Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

183. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, December 19, 1986, 11 a.m.–noon

JCS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT

• Regular JCS Quarterly Meeting with the President.
• Topics Discussed: NSDI–250 re elimination of ballistic missiles; JCS Exercise Program

PARTICIPANTS

• White House

  • The President
  • Alton G. Keel

• Defense

  • Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
  • Deputy Secretary William H. Taft, IV

• JCS

  • Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman
  • Admiral Carlisle P. H. Trost
  • General Larry D. Welch
  • General Paul X. Kelley
  • General John A. Wickham
  • Major James T. Conway, USMC

• NSC

  • Rodney B. McDaniel
  • Michael Donley
  • William Cockell
  • Robert E. Linhard

• Other

  • Sam Watson (Office of the Vice President)

Minutes

The President opened the meeting at 11:10 a.m.

Admiral Crowe began by describing the tasks and schedule laid out in NSDD–250, indicating that a world without ballistic missiles would present genuine challenges. He first described how this might affect the balance of forces in Europe.

The Chiefs believe the zero-zero INF proposal for Europe “has great promise,” and they are flexible on the manner in which this might be achieved. However, a continuing draw-down into SRINF/NSNF would present problems and would have to be worked very carefully with Europeans. [2½ lines not declassified] Verification would continue to be problematic in such a regime.

Admiral Crowe indicated that a 50 percent reduction of strategic forces in five years would not jeopardize our deterrent and would be strongly supported by our allies; although negotiation of sublimits, and verification, would be thorny.

However, moving to zero ballistic missiles within ten years is a completely different challenge, “requiring us to adjust our thinking in every area”: nuclear weapons policy; fiscal projections; Soviet force structure and strategy; new technology; and the role of NATO in 1996. The intel community has been very cooperative in these areas.

[3 lines not declassified] In response, “to maintain the same level of deterrence we have today,” we would need to do four things: strengthen and modernize the remaining deterrent forces (particularly air-breathing systems); improve conventional forces; examine new defenses; and continue to emphasize alliances.

Crowe turned to General Welch, who reviewed bomber penetration issues from both offensive and defensive perspectives. Welch began by nothing that we [1½ lines not declassified] Welch indicated that, in a zero ballistic missile regime, to penetrate Soviet defenses would require more US SLCMs, ALCMs, and ATBs, costing “tens of billions” of dollars. Similarly, the JCS would expect the Soviet offense to evolve in a similar fashion, requiring greater US investment in defenses (aircraft, missiles, and tankers)—again on the order of “tens of billions” of dollars.

Admiral Crowe noted the naval picture would also change, and turned to ADM Trost. Admiral Trost noted that much of the Soviet SSN force is devoted to protecting bastions for SSBNs. Thus, a zero ballistic missile regime would free-up Soviet SSNs for other missions. Overall the Soviets still lack carrier-based air and at-sea sustaining capabilities; but their open-ocean capabilities and ability to influence crises would increase. Trost also focused on the dramatic changes expected in the ASW picture. The Soviets would operate SSGNs closer to the US, so US land-based air defenses and ASW alert rates “would go way up.” At the same time, Trost noted, the Soviet ASW problem would become easier as the US would have to concentrate SSGN/SLCM assets closer to Soviet coasts.

General Wickham then assessed the additional requirements for ground forces. He noted that the current modernization program for ground forces is only about 30 percent complete and that, to be completed with the ten-year transition period, it would have to be accelerated at an estimated cost of $180 billion. To emphasize the scope of the challenge, he noted that a single week of combat sustainability for the Army costs about $14 billion and that our current sustainability of about 6 weeks in Europe needs to be doubled. In addition, the current Army force structure is short 200,000 billets. Wickham noted that the Allies may or may not have the will to join us in this effort—even though they can afford to do so; and that the Soviets may also choose to significantly strengthen their conventional capabilities.

General Kelley wrapped up the conventional force analysis in a regional context. Kelley noted that up to now, extended deterrence of the “nuclear umbrella” has “really depended on ballistic missiles.” Any premature shift away from ballistic missiles would stress both conventional capabilities and regional balances. He was not sure we could really implement the necessary force improvements outlined by the other Chiefs.

Admiral Crowe concluded by outlining the four things that would have to be done (as listed above) and stressing the downsides of cost and verification. The upsides, however, were that the Reykjavik proposals brought the arms control process into sharper focus, making US citizens and Allies look carefully and realistically at the prospect of real reductions in strategic weapons.

The President responded by assuring the Chiefs he is not “living in a dream world.” He noted the economic potential of the US and its Allies if there is a will to act; and suggested the Soviets have their own economic problems: “The Soviets fear an arms race which they would lose.” The President said he was focusing on ballistic missiles because of their destabilizing characteristics; but recognizes that none of this can come about without realistic verification.

The President noted that “at the end of Reykjavik we were talking ballistics, and they [the Soviets] brought up the idea of all nuclear weapons.” The President said he recently told Prime Minister Thatcher that before ballistic missiles are eliminated, we would have to begin serious negotiations on chemical and conventional reductions to ensure we wouldn’t be placed in an inferior position.

The President said we needed to go through with this so that the Soviets can see we are serious: “They have a choice—join us in arms reduction or lose an arms race. We will not allow Soviet superiority to develop.”

Secretary Weinberger asserted that the first step should be a 50 percent strategic missile reduction in five years; all the rest (zero ballistics, etc.) would pose problems. He noted that while we have the resources to move towards conventional emphasis, we don’t have the will (i.e., “We don’t have the votes”). But while the Soviets don’t have the overall resources, they can make up for this through their determination to make further sacrifices. The President agreed that the conditions essential to the US proposal for the second five years had been changed due to the Soviet proposal.

There followed general discussion about how best to measure economic sacrifices (GNP, per capita GNP, etc.). The President noted that the Soviets have an increasingly cynical and restive population owing to their lower standard of living. Admiral Crowe picked up on this theme by noting the importance of high quality and motivated personnel for the armed forces.

Discussion of NSDD–250 concluded at 11:45 a.m.

JCS Exercise Program

Admiral Crowe stressed the importance of the worldwide exercise program as an adjunct to US foreign policy, strengthening war planning, Allied interoperability and politico-military relations. For a cost of $400 million in FY85, the exercise program involved 45 countries and the joint training of 1.1 million US and 3.3 million Allied servicemen. Crowe summarized the exercise program for Northern and Central Europe, focusing on maritime/amphibious exercises in Norway and Denmark and the REFORGER and AUTUMN FORGE series.

General Wickham discussed the DISPLAY DETERMINATION series on NATO’s Southern Flank and the BRIGHT STAR series in Northeast Africa. General Kelley followed with a brief outline of minor exercises with Gulf States, and then focused on major Pacific exercises, such as TEAM SPIRIT—which he described as the largest regularly scheduled exercise in the free world. Admiral Trost discussed the importance of the Central America exercise program to US foreign policy objectives of deterring Nicaragua, reassuring Honduras, and upgrading Honduran facilities and joint US-Honduran force readiness.

All the Chiefs noted the continuity and political importance attached to these exercises by friendly governments. (For example, the UNITAS, Latin American naval exercise series is 27 years old.) All stressed the important role played by Guard and Reserve forces in these exercises.

The meeting was adjourned at 12:01 p.m. No decisions were requested. No follow-up action is required.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Michael Donley Files, Subject File, [Joint Chiefs of Staff] JCS Meeting with President 12/19/86. Top Secret. Brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original. Prepared by Donley. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.