Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

197. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 23, 1987

SUBJECT

• Briefing by General Abrahamson, January 22, 1987

I was briefed by General Abrahamson on SDI on above date. Abe said the briefing was to have had two parts. Perle was to address the narrow vs. the broad interpretation while he was to address a program for “phased deployment of SDI.” Perle was not available, so Abe proceeded with his part.

He described four possible phases. The earliest he called early deployment. That would use existing technology and be in place by 1992. He was not recommending it. The three phases he was recommending were:

Phase I. Abrahamson said this phase would not be very effective, it would not be cost-effective, and it would not be survivable. But it should have a meaningful capability, i.e., an impact on Soviet strategy and tactics. Deployment could begin in 1993, but this would be neither a full operational capability (FOC) nor an initial operational capability (IOC). What kind of a capability would need to be defined by the Chiefs. It should be able to kill hundreds of Soviet warheads (not thousands), some in boost phase, some in close in mid-course.

Phase II would be a second generation system with an add-on of features to make it survivable against the countermeasures the Soviets would have deployed against the Phase I system. It should be able to intercept some 70% of Soviet warheads, i.e., some 5000 to 6000. If the survivability measures were effective it should come close to meeting the three criteria. This phase might be deployable in 1995.

Phase III would be deployable in 1997 or thereafter, would not be leak-proof, but its effectiveness should be in the upper 90’s. The three criteria should be fully met in this phase.

Abrahamson also discussed his heavy-lift program. He doubted it could become operational at the level of cost-reduction he desires ($200 per pound lifted) until after 1997.

Abrahamson recognized that none of these deployments could take place without abrogating or amending the Treaty. He also acknowledged that the testing required would exceed what is permitted by the Treaty well before the first deployments.

I subsequently talked to Bob Linhard on this subject. He saw five issues to be discussed:

a). Should the President endorse a phased incremental approach to SDI deployment?

He thought the answer should be yes, some time in the future, if each step is on the main line that leads to where we want to be in the future and if it will meet our criteria.

b). Should we go forward with a heavy lift program? Yes; but it won’t be ready earlier than 1997.

c). Can we endorse, as an illustrative first approach to SDI architecture, the approach proposed? This approach includes, as a principal element, 210 satellite garages in earth orbit and 5 sensor packages in synchronous orbit.

Linhard believes we must first get an answer as to its survivability against a direct attack. If this cannot be done the Congress will kill it. If we assert that it is survivable, they will demonstrate we are wrong and will kill it. If we admit it is not survivable they will also kill it.

Perhaps if we set forth a reasonable survivability program to be worked on concurrently, we could defend it.

d). To what extent should we demand adherence to the three criteria? Linhard says Cap is against them but that they are sound and will survive. If the garages cannot be directly attacked, the cost to the Soviets to defeat our defenses are hard to measure, we may be able then to defend the cost-effectiveness of the system.

e). Should we go now for what we think is the legally correct interpretation of the Treaty? He thought this to be the principal issue to be discussed.

I said I thought there was a sixth and over-riding issue. That is, does the President now want to endorse a program which unambiguously contemplates withdrawal from the ABM Treaty?

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1987. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum.