Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

194. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 15, 1987

SUBJECT

• Secretary Weinberger Proposes Adoption of the Broad Interpretation of the ABM Treaty to Support SDI Development

SUMMARY: The press has reported that Secretary Weinberger has told the President that agreeing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years would hurt SDI, that the U.S. could deploy an effective strategic defense by 1994. We have learned Weinberger recommended the U.S. immediately adopt the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty to facilitate development and testing of a space-based system required for the proposed defensive system. Making such a development decision now could have extremely negative effects, both politically and technologically. END SUMMARY

In a January 14 column (attached),² Evans and Novak contend that Secretary Weinberger warned the President last month that agreeing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years would result in real penalties for SDI. Evans and Novak claim that Weinberger, Adm. Crowe, and Gen. Abrahamson told the President the U.S. could deploy the first stage of a land- and space-based territorial missile shield by 1993 or 1994, using space-based kinetic kill vehicles (SBKKVs). This report has been picked up by the European press.

Sources inside SDIO inform us that Weinberger recommended the U.S. shift immediately to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty for the conduct of the SDI program and begin development of a multi-layered ABM system, containing space-based elements, that could be deployed in the 1994 timeframe. The deployment outlined by Weinberger consists of three layers, SBKKVs for boost-phase intercept and two types of ground-based interceptors for exo- and endo-atmospheric intercept.

In classified briefings during the past year, SDIO has consistently described this sort of hybrid system as the most promising near-term deployment option. It is essentially the same as the option proposed in a study by Robert Jastrow and others at the George C. Marshall Institute at the request of Sens. Wilson, Wallop, Quayle, and Reps. Courter and Kemp.

Under any interpretation of the ABM Treaty, we would be free to develop, test, and deploy up to 100 of the proposed ground-based interceptors, providing they are deployed in fixed launchers at either Grand Forks, North Dakota, or the national capital area as permitted by the Treaty. Further, under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, we could develop and test, but not deploy, space-based systems and components as long as they are based on “other physical principles (OPP).” Space-based rockets of the type envisioned for SBKKVs, however, have generally been considered as based on traditional technologies; thus, developing and testing them appears prohibited even under the broad interpretation of the Treaty.

OSD is now arguing that the sensors employed by the space-based rockets—some of which will be attached to the rockets—are based on other physical principles. Therefore, they contend SBKKVs should be considered OPP systems. Adopting this controversial assumption would permit us to develop and test, but not deploy, SBKKVs. We understand SDIO claims it could begin tests of these rockets as full components within one year of restructuring the program toward the broad interpretation.

As I pointed out in my December 19 memo,³ there are many questions, both political and technological, that will have to be answered before we adopt a course of action such as Secretary Weinberger has proposed. Politically, such a decision could have very negative effects on congressional, public, and allied support for SDI and on the prospects for reaching agreements with the Soviets on offensive arms reductions. Technologically, we need to solve several difficult problems, including mid-course discrimination necessary to support an exo-atmospheric interceptor, and we still require sophisticated battle management systems to operate the SBKKVs.

Aside from deciding whether we wish to freeze ourselves into this possibly limited set of technologies, we must also determine whether this system can meet our criteria for deployment. We are requesting that the briefing given last month to the President be promptly presented to you and other appropriate State officials. We hope we can then offer a considered judgment on the proposed system’s effectiveness, survivability, and cost effectiveness at the margin. Such judgments will be sensitive, however, to assumptions concerning how the Soviets will respond.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 NODIS and EXDIS MEMORANDUMS, Lot 94D432, 1987 Nodis Memorandums: January 1–31, 1987. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on January 14 by Jeffrey Garrison (PM/SNP) and Thomas Farr (EUR/RPM); cleared by Timbie and in PM/SNP, PM, EUR/SOY (draft), and S/ARN (draft). A stamped notation indicates Shultz saw the memorandum. Pascoe also initialed the memorandum and wrote “1/15.”
2. Attached but not printed is Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Weinberger’s SDI Move,” Washington Post, January 14, 1987, p. A23.
3. Not found.