protection.

— Soviet propaganda on SDI is relentless, and Moscow is already mobilizing the World Peace Council and others to spread the word in Europe; nor should we underestimate the impact on many Europeans of renewed Soviet threats to bust up the Geneva talks.

For all these reasons we made a remarkable effort to get our rationale across, with Thatcher at Camp David,² and post-Geneva through our extraordinary orchestration of high-level consultations with key allied and friendly countries. These exchanges were valuable and had a high pay-off. Reactions back from the Kohl-Mitterrand-Thatcher level now reveal greater understanding for our goals and approach to strategic defense.

But we still have our work cut out for us. Current discussions with several European officials indicate an acute concern on their part that there are major unanswered questions, with important risks for Europe’s security:

— All our allies are disturbed by the continuing U.S. emphasis on the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The implications for British and French nuclear forces are obvious. Defense Minister Michael Heseltine, who championed INF deployments in Britain, expressed particular concern about this aspect of our declaratory policy. London and Paris want us to stress the continuing vital role of offensive nuclear weapons in ensuring deterrence, pending any results of SDI research, to avoid degrading of their own deterrent forces.

— FRG Arms Control Commissioner Ruth questioned me and others in the Department closely last week about our aim of eliminating nuclear weapons. FRG leaders worry that undue “Carteresque” talk about a nuclear-free world will resuscitate pressures for immediate de-nuclearization in Germany. Despite their commitment to arms control, Germans also know that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is the ultimate guarantee of their security. They need, and want, both that guarantee and a politically credible arms control process. They (and other Europeans) fear that a “fortress America” of the 1990’s, shifting further toward a Pacific orientation, could decouple its own security from that of the nuclear defense of an increasingly weak and vacillating Europe. The FRG, therefore, will be guided on these issues by the political slogan of a recent German election: “keine Experimenten” (no experiments).

— All our European allies will be inclined to play Geneva for their own political purposes. Unlike INF, there will be a fairly common European approach; Mitterrand and Thatcher will not be pressing Bonn for greater firmness. While most leaders understand our wish to continue SDI research, most are also skeptical about SDI’s effectiveness in the face of a further buildup of Soviet offensive forces that could barrage our defenses.

— The Europeans also will be afraid that our protection of SDI at Geneva will lead to disruption or failure of the negotiations.

— Japan’s Nakasone so far has been our strongest allied supporter on SDI. This is logical since the issue is not as hot in Tokyo as in Europe and SDI might make a big difference in securing Japan’s relatively small territory against nuclear threat. Moreover, unlike Britain and France (and China), non-nuclear Japan need not fear degrading of any national nuclear assets. (This also explains Kohl’s relaxed view.) Yet even Nakasone has publicly distinguished between his support for SDI research and his open position on the future of defensive weapon systems.

What To Do

I have my own doubts whether the European peace movement is really able to exploit our rhetoric about eliminating all nuclear weapons. To exploit it they would have to concede the genuineness of the President’s intention—which I doubt they would do. Probably the nervousness of allied governments reflects their perennial condition of fragile nerves and fear of the unknown, as I have suggested. At the same time, the nervousness is real, and we need to bolster our friends.

The allies will first need to recognize that there are certain things we cannot do to assuage their concerns:

— We cannot depreciate the prospects for SDI in our declaratory policy;

— we cannot depict SDI as a bargaining chip, to be given away;

— nor can we entertain allied proposals for testing and deployment bans, even on a limited time basis.

However our ultimate national policy on strategic defense evolves, in light of the research effort and Soviet strategic programs, accommodating the allies on these points would dangerously undermine support for SDI funding. A strong Administration position on SDI is essential to gain adequate funding from Congress. The Soviets fully understand that their best shot at aborting SDI lies on Capitol Hill, where SDI funding will be a tough fight, rather than in Geneva. That is why they are pressing so hard on all fronts to build international pressure for limits on SDI testing and deployment.

At the same time, it should be possible to devise a political and public affairs strategy for building allied understanding and generating at least a reasonable measure of consensus. Our embassies in London and Paris have appealed for an updated policy line to this end (see Tab 1).³ On one level this means a circular cable with talking points that take account of specific allied concerns. More importantly, as our embassies and Washington-based European diplomats point out, it means getting our senior people here to keep in mind the need to:

— tone down the emphasis on elimination of all nuclear weapons, while indicating our hopes for a less dangerous world in which we increasingly secure deterrence through defense, with a reduced role for nuclear forces;

— stress that continued reliance on offensive nuclear weapons is absolutely essential pending the results of SDI research;

— note, where appropriate, the continued contribution to NATO security of allied nuclear forces; and

— emphasize the importance of Carrington’s efforts to strengthen NATO’s conventional defense.

I realize that we already have a general public affairs approach for handling the SDI issue. We will work with EUR and PM to develop further talking points for the field that reflect these specific allied concerns. You might also want to raise this matter with Bud McFarlane and Cap Weinberger.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/06/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Philip Kaplan (S/P) on February 4. Copies were sent to Kampelman, Nitze, Rowny, Burt, and Chain. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Platt initialed the memorandum, as did McKinley, who wrote “12 Feb” in the top right-hand margin.
2. See Document 9.
3. Attached but not printed are telegram 2273 from London, January 30; telegram 4615 from Paris, February 2 (incorrectly dated 1984); and telegram 2383 from London, January 31.
4. Shultz wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “OK—& I think the time is right for a speech on this subject & other arms control, possibly before Geneva.” McKinley drew a downward-facing arrow from “speech” in a typed transcription of Shultz’s handwritten note and wrote: “(Austin—March 28).” For more information on this speech, see Document 27.