27. Editorial Note
On March 19, 1985, President Ronald Reagan released a statement: “I am pleased that the Senate today voted to support the MX Peacekeeper missile and to send a message of American resolve to the world. And I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress to build upon the consensus we achieved today. As we continue to move forward to maintain the modern forces necessary for effective deterrence, let us remember that deterrence alone is not sufficient. The MX Peacekeeper will strengthen our national security and our negotiating position at Geneva. Deterrence and arms reductions go hand in hand, and our negotiators are working hard—flexibly and with an open mind—to achieve agreements leading to deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. It is critically important that the second Senate vote and next week’s votes in the House reaffirm this demonstration of America’s determination to achieve effective deterrence and significant nuclear arms reductions.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, page 317)
On March 21, President Reagan held a news conference in which he led off with a statement: “Let me commend again the Senate of the United States for having approved production of 21 more MX/Peacekeeper missiles. The Senate has endorsed the decision of four Presidents that the Peacekeeper is a vital component of the American deterrent. Now is the testing time for the House of Representatives. The votes there will answer the question of whether we stand united at Geneva or whether America will face the Soviet Union as a nation divided over the most fundamental questions of her national security. For more than a decade we’ve debated the MX, and while we were debating, the Soviets were deploying more than 600 such missiles and [Page 83] targeting them upon the United States. Now they’re on the verge of deploying two new strategic land-based systems, and we’re still debating. Not long ago the parliaments of four NATO countries courageously voted to accept deployment of Pershing II’s and cruise missiles. And these NATO countries are now looking to see if the American Congress is possessed of equal courage—or resolve, I should say. No request by an American President for a major strategic system deemed vital to the national security has ever been denied by an American Congress. It is that tradition of bipartisan unity on national defense that brought the Soviets back to Geneva. And unless that tradition is maintained next week in the House, there’s little prospect of success at Geneva.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, pages 326–327)
On March 26 and 28, President Reagan released statements commending votes in the House of Representatives approving the production of the MX missiles and the release of appropriations for it. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, pages 352, 360) On March 28, in an address before the Council on Foreign Affairs in Austin, Texas, Secretary of State George Shultz delivered a speech in which he began: “One of the most profound moral and political challenges facing our nation today is the effort to control and reduce nuclear weapons. In recent years, concern about the danger of nuclear holocaust has made nuclear arms control more than ever the focus of national debate. This is all to the good. In our free society, vigorous debate makes us stronger, not weaker, as we work to safeguard our security and protect the peace. But moral concern about nuclear weapons must be matched by an understanding of the underlying political and military complexities. If it is not, this moral concern can only raise false hopes—with consequences of the greatest immorality, endangering the prospect for peace. As we embark on a new round of arms negotiations with the Soviet Union—the most comprehensive and complex of any in history—such understanding is more important than ever. Today, I would like to discuss these underlying issues with you and to explain how your government is meeting this challenge.” After outlining U.S. objectives at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva and the Reagan administration’s aspiration that the Strategic Defense Initiative would enhance deterrence, Shultz went on to say: “The road to this safer world would have to be traveled with care. In making the transition from today’s near total reliance on offense, our objective would be to deploy defensive systems which, at each step of the process, make a first strike even more difficult. By doing so, we would not only enhance stability but also provide further incentives for reducing offensive forces. The feasibility criteria we have adopted—survivability and cost effectiveness—are designed precisely to ensure that any transition period is a stable one. Thus, survivability means less temptation and incentive for either side to attack these new defensive systems at a moment of political crisis during the transition period. [Page 84] Phasing in of truly cost-effective defensive systems will mean that offensive countermeasures—such as piling up more missiles to swamp the defenses—are a losing game. SDI is not a bid for strategic superiority; on the contrary, it would maintain the balance, in light of the rapid Soviet progress in both offensive and defensive systems. Nor is SDI an abrogation of the ABM Treaty. President Reagan has directed that the research program be carried out in full compliance with the treaty. He has also made clear that any future decision to deploy defenses that were not permitted by treaty would have to be a matter of negotiation.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 1985, pages 24–28)
The following day, President Reagan conveyed similar themes at the National Space Club Luncheon in Washington D.C., in remarks that included: “The Strategic Defense Initiative has been labeled ‘Star Wars,’ but it isn’t about war; it’s about peace. It isn’t about retaliation; it’s about prevention. It isn’t about fear; it’s about hope. And in that struggle, if you’ll pardon my stealing a film line: The force is with us. Technology is with us as well. Twenty years ago, we simply could not build systems which would prevent ballistic missiles from reaching their targets; because of new advances in technology, that may no longer be true. That’s why we’ve embarked on a vigorous research program, a program that does not violate treaties or threaten world stability. The means to intercept ballistic missiles during their early-on boost phase of trajectory would enable us to fundamentally change our strategic assumptions, permitting us to shift our emphasis from offense to defense. What could be more moral than a system designed to save lives rather than to avenge them? What could be more peaceful than moving away from reliance on our ability to threaten global annihilation and toward reliance on systems which are incapable of threatening anyone? We’re not discussing a concept just to enhance deterrence, but rather a new kind of deterrence; not just an addition to our offensive forces, but research to determine the feasibility of a comprehensive nonnuclear defensive system—a shield that could prevent nuclear weapons from reaching their targets.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, pages 363–364)
On March 30, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane sent Robert Linhard of the National Security Council (NSC) staff an electronic message expressing concern about erosion of support for SDI on the part of U.S. allies, arguing the “need to restore some discipline to the community of who speaks on this issue and what they say.” McFarlane instructed the NSC staff to develop a National Security Decision Directive that would “express concern over the mixed signals being sent on what our intentions are.” It should then “go on to say what motivated the President to propose the concept in the first place—that is, concern over the destabilizing trend in Soviet offensive forces—most significantly in the development of a mobile mirv’d [Page 85] system and others for which verification will become less and less certain. In short we could expect to reach a point where we would have no confidence in our knowledge of the state of the balance/imbalance. The second reason was that the state of the art seemed to make possible effective non-nuclear defense. Then it should turn to the concept for conducting research consistent with the ABM treaty and if one or more of the technologies proved feasible to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union to determine how these forces might be integrated into the force structure—indeed such negotiations would already have been in progress for years having started already in Geneva. This does not imply that we would give the Soviets a veto over the outcome. Secretary Shultz expressed this well in his Austin speech last week. The NSDD should also reaffirm that we will need offensive deterrence into the next century (so as to assuage our European colleagues). I also think it should also express some tentative thoughts on how the ultimate development could foster offensive arms reductions and not an offensive buildup (by giving explicit endorsement to the two criteria that Paul and I have used—invulnerability and comparative cost advantage.)” McFarlane noted that he could use the NSDD to address the concerns of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and French President Francois Mitterrand, all of whom were “in an extreme state of doubt over exactly what our intentions are.” (National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration)