192. Memorandum From William Tobey
and Steven Steiner of the National
Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Carlucci)1
Washington, January 14, 1987
SUBJECT
Tomorrow you will receive a briefing on OSD’s concept for near-term deployment of strategic defenses. In
brief, the architecture would consist of: a geosynchronous orbit
surveillance and tracking system; 210 lower orbit kinetic kill vehicle
satellites (each carrying 10 interceptors); up to 1000 ground-based
exoatmospheric interceptors (ERIS); and 40
ground-based space probes for tracking and guidance. The system would
provide a thin global defense, countering the attack from boost through
terminal phases. Deployments could begin as early as 1993.
The OSD estimate of cost, provided as a
“rough order of magnitude only,” is $32 to $60 billion for FY 1988–2001.
OSD maintains that in order to protect the
U.S. option to pursue these deployments,
decisions on two key policy questions must be made now: (1) the concept of
phased deployments must be endorsed; and (2) SDIO must be authorized to restructure its programs to take
advantage of the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty (LCI). Both recommendations are contained in a draft NSDD forwarded to you at Tab II. Both
recommendations raise thorny policy problems.
Phased Deployments. In abstract, the concept of a
phased deployment of strategic defenses makes perfect sense. No strategic
defense system could be deployed in full, at once. However, the draft NSDD attempts to displace our current
criteria for judging the effectiveness of a potential strategic defense
system (military effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and survivability) with
the new criterion of “whether the deployment in question is an integral part
of the whole system, onto which other phases of deployment could be added to
secure the whole system we want, namely a system that protects people and
continents not just silos or other targets.”
The President’s criteria have shielded us from criticism that SDI is destabilizing and have thus largely put
to rest the question of whether the program should be pursued at all. To
abandon the criteria directed
[Page 631]
in
NSDD 1722 could reopen
fundamental questions about the wisdom of the program itself. However,
Secretary Weinberger has never been
particularly enthusiastic about the criteria, especially cost-effectiveness,
and he has a limited but legitimate point.
NSDD 172 states that “Our
cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any deployed defensive system
would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive
arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive
capability needed to defeat them. This is much more than an economic
argument, although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider,
in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive
systems, by their nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm
them with additional offensive capability while other systems can discourage
such a counter effort.”
SecDef is worried that this criterion
will be used to defeat any deployment plan because initial deployments have
fixed costs which do not fit easily into a comparison of the cost of a
particular interceptor vs. the cost of an additional warhead. This concern
is legitimate. At the same time, abandoning this criterion would leave us
open to the criticism that we will encourage the Soviets to proliferate
their offensive forces.
We have brokered an uneasy compromise on this issue by stressing that this is
much more than an economic concept and deleting references to specific cost
comparisons in policy guidance. At some point this may need to be elaborated
in a new NSDD, but we believe it would
severely damage the SDI program politically
to drop the criterion completely. We will need to avoid a simple comparison
of U.S. interceptor vs. Soviet warhead
costs.
SecDef has been less critical of the
survivability criterion, but we have serious questions about whether or not
it can be met by the concept proposed by osD. After the briefing to the
President,3
OSD was tasked to do several papers,
including one on how the system would be made survivable. Their response (on
half a page) was disappointing.4 Essentially, it argues that the 32 Soviet GALOSH ABM interceptors and 20 Soviet ASAT interceptors pose only a limited threat
to the 220 satellite defense constellation which DOD proposes. Unfortunately, the paper leaves unanalyzed the
threat posed by ballistic missiles (which can be reprogrammed to attack
targets in orbit), GALOSH reloads (a concern raised in our compliance
report),5 and
even the large laser at
[Page 632]
Sary
Shagan (which has been judged to have possible ASAT capability). These systems could be used to punch a hole
in our defense as it orbits the earth. More work will have to be done by
OSD on this question.
Legally Correct Interpretation (LCI). The LCI
would permit development and testing of ABM
systems and components that are not fixed, ground-based, if they are based
on “other physical principles,” e.g. lasers. The SDI program was originally structured to permit it to achieve
its objectives while remaining consistent with a more narrow interpretation
of the ABM Treaty. This being the case, in
October 1985, while reserving the right to move to the LCI, the President directed that the program
not be restructured toward the boundaries of the ABM Treaty which the U.S. could
legally observe.
The President also directed that OSD provide
quarterly reports, beginning in December 1985, of financial and program
costs associated with adhering to the more narrow interpretation of the
Treaty. To date, we have received no reports.
