Accordingly, I have developed a “think piece” which might deal with
permitted/prohibited activities. I have circulated to a number of people in
the Administration in an effort to refine the paper; most have been helpful
and the attached paper represents this refinement.
It will not be surprising to you that the comments fall into two basic
categories: (1) from those who wished to work constructively on the problem,
and (2) those in OSD who wished to block
any solution to the problem.
Attachment
Draft Paper Prepared by the Special Advisor to the President and the
Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz4
Washington, January 7, 1987
Draft #II
(As modified)
A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO WHAT TESTING THE ABM TREATY PERMITS AND DOES NOT PERMIT
Should the Soviets indicate an interest in working out an NST deal of interest to the U.S., what kind of an NST package would be of interest to us and
be potentially negotiable?
Our interest would be in stabilizing START and INF reductions.
The Soviet interest appears to be focused on a time period involving
non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and
strict adherence to an agreed interpretation of its terms.
We know pretty well what we want with respect to START and INF. The most difficult and controversial Space/Defense
issue within the Executive Branch is the question of what we could live
with in the way of an agreed interpretation of what testing of
components of systems based upon “other physical principles” (OPP) is permitted and not permitted by the
ABM Treaty. The currently agreed
interpretation of the Treaty in the U.S.
Executive Branch includes the view that Article V does not apply to
testing of components based on OPP as
addressed in Agreed Statement D.
As a possible approach, the concept in Agreed Statement D of consultation
under Article XIII, combined with the concept in Article VI, could
logically be applied to “components” based on OPP capable of substituting for ABM missiles, launchers, or radars. Article VI explicitly
applies to missiles, launchers, and radars that are not Article II
“components”; specifically, Article VI(a) prohibits giving “missiles,
launchers, or radars, other than ABM
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or
ABM radars” ABM capabilities or testing them in an
ABM mode. It would be consistent
with the concept of Agreed Statement D and of Article VI, after
consultation under Article XIII, to extend the coverage of Article VI to
devices based on OPP and potentially
capable of substituting for ABM
missiles, launchers, or radars.
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A procedure which could lead to a mutually agreeable solution to the
permitted/non-permitted testing of components based upon OPP issue might be found along the
following lines:
The sides would confirm that it would be consistent with the concept of
Agreed Statement D and of Article VI of the ABM Treaty to interpret Article VI to provide that neither
side will give systems or components other than those defined in
Articles I and II an ABM capability or
test them in an ABM mode.
- —
- The sides would specifically agree that “components” based upon
OPP
and potentially capable of substituting for
ABM components as defined in
Article II are subject to the limitation in Article VI.
- —
- It would then be necessary for the sides to arrive at a mutual
understanding as to what are such components based upon OPP that have the potential to
substitute for ABM components as
defined in Article II if tested in an ABM mode and what the term “testing in an ABM mode” means with respect to such
potential components based upon OPP.
The U.S. Government, before offering to negotiate such a mutual
understanding, would have had to arrive at a judgment as to the answers
to two questions implied by the above.
- a)
- What could we now agree would constitute components based upon
OPP potentially capable of
substituting for ABM components as
defined in Article II?
- b)
- What could we now agree would be verifiable criteria with respect
to determining whether such potential ABM components are tested in an ABM mode?
With respect to question a) above, a number of possible examples come to
mind:
- i.
- Space-based continuous lasers with power greater than 10n watts or space-based pulsed lasers
with energy greater than 10p joules
per pulse.
- ii.
- Ground-based continuous lasers with power greater than 10n+y watts or ground-based pulsed
lasers with energy greater than 10p+z joules per pulse.
- iii.
- Space-based mirrors associated with directed energy systems
with an effective diameter greater than “D” or ground-based
mirrors with a diameter greater than “D”+X.
- iv.
- Other space-based and ground-based directed energy weapons
with comparable potential effectiveness.
- v.
- Space-based kinetic energy devices capable of accelerating to
a relative velocity greater than 3 kms per second.
With respect to question b) above, the sides would use an appropriate
modification of the definition of “tested in an ABM mode” as
[Page 686]
it
was defined in the 1978 Agreed Statement to the Treaty (attached).5 In addition, we would
seek reaffirmation: (1) that “subcomponents” or devices that do not have
the potential for component-level capabilities as defined above may be
tested without limitation; (2) that testing against an object in orbit
in space is not a test in an ABM mode;
and (3) that tests in space from fixed, land-based test ranges not “in
an ABM mode” are permitted, but if
these tasks are “in an ABM mode” they
would cause the components capable of substituting for ABM components involved in the test to
become “ABM components” subject to all of the treaty’s limitations on
such components.
