191. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Some Post-Iceland Thoughts on Technology and Strategic Doctrine
Several months ago when the President came home from Iceland there was a certain feeling of euphoria that stemmed from the notion that it might really be possible to reach an agreement to eliminate all ballistic missiles over a 10 year period. At that time, I started this memo [Page 628] for John Poindexter to make sure John was aware of how long it takes technology to mature in certain areas.
John is gone now, and I was sidetracked by all the effort I had to put into the Peacekeeper/SICBM issue. Reading it again in retrospect, however, it still strikes me as a useful paper on what is or is not achievable in 10 years. I submit it to you as background for the more detailed work done by the JCS.
First, it is important to remember how incredibly short 10 years is in terms of our ability to develop new systems and new doctrines. It took us eight years to develop and deploy SENIOR TREND and that was an extraordinary achievement. The ATB will take us 15 years if we’re lucky (they already want to extend it a year). The ATF will end up taking that long or more, the Tomahawk and the ALCM about 12 years. It’s important that this lead-time not be underestimated—especially if we have the idea in mind of balancing existing Soviet defenses against future U.S. achievements in the technologies of air power. Thus, it may be important that we move now to initiate certain thrusts of technology or turn up the heat where work has already been started. Air defense is an example of an area where we are very short of resources.
Looking first at the offense, one of the aspects of a world without ballistic missiles that strikes me as most pervasive is that we will need to move away from the spasm type analysis that we have become used to and move towards a concept that is more like the analysis of tactical warfare than the present way we look at strategic capabilities. We will have to judge the capabilities of both sides in manner more like we did in the 40’s and 50’s than like we do today. Bombers will have to be measured realistically in terms of their contribution to air power than in terms of the loads they can carry in a single strike.
Since bombers can be reused, and the technologies of speed, Stealth and deception can reasonably be expected to keep pace with opposing technologies of defense, the concept of the strategic air battle will once more become more pertinent. We will need to develop systems that allow the air commanders to interact in such a way that the offense can be controlled to counter the moves of the defense. Old notions of mass and saturation will again become important and the days of preplanned missions carried out like some rigid computer game will end. Clearly, this will generate the need for systems like airborne command posts, long range fighters that might be manned or unmanned to engage the enemy on his own turf, hypersonic systems, massive use of mechanical, optic, and electronic Stealth, and a new generation of C3 and intelligence systems that operate at speeds and logic densities comparable with those required for SDI.
Armament will also have to be updated. Changes here will range from simple projects already under way like SRAM II to newer cruise [Page 629] missiles that have longer range and better accuracies. Longer range brings forth the concept of stand-off systems like cruise missile carriers and, of course, intercontinental cruise missiles or indeed whole bombers loaded with cruise missiles and SRAMs that have no humans on board (such a notion is well within the present state of the art).
On the defense side of the equation, changes will be equally dramatic, perhaps more so for us than the Soviets. We will have to rapidly adjust our priorities. In FY 1986 we spent over $3B on SDI and only $50M on air defense. This will have to change and change quickly.
We will have to immediately start a program to produce a modern interceptor aircraft and a much more robust development for systems that can get to the Soviet bombers fast—like hypervelocity unmanned interceptors. Our sensor technology programs will have to be expanded and improved, and new radars or other types of sensors deployed as soon as possible, to offset the inevitable Soviet transition towards Stealth. Many of these changes are evolutionary and some are underway already, but they will not be reflected in hardware by 1996.
Because of the time required to deploy these new technologies, the world we would most probably see in 1996 if we went to zero ballistic missiles would not be a revolutionary change from what we know today.
We could have a significantly bigger force of B–1B Bombers and we could have a large number of stealthy cruise missiles and SRAM II’s, but we would not have many more ATBs than we now have planned without significantly increasing the risk in the ATB program. Further, given the problems with the B–1B, it’s not at all clear that the extra B–1Bs we could buy would be a good investment.
On the defense side, our defenses would be primarily based on an early deployment of SDI options and existing systems like the F–15E and the AWACS. A new interceptor would not be available by 1996 nor will the ATF be available in numbers. If we decided to develop a new ground-to- air missile, it would probably be in its operational test phase by the mid-1990’s.
The bottom line of all of this is that technology can lead us toward stability in a world without ballistic missiles, but not within 10 years. We would probably need more like 15 to 20 years to make our strong suit felt in a way that would approach the stability that now emanates from the triad that exists on both sides of the strategic balance.
Bill Cockell concurs.2
- Source: Reagan Library, W Files, Box WI–18, Special Programs 1987. Top Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates Carlucci saw the memorandum. Carlucci wrote in the upper right-hand margin of the memorandum: “John—Interesting. Thanks. FC.”↩
- Cockell wrote below this sentence: “The Chiefs’ reply to NSDD–250 should shed light on many of these, & other important areas.”↩