OSD is now arguing that to preserve the
option of a near-term deployment, we must move immediately to the LCI. They state that this is necessary to
begin planning for proof of principle experiments for the following systems:
Space-based Kinetic Kill Vehicles (FY 88
experiment); Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (FY 92 experiment); Airborne Optical System (FY 89 experiment); and Long Wave Infra-red
Probe (FY 92 experiment).
We must balance the threat of incurring Congressional intervention against
the cost of delaying these experiments. Senator Levin and others intend to
attempt to legislate compliance with the narrow interpretation. We are now
in a position to rebut such an attempt by arguing that: we are currently in
compliance with the narrow interpretation; there is no practical problem to
be addressed; and intervention by Congress will damage our leverage in
Geneva.
Moreover, even if we successfully resist attempts to legislate the narrow
interpretation, restructuring would create obvious targets for opponents to
cut out of the budget. We would highlight for opponents of SDI those cuts that would hurt us most.
This is not to say that we should not move to the LCI, but rather means that there will be real costs and risks
which must be weighed against the costs of continuing to adhere to the more
restrictive interpretation.
Conclusion. We believe the OSD concept is constructive, but much work remains to be done.
A premature decision on SecDef’s
specific deployment proposals could dangerously undermine support for SDI. Nonetheless, endorsement of the general
concept of phased deployments may add impetus and focus to the program. At
Tab I is a list of
[Page 633]
questions you
may wish to bear in mind during the briefing.6 Clearly, the issue first must be discussed further in
the interagency community. We stand by our plan submitted to you on January
12, recommending interagency follow-up and eventually a new NSDD.7
Bob Linhard and Bill Cockell concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you bear in mind the questions at Tab I during the briefing.8
Tab I
Paper Prepared in the National Security Council9
Washington, January 15, 1987
Questions for SDI Briefing
- —
- General: We clearly want to move as fast as
possible in SDI, but we need to
make sure we put together our proposed first moves in a way that
will get us what we need. Above all, are we sure that the plan you
present gives the needed attention to the criteria which the
President established for judging our research: military
effectiveness, cost effectiveness and survivability?
- —
- Survivability: I am worried about
survivability. From your briefing and from the short paper you gave
us, it does not appear that this has been adequately addressed. We
are certain to get hard questions from Congress on the survivability
of our proposed space-based platforms. Do we have good answers
yet?
- —
- Cost Effectiveness: Also, we will need to
show, at least in military terms, how this meets the President’s
criterion of cost effectiveness. At a minimum, we will need to make
the best case to Congress that we are not providing clear incentives
to the Soviets to proliferate their offense.
- —
- Legally Correct Interpretation (LCI): Another potentially major
problem is the treaty question. We haven’t received the quarterly
reports which the President requested in 1985, when he made his
decision on the legally correct interpretation. Since some of the
experiments
[Page 634]
required for
this system would not occur until FY
1992, why is it necessary to move to LCI now?
- —
- Budget: I have some questions on the
budgetary aspects too. How much would it cost if the President wants
to move on this proposal? Over how many years? When would we need
increases over the amounts we had planned to request for SDI, and how much? What would the
effect be on the need to continue other basic research to reach the
President’s objective of fully comprehensive defenses?
- —
- Heavy Lift-launch Vehicle (HLV): While I agree on the need for an
HLV and that it should be
within SDI initially, it is not
clear to me how long it should stay within the SDI program. At what point would we
have funding requirements that could affect adversely other parts of
the SDI program? Should we perhaps
be working toward eventually pursuing it as a separate program, led
by DOD but in cooperation with
NASA and the private
sector?
- —
- Political Management: As you know, this is
a very delicate issue, and one which requires further work with
other agencies before the President has what he needs to make a
decision. We therefore need to cut off the press play on this issue
and work it quietly within the Administration so that all of the
President’s options are fully protected.
Tab II
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Carlucci)10
Washington, January 13, 1987
SUBJECT
- The ABM Treaty and the Phased
Deployment of Strategic Defenses (U)
(S) On 17 December, I briefed the
President on the phased deployment of strategic defenses. During that
briefing I emphasized that our research has advanced technology much
faster than political roadblocks have been cleared away. Consequently, I
recommended that we adopt the legally correct interpretation of the
ABM Treaty and that we take steps
to preserve the ability to deploy the first phase of advanced strategic
defenses, including beginning work on a heavy lift launch vehicle.
[Page 635]
(S) My view is that the decisions
necessary to support a deployed system in the mid-1990’s, especially
with regard to the ABM Treaty, must be
taken in early 1987. In the immediate future, we are facing several
deadlines concerning reports to Congress that can only be properly
prepared if the decisions I am recommending have been taken. Of
particular importance in this regard are our annual report on compliance
of SDI with the ABM Treaty which is due by 1 February; a
report on the effect of ABM Treaty
interpretation also due by 1 February; and a report on near-term
strategic defense deployment options due by 15 March. I believe it is
imperative that we have the necessary Presidential guidance correcting
our programmatic approach under the ABM
Treaty and clarifying our commitment to a phased deployment of strategic
defenses prior to submitting these reports.
