Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

180. Minutes of a Presidential Briefing¹

Washington, December 17, 1986, 11 a.m.–noon

SECRETARY WEINBERGER’S BRIEFING ON SDI

SUBJECT

• DOD Briefing on SDI

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• DOD:

  • Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
  • Under Secretary Richard Godwin
  • Assistant Secretary Richard N. Perle
  • SDIO Director Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.

• OMB:

  • Mr. L. Wayne Arny

• JCS:

  • Admiral William J. Crowe

• OSTP:

  • Dr. William Graham

• White House:

  • Mr. Donald T. Regan
  • Dr. Alton G. Keel, Jr.

• NSC:

  • Adm. William A. Cockell
  • Col. Robert E. Linhard
  • Mr. Steven E. Steiner

MINUTES

Dr. Keel opened the meeting by informing the President that Secretary Weinberger and his staff had been working very hard in studying various SDI deployment options and wished to brief him on their conclusions thus far.

Secretary Weinberger stated that the program has been proceeding very well and that we are far ahead of our expectations of a year or two ago. He said that we are at the point where it is essential to move to the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He said he wished to present to the President a proposal for phased SDI deployments which would work toward the President’s objective of full population protection.

The Secretary said he remains negative toward deployment of traditional systems designed exclusively to protect military sites and communications centers. He recommends instead a first generation defense which will begin to build a structure which will protect whole continents. This first step will require only an extension and increase of what we are already able to do technologically.

The Secretary expressed his concern over the impact of keeping the U.S. within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He expressed the view that if we continue to limit the program in this way, it will slow our progress and discourage Congress from providing the needed funding. He applauded the President’s rejection of Gorbachev’s efforts in Iceland to kill SDI, and cautioned that this Soviet effort will continue to come back at us in various forms.

General Abrahamson then briefed the President on the proposed deployment plan. He emphasized that it is logical to move toward our final goal of comprehensive defenses incrementally. He said we can deploy a first generation defense as early as 1993 if we are provided with adequate resources. This would not include the most advanced technologies, such as lasers, which will not be ready until the second or third generation of deployments. He said that we should look at phased deployments in terms of how many incoming Soviet warheads they could destroy. The deployment of the maximum one hundred interceptors permitted by the ABM Treaty would not make sense, as this could destroy only tens of incoming warheads. We are looking instead for a starting point which will give us the ability to destroy hundreds and to interfere with the timing and attack plans of Soviet military planners. This would consist of both space-based kinetic kill vehicles (SBKKVs) and ground-based systems, both of which would constitute area defenses which could protect both population and military targets.

Our second generation deployments would build on this by adding to the thickness and robustness of these systems and providing some advanced technological capabilities. This would be designed to create sufficient uncertainty so that Soviet military planners could not be confident of achieving their objective through aggression.

The General stated that DOD had studied the question of even earlier deployments such as the light area defense over much of the U.S. which could be provided by the ERIS system (Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor System). However, this would cost $5–6B and would not make a major contribution. What we seek instead is a combination of space-based systems complemented by targeting satellites, along with a ground-based system such as ERIS.

The General said that in order to provide the needed space lift capability, DOD has plans to develop a large booster similar to that which the Soviets already have on the launch pad. He said that approximately 150,000 pounds of lift capability would be needed. Dr. Graham added that such a booster would give significant benefit to the civilian space program as well.

General Abrahamson continued by stating that DOD envisions a third generation of deployments occurring near the end of this century which would move us even closer toward the President’s objectives. He stressed that the advantage of this phased approach would be that we could watch step-by-step how the Soviets try to counter our actions and in the end may not need to deploy systems as extensive as now envisioned. This may save money in the final analysis.

Assistant Secretary Perle then provided to the President the background of the ABM Treaty negotiations, emphasizing that the negotiations focused on the Soviet effort to limit our freedom to deploy defenses and the U.S. effort to cut offensive levels. As a result, with the Treaty limit of 100 interceptors the U.S. decided that this was too modest a defense to maintain.

Mr. Perle said that the interpretation of the Treaty given by our negotiators at that time remained in place until after the President began the SDI program. A rigorous review of the negotiating record then revealed that there was considerable U.S.-Soviet disagreement on what should be permitted in regard to systems based on “other physical principals” (OPP). The Soviet Union said it would not accept limits on future systems which could not then be defined. The Soviets clearly wanted to protect future technologies and therefore insisted on addressing this issue in an Agreed Statement rather than in the Treaty proper. Further, the language of Agreed Statement D contemplates the creation of future systems and stipulates that any limits on them in regard to research, development and testing would have to be discussed and agreed. He noted to the President that systems based on OPP are a major part of the U.S. program, and he stated that it would be extremely difficult to meet the timetable presented by General Abrahamson if we stayed within the restrictive Treaty interpretation.

Mr. Perle emphasized that staying within the restrictive interpretation would require us to withdraw from the Treaty in order to test. He expressed doubt that Congress would support such a move for testing systems that might not work out, as opposed to doing it for the purpose of deploying systems which have been successfully tested. A second problem, which will grow more serious over time, is that in order to stay within the restrictive interpretation we have been instructing our program managers to degrade the performance of components which are being tested so that they are not capable of serving as components of ABM systems. Mr. Perle said this is placing a technical and a political burden on the program and is likely to incur increasing criticism in Congress as a “sharp practice” designed to evade the Treaty. It also slows the program and makes it more expensive.

