Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

182. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel) to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 18, 1986

SUBJECT

• Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missiles

Issue

To respond to the initial input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles.

Facts

In NSDD–250² you tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense, to develop a plan which would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, should the Soviets prove willing to join us in such an agreement. The initial JCS report has been received; a final report will be provided by January 31, 1987. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will discuss the subject at their planned December 19 meeting with you.

Discussion

The initial JCS report (Tab B)³ covers the assumptions and methodology to be used in the final report. The initial report makes no recommendations. A synopsis of the key points raised by the JCS is at Tab A.

Generally the JCS report is a sound approach to a complex issue, There are, however, several areas of possible concern:

— The JCS assume that the Soviets will retain their hard-target kill ICBMs as long as possible and imply this may present unacceptable risk. If the final analysis confirms such a risk, they should be tasked to provide recommendations on arms control measures which would result in a safer phasing of reductions.

— The JCS are using a narrow interpretation of your guidance in NSDD–250 not to increase risks to the United States. They have chosen to define this guidance as requiring the same quantitative damage be inflicted on the Soviet Union by our strategic offensive forces in the future as can be inflicted today. Using this criteria will invariably drive the analysis in the direction of numerical measures of merit, which, while important aides to judgment, must not replace the considered military judgment of the JCS. In particular it will be important to ensure that the analysis does not overlook the great improvements in deterrence which will be achieved by increasing Soviet uncertainty that they can conduct a successful attack.

— The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that, in a world without ballistic missiles, the guidance provided in NSDD–13 on the priority used to allocate weapons to the target base should be reevaluated. Their specific recommendations should be requested.

— The JCS elected to use levels for fiscal guidance which they (and we) believe to be overly optimistic. Alternate, more realistic levels are available; their use should be directed.

— The preliminary JCS report indicates a heavy dependence on sea-launched cruise missiles to replace some of the capability lost through the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. Given this, the final JCS report should consider what arms control restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles are advantageous as part of the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles. We are committed with the Soviets to seeking a solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles; we must understand the relationship between such a solution and the military sufficiency of our strategic forces in a world without ballistic missiles.

Once you have reviewed the synopsis at Tab A and heard the JCS discussion on December 19, I will, in your name, provide a response to the JCS initial report, making the points above.

Recommendation

OK NO

____ ____ That you review the synopsis at Tab A and skim the report at Tab B.⁴

____ ____ That after you meet with the JCS, you authorize me to respond in your name, approving the initial report subject to the comments noted above.⁵

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

SYNOPSIS OF JCS INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT

Basic Planning Assumptions. The basic purpose of the study is to determine those U.S. military forces which will permit a safe transition to a world without U.S. or Soviet ballistic missiles. The study makes the following general assumptions:

— U.S. arms control proposals presently on the table are accepted.

— The currently projected real growth in DOD spending actually occurs. The JCS note that this is overly optimistic and will bias the study toward favorable results.

— Soviet war aims remain unchanged. To meet their strategic nuclear war aims the Soviets will retain ICBMs as long as possible. In addition, by 1996 the Soviets could have 450–500 bombers, up to 1750 sea-launched cruise missiles, and improved air defense.

— Soviet military strategy (which views domination of the Eurasian land mass as central) will not change. Eliminating ballistic missiles will stress Soviet theater air forces; there is no good substitute for Soviet short range ballistic missiles.

— The Soviet target base (i.e. the targets the United States must hold at risk for deterrence) will be roughly comparable to today, with the exception of ICBMs.

United States National Strategy to 1996 and Beyond. The study assumes the U.S. National Security Strategy will remain as set forth in NSDD–238.⁷ The initial report summarizes and restates the importance of deterrence and the need to maintain strong military forces. It makes the following assumptions and observations:

— [less than 1 line not declassified] sea-launched cruise missiles on dedicated submarines will be included in the SIOP and in NATO nuclear strike plans.

— The alert rate of strategic forces will decrease as ICBMs (which have the highest alert rate) are eliminated.

— The reduction of the ballistic missile threat from the Soviet Union will largely offset our loss of ballistic missile capability. Some employment policies will need to change, however. [2½ lines not declassified]

— Escalation control options will be more difficult without ballistic missiles; stealthy systems may fill this gap.

— It will be essential to have a multiplicity of strategic/nuclear systems (different bombers, air-and sea-launched cruise missiles on a variety of platforms) to prevent the Soviets from being able to concentrate on a single aspect of our strategic forces.

— Large, pre-planned attack options (like today’s SIOP) will still be required, although existing target allocation priorities should be reevaluated.

— The need to employ sea-launched cruise missiles near the USSR could alter naval strategy.

— Effective defensive systems will be essential and must themselves be defended.

— The essential NATO strategy will remain unchanged. Since NATO now relies on nuclear weapons to deter chemical attack, reduction in non-strategic nuclear forces could weaken such deterrence.

— The period of transition to a ballistic missile-free world will require especial care.

Analytical Methodology. The analysis will use military judgement along with mathematical modeling. To comply with instructions in NSDD–250 to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, the capability of forces proposed in the study will be measured against the capability of [less than 1 line not declassified] (today’s strategic nuclear war plan). Specific analytical assumptions for strategic systems and non strategic nuclear forces are attached. A separate annex will deal with the contribution from highly compartmented programs such as stealth.

Completion. A baseline analysis will be submitted on 31 January. This will continue the current targeting policy set forth in NSDD–13 and will hold overall risk levels constant.⁸ Excursions and alternatives will be submitted subsequently if required.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Michael Donley Files, Subject File, [Joint Chiefs of Staff] JCS Meeting with the President 12/19/86. Top Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on December 19. Keel wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Mr. President, If time permits, you may want to glance at this before your meeting with Chiefs. Al.”
2. See Document 152.
3. Not found attached.
4. Reagan did not indicate a preference.
5. Reagan approved the recommendation. An unknown hand underlined “authorize me to respond in your name, approving the initial report subject to the comments noted above,” drew a box around the recommendation and Reagan’s initials, and drew an asterisk in the left-hand margin beside the box.
6. Top Secret.
7. NSDD–238, “Basic National Security Strategy,” September 2, 1986, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, pt. 2, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.
8. NSDD–13, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” October 19, 1981, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.