(S) I understand that a briefing to you of
the information presented to the President has been scheduled for 15
January. In the interest of streamlining the consideration of these
vital issues and the translation of decisions arising therefrom into an
NSDD, I am enclosing a draft of
such a document for your review. Following your receipt of this briefing
I suggest that you and I get together with Secretary Shultz immediately upon his return to
expedite addressal of these issues by the President. I believe all this
is particularly timely now, in view of all the testimony we have to
give, and our conversations on this subject the past few days.
Enclosure
Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense11
DRAFT NSDD
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
I. Introduction
The basic objectives of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) since the program was initiated are
still appropriate. SDI is a research,
development and testing program examining means to provide an effective
defense of the United States and its allies from attack by nuclear
ballistic
[Page 636]
missiles. The
defenses we seek in the long term would be sufficiently effective to
make such missiles impotent and obsolete.
The SDI program continues to be carried
out consistent with all U.S. arms
control obligations. The program has made major progress in examining
the technical approaches to strategic defense. In fact, the program has
reached the point where we must now begin to identify specific means to
achieve our long term goal for strategic defense. Such means must also
support our approach to strategic arms control with the Soviet
Union.
II. SDI and the
ABM Treaty
In October 1985 I directed that, as a matter of policy, SDI be carried out consistent with an
interpretation of the ABM Treaty that
is more restrictive than is our legal right under the Treaty. It was
clear at that time that the United States retained the right to alter
that policy in order to restructure the SDI program towards the boundaries of the Treaty which the
United States could observe.
I am now concerned about the effect of that unilateral restraint on the
fruits of SDI. The schedule of the
program, its cost, and the breadth of technical approaches being
examined in it are all becoming increasingly affected by that restraint.
We must have an affordable SDI program
to examine all of the technologies relevant to effective defense, and
the program must be able to support a decision concerning possible
deployment of defenses in a timely manner. In particular, this nation’s
security demands that we not be in a position where the Soviet Union
could consider unilateral deployment of large scale, very effective
strategic defenses before the United States reached that point.
In order to avoid such a situation, we cannot continue to abide by a more
restrictive standard under the ABM
Treaty than is our legal obligation. Accordingly, I am directing that
the Secretary of Defense may restructure the SDI program. This restructured program is to remain
consistent with our legal obligations under the ABM Treaty, but, as the Secretary deems appropriate, it may
take advantage of all our legal rights under that Treaty.
III. Phased Deployment of Defense Against
Ballistic Missiles
Defenses that would render nuclear ballistic missiles impotent and
obsolete cannot be put into service quickly. It is important to begin
now to identify a specific, practical approach to deployment of
defenses, an approach that would maintain—and seek to enhance—stability
during the phasing in of defenses. Our criterion for judging whether a
particular defense would be appropriate for deployment is whether the
deployment is part of the entire system, that is whether the deployment
[Page 637]
in question is an integral
part of the whole system, onto which other phases of deployment could be
added to secure the whole system we want, namely a system that protects
people and continents not just silos or other targets.
Phased deployment is an integral part of the whole system would provide
some benefits of defense before the remaining phases would become
available. In addition, phased deployment can support the United States
arms control objectives. If we were to demonstrate a resolve to proceed
with a phased deployment of defenses, we would create additional
incentive for the Soviet Union to join us in a cooperative transition to
defenses. In particular, the Soviets would be more likely to reduce
strategic offensive arms substantially, given such a U.S. decision. Phased deployment would also
provide an active defense deployment program, which would give the
United States a viable response to possible Soviet arms control
breakout. Such a U.S. posture would
significantly enhance deterrence against such Soviet breakout.
The Secretary of Defense should consider such a phased deployment of
defenses against nuclear ballistic missiles to be the baseline for
planning a possible future deployment. The Secretary should define a
specific phased deployment program and should provide that program for
my consideration by March 31, 1987.
IV. Other Policy Considerations
The redirection of the SDI program to
take advantage of all our rights under legally correct construction of
the ABM Treaty, and to use phased
deployment as a planning baseline for possible future defense deployment
does not alter our arms control objectives of seeking to facilitate
deployment of the full strategic defense system and of seeking Soviet
agreement to a cooperative transition to defenses. Similarly, it also
does not change our commitment to consult with our allies as we proceed
with deployment.