Mr. Perle noted that State Department Legal Advisor Sofaer and DOD Counsel are in full agreement on the legally correct interpretation, and he expressed the view that we can withstand any challenge to it. He therefore urged that the President pave the way for his successor by moving to the legal interpretation during his Administration.

Secretary Weinberger said there are numerous additional things we could do short of deployment if we move to this interpretation. He said that abrogation of the ABM Treaty would not concern him as he feels the Treaty was a mistake, but this would admittedly cause political problems. The answer therefore is to move to the legal interpretation.

The Vice President asked if we would have to discuss this with the Soviets and get their agreement prior to making such a move. Secretary Weinberger responded that this is not necessary, as only the question of restrictions on OPP short of deployment would have to be discussed and agreed. He added that we need to make this move in 1988 if we are to carry through on the proposed deployment plan, and said the SDI program is already being slowed by the restrictive interpretation.

General Abrahamson said that political problems such as this, along with funding cuts, have slowed the program rather than technological barriers. He said the technologies which we would wish to deploy in the first generation do not involve high risk technically. He emphasized that we are planning tests now which make it urgent to move to the legal interpretation, as Congress would likely be pressing us on Treaty questions in regard to these tests.

Finally, General Abrahamson stressed that although his organization has been doing war-gaming on the value of partial defenses leading to full defenses, this is subject to additional thinking by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He indicated that while the military principles make sense, additional work is necessary. He believes, however, that if we can show Congress that we have come up with bridging steps toward out ultimate goals, this would gain additional support for the program.

Secretary Weinberger stressed that it was the Soviets who favored the weaker restrictions on OPP contained in Agreed Statement D, not the U.S. He said Soviet programs are proceeding apace in secrecy, and he offered the President another briefing in this regard.

The Secretary said DOD is seeking a supplemental in FY87 for some of the funds which have been cut. He stressed the program is now moving more rapidly than expected and that if the President approves the DOD proposal for early deployments, we can focus now on the first generation and on the launch vehicle while continuing our research.

The President asked how this plan would affect the commitments which he made at Reykjavik and earlier concerning the elimination of ballistic missiles and the concept of sharing the benefits of strategic defense, to show that we do not intend to achieve a first strike capability. The Secretary responded that the Soviets have rejected this. The President said that in regard to sharing the Soviets said that they did not believe that we would do this.

Dr. Keel noted that this plan raises a number of political, technical and arms control questions which could require adjusting our Reykjavik proposal. Secretary Weinberger responded that a rejected offer is one that has ended. Assistant Secretary Perle said we would not need to change our proposal and could simply move forward in the program as we wish as long as the Soviets have not agreed to that proposal. Secretary Weinberger stressed once again how fast the Soviets are working on their own strategic defenses.

The Vice President asked if we knew Soviet intentions concerning their heavy lift capability. General Abrahamson said that we have an idea of their capability, but are not sure of their intentions. He noted that the Soviet vehicle could be used for strategic defense systems, but their space-based strategic defense programs probably are not as far along as the Soviets would like, particularly due to their computer dependency. He said our own work on a vehicle would be a helpful signal which would still give us flexibility in arms control.

Mr. Godwin said our vehicle would involve an engineering jump. General Abrahamson agreed, but said it is achievable and that the real need is to bring down the cost.

Mr. Regan asked the additional cost of the DOD phased deployment plan and of the launch capability. General Abrahamson responded that the first phase deployments would cost an estimated $40–50B. Secretary Weinberger noted this is the approximate cost of the small ICBM. Mr. Regan asked if this included the heavy launch vehicle and the General said that it does. Secretary Weinberger stressed that these costs would be stretched over a number of years.

Mr. Regan asked when these costs would go into the budget. Secretary Weinberger replied that 300 million of the 500 million dollar supplemental already requested by DOD would be applied to work on the heavy launch vehicle. He said we would not seek a further program increase in the two year budget for 1988–89. General Abrahamson noted we would change our priorities to stay within this budget. Secretary Weinberger said we need the SDI supplemental in any case. General Abrahamson noted that during the last two years we have lost through cuts 26% and 32%, respectively, of our SDI budget, which will require us to restructure the program to get support at the levels required.

Admiral Crowe emphasized that the heavy lift capability will give the U.S. benefits well beyond SDI. Mr. Regan asked how long it would take to have the vehicle ready and whether it would be funded entirely by DOD. General Abrahamson said it would take seven years, and Secretary Weinberger said it would be part of the SDI budget. Mr. Regan asked whether we could share the project with NASA and the private sector. The Secretary said he would be delighted to try to do this, and noted that Mr. Godwin would work with the private sector. Dr. Graham added that the technologies involved in the shuttle program would give us this capability in less than seven years.

In closing the meeting, Dr. Keel stated that we would work with DOD to explore these issues further and would then be back in touch with the President.

1. Source: Reagan Library, William Cockell Files, Subject File, SDI (5). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Steiner. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. In a personal diary entry for December 17, Reagan wrote: “Cap W. came by for a meeting in the situation room. It was an update on S.D.I. and a proposal that we deploy partially about 1993—not the finished system but 2 stages that will give us a partial defense but more important valuable information for completing the system. There are some problems but I’m inclined to go forward with it.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 